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Quotes 
(3 are better than1) 
 
 
“If people are good only because they fear punishment, and hope for 




“There is no such thing as an accident, only a failure to recognise the 
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Abstract 
 
Subjective evidence suggests that the Safety Management Systems (SMSs) 
used to address hazards, manage and measure safety in aviation 
organizations may not be as effective as it is believed. As part of their SMS 
organizations use incident data to develop their Safety Performance 
Indicators (SPIs) to measure their performance and improve their safety 
levels. The use of low-quality data might lead organizations into not 
developing the appropriate SPIs thus resulting in misleading assessments of 
their safety performance. This thesis extends the work of Gerede (2015) and 
attempts to acquire deeper knowledge by performing, a series on in-depth 
interviews with participant followed by a structured questionnaire survey to 
obtain a better understanding of the factors impeding the effectiveness of their 
SMS. 
Initially in the first study, five aviation service providers participated in a study 
aiming to identify factors that impact the development of data to be used for 
the development of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). Safety managers 
were interviewed, and their comments analyzed using a grounded theory 
approach. The hindering factors were categorized and integrated into a model 
showing the factors that impede the development of safety data and thus 
impact the effectiveness of the SMS.  
Secondly, using the hindering factors derived from the preliminary study, an 
interview with the safety managers and safety officers from five aviation 
organizations was performed to investigate these hindering and underlying 
factors. Using thematic template analysis, their comments were categorized 
under main themes and subcategories. Although SMS regulations such as 
those in ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) Annex 19 are derived 
from the perspective of a North American and Western European Culture, the 
results of this thesis suggest that certain national cultural characteristics might 
impede the implementation of SMS in small Mediterranean countries. 
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Finally, in a survey study, a statistical analysis was performed to describe the 
perceptions of aviation organization employees which aims to confirm the 
findings from the previous studies. The study suggests that the identified 
factors, either individually or in combination may have an influence on the 
quality of data organizations collect for the development of their SPIs. The 
study suggests that there is a gap between actual performance of the SMS 
and reality. The results support a previous recent study regarding the 

















 9  
Publications Resulting from this Work 
 
Journal articles 
Ioannou, C., Harris, D. Dahlstrom N., (2017). Safety Management Practices 
hindering the development of safety performance indicators in aviation service 
providers. Aviation psychology and Applied Human Factors 7(2), 95-106. 
 
Industry presentations 
Is it working? Challenges in training people in SMS, Flight Safety Foundation, 
Larnaca, 2015 
The good, the bad and the ugly: The true story between SMS and reality, 
Middle East and North Africa Society of Air Safety Investigators (MENASASI) 
Dubai, 2016 
  
 10  
Table of Contents 
Publications Resulting from this Work ................................................................... 9 
List of figures ...................................................................................................... 15 
List of tables ....................................................................................................... 16 
Glossary .............................................................................................................. 17 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 19 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................................... 19 
1.2 Objectives and research questions ................................................................................................. 23 
1.3 Structure of the thesis .......................................................................................................................... 24 
2. Literature review............................................................................................. 27 
2.1 Air Ontario 1363 ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
2.2 Theoretical framework: this “Swiss Cheese” model ................................................................ 30 
2.2.1 The accident trajectory .................................................................................................................... 30 
2.3 Aviation Accident rates ........................................................................................................................ 32 
2.4 Safety Management Systems ............................................................................................................. 33 
2.4.1 Traditional safety management approaches ...................................................................... 33 
2.4.2 Performance based approaches ............................................................................................... 34 
2.5 Safety management practices for the success of safety management systems ............ 36 
2.5.1 Safety culture and safety relevant behaviour .................................................................... 39 
2.6 Reporting culture/systems, just culture and criminalization of human error ............. 43 
2.6.1 Reporting systems and just culture ......................................................................................... 43 
2.6.2 Criminalization of error .................................................................................................................... 46 
2.6.3 Media and populism .......................................................................................................................... 48 
2.6.4 Interference with safety reporting and disclosure of errors ....................................... 48 
2.6.5 Consequences of criminalizing human error ..................................................................... 49 
2.7 Measuring safety in civil aviation .................................................................................................... 50 
2.7.1 Safety Performance Indicators ................................................................................................... 51 
2.7.2 Lagging indicators .............................................................................................................................. 52 
2.7.3 Leading indicators .............................................................................................................................. 52 
2.7.4 The accident trajectory and leading/ lagging indicators .............................................. 53 
2.7.5 Functional areas and purpose of safety performance indicators .......................... 53 
2.8 Safety management practices creating challenges in the production of data to be 
used for the development of safety performance indicators ...................................................... 57 
 11  
2.9 And what’s next? ..................................................................................................................................... 58 
3. Overview of Methodology ............................................................................... 60 
3.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 60 
3.2 Research Paradigm ................................................................................................................................ 60 
3.2.1 Epistemology of a paradigm ........................................................................................................ 60 
3.2.2 Ontology of a paradigm ................................................................................................................... 61 
3.2.3 Methodology of a Paradigm ......................................................................................................... 62 
3.2.4 Axiology .................................................................................................................................................... 64 
3.3 Preliminary study................................................................................................................................... 65 
3.4 Qualitative Interview Study ............................................................................................................... 66 
3.5 Questionnaire study .............................................................................................................................. 67 
4. Preliminary study ............................................................................................ 69 
4.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 69 
4.2 Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 72 
4.2.1 Participants ............................................................................................................................................. 72 
4.2.2 Data Gathering ..................................................................................................................................... 72 
4.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................... 73 
4.3.1 Open Coding.......................................................................................................................................... 74 
4.3.2 Axial Coding ........................................................................................................................................... 74 
4.3.3 Selective Coding ................................................................................................................................. 75 
4.4 Data Analysis and Model Development ........................................................................................ 75 
4.5 Top Management’s Decisions Influencing Safety ...................................................................... 76 
4.5.1 Allocation of Resources .................................................................................................................. 76 
4.5.2 Allocation of Time ............................................................................................................................... 77 
4.5.3 Failure to Clarify Safety Commitment .................................................................................... 77 
4.5.4 Failure to Participate in the Safety Activities ...................................................................... 77 
4.5.5 Not Interested to Know or Learn Anything About Safety............................................ 77 
4.5.6 Delay in the Investigation of Accidents ................................................................................. 78 
4.6 Lack of Safety Culture ........................................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.1 Lack of Safety Promotion ............................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.2 Lack of Training ................................................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.3 Lack of Trust Between Personnel ............................................................................................. 81 
4.6.4 Lack of Attention to What the Employees Are Saying ................................................. 81 
4.6.5 Lack of Encouragement to Report by Top Management ........................................... 82 
4.6.6 Resistance to Change ..................................................................................................................... 83 
 12  
4.7 Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach .................................................................. 83 
4.7.1 Fear of Punishment That Impairs Reporting ...................................................................... 84 
4.7.2 Impracticality of Reporting System That Hinders the Reporting Process ........ 84 
4.8 A Model of Factors Impeding the production of quality data for the Development of 
SPIs ...................................................................................................................................................................... 85 
4.9 Results and Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 86 
4.9.1 The Perceived Role of Top Management ............................................................................ 86 
4.9.2 Lack of Safety Culture ..................................................................................................................... 90 
4.9.3 Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach ......................................................... 91 
4.10 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 92 
5. Interview Study ............................................................................................... 94 
5.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 94 
5.2 Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 95 
5.2.1 Participants ............................................................................................................................................. 95 
5.2.2 Data Gathering ..................................................................................................................................... 95 
5.3 Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................... 96 
5.4 Data analysis and model development.......................................................................................... 97 
5.5. Top management’s attitude towards safety ............................................................................. 101 
5.5.1. Top management’s commitment to safety ...................................................................... 101 
5.5.2. Management not interested to know anything about safety. ............................... 103 
5.5.3 Failure to participate in the safety activities ..................................................................... 106 
5.5.4 Failure to understand risks......................................................................................................... 107 
5.5.5 Allocation of financial resources ............................................................................................. 109 
5.5.6 Lack of staff-human resources ................................................................................................ 112 
5.5.7 Allocation of time .............................................................................................................................. 114 
5.6. Lack of safety promotion.................................................................................................................. 115 
5.6.1 Lack of encouragement ............................................................................................................... 115 
5.6.2 Lack of training. ................................................................................................................................. 117 
5.6.3 Just culture........................................................................................................................................... 117 
5.6.4 Blame culture ..................................................................................................................................... 117 
5.6.5 Fear culture ......................................................................................................................................... 118 
5.7 Resistance to change ........................................................................................................................... 119 
5.8 Deficient reporting system ............................................................................................................... 124 
5.8.1 Inadequacy of the reporting system ..................................................................................... 124 
5.8.2 Impracticality of the reporting system/process .............................................................. 126 
 13  
5.8.3 Selective reporting .......................................................................................................................... 127 
5.9 External factors ..................................................................................................................................... 129 
5.9.1 Government......................................................................................................................................... 129 
5.9.2 Outsourcing ......................................................................................................................................... 131 
5.9.3 Media ....................................................................................................................................................... 132 
5.9.4 Legal authorities ............................................................................................................................... 133 
5.9.5 National culture ................................................................................................................................. 134 
5.9.6 Family effect ........................................................................................................................................ 136 
5.10. Results and discussion ................................................................................................................... 136 
5.10.1 Top management’s behaviour towards safety ............................................................ 138 
5.10.2 Top management’s commitment to safety .................................................................... 138 
5.10.3 Allocation of resources .............................................................................................................. 140 
5.10.4 Safety culture ................................................................................................................................... 152 
5.10.5 Lack of safety promotion .......................................................................................................... 152 
5.10.6 Just culture ........................................................................................................................................ 153 
5.10.7 Resistance to change ................................................................................................................. 154 
5.10.8 Reporting systems/ Data collection ................................................................................... 155 
5.10.9 Deficient reporting systems .................................................................................................... 155 
5.10.10 Selective reporting ..................................................................................................................... 157 
5.10.11 External factors............................................................................................................................ 158 
5.11 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 161 
6. Survey study .................................................................................................. 163 
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 163 
6.2 Procedure ................................................................................................................................................ 163 
6.2.1 Questionnaire ..................................................................................................................................... 163 
6.3 Results ....................................................................................................................................................... 165 
6.4 Overview of analysis ........................................................................................................................... 165 
6.5 Initial Cronbach’s analysis of scale internal consistency ..................................................... 166 
6.6 Reliability ................................................................................................................................................. 169 
6.7 Confirmatory Factor Analysis ......................................................................................................... 172 
6.8 Final CFA model .................................................................................................................................... 176 
6.9 Path analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 177 
6.10 Discussion ............................................................................................................................................. 179 
6.11 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 183 
7. General discussion and conclusions ................................................................ 184 
 14  
7.1 General discussion ............................................................................................................................... 184 
7.2 Dryden accident and Safety Management today ..................................................................... 185 
7.3 Recommendations for safety management based on the findings: ................................. 186 
8.1 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 189 
8.2 Research contribution ........................................................................................................................ 190 
8.3 Suggested further research .............................................................................................................. 191 
References ......................................................................................................... 193 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................ 218 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................ 220 
Appendix C ........................................................................................................ 222 
Appendix D ........................................................................................................ 226 
Appendix E ........................................................................................................ 232 











 15  
List of figures 
Figure 1 structure of the thesis ...................................................................... 26 
Figure 2 Factors impeding the production and collection of the quality data 
required for the development of SPIs showing the gaps between SMS 
and actual performance .......................................................................... 87 
Figure 3 The final model showing the factors and the relationship between the 
factors impeding the production of data for the development of SPIs ... 138 
Figure 4 Final detailed model showing the influence of each factor on other 
factors ................................................................................................... 161 
Figure 5 Hypothesized model showing the factors impeding the production of 
quantity and quality safety data required for the development of SPIs, 
showing the gaps between SMS and actual performance. ................... 165 
Figure 6 The preliminary model showing the factors and the scales under 
each factor. ........................................................................................... 167 
Figure 7 Hypothesized initial model showing the relationship between the 
latent variables. ..................................................................................... 175 
Figure 8 Final CFA solution showing the correlation between the new latent 
variables. .............................................................................................. 177 
Figure 9 Path analysis model describing the impact of the safety management 
practices on the data collection, based on the meta-variables derived 




 16  
List of tables 
Table 1 Dimensions of the impeding factors of data collection used for the 
development of SPIs derived from the Open Coding process. ............... 78 
Table 2 Categories and subcategories of the factors impeding the 
performance of the SMS ....................................................................... 100 
Table 3 Showing the factors leading to the main problem, the main problems 
and the results deriving from the main problem .................................... 142 
Table 4 Summary of the factors hindering the production of safety data 
required for the development of SPIs. .................................................. 168 
Table 5 Reliability of safety management practices ..................................... 171 
Table 6 Initial descriptive statistics, inter-factor correlation among latent 
constructs  ............................................................................................ 173 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics showing the inter-factor correlation among latent 
constructs after removing the weak indicator variables  ....................... 174 









 17  
Glossary 
AGFI             Adjust goodness of fit 
AMA             American Medical Association 
APU              Auxiliary Power Unit 
ASMT           Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool 
ATM              Air Traffic Management  
EASA            European Aviation Safety Agency 
FDM             Flight data monitoring 
CANSO        Civil Air Navigation Services Organization 
CASS            Flight Safety Foundation’s Corporate aviation safety     seminar 
CFA              Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFI               Comparative Fit Index 
CRM             Crew Resource Management 
CST              Central Standard Time 
DF (df)         Degrees of Freedom 
EST              Eastern Standard Time 
FSF               Flight Safety Foundation 
GFI               Goodness of fit index 
HSE              Health and Safety Executive 
HRO             High Reliability Organizations 
HSLB           Accident Investigation Board Norway  
 18  
IAEA             International Atomic energy Agency 
IATA            International Air Transport Association 
ICAO           International Civil Aviation Organization 
NPP             Nuclear Power Plant 
NFI              Normed Fit Index 
NTSB          National Transportation Safety Board 
OECD         Organization for economic co-operation and development 
PCMCIA     Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
PGFI           Parsimony goodness of fit index 
RAT            Risk Analysis Tool 
RMSEA      Root mean square error of approximation 
SMM           Safety Management Manual 
SMS            Safety Management Systems 
SPIs            Safety Performance Indicators 
SSP            State Safety Program 
TOKAI        Toolkit for ATM occurrence investigation 
  
 19  
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
For the last five years, the accident statistics in the 2017 the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety report show a decrease in both number 
of accidents and the accident rate, while at the same time there was an 
increase in scheduled commercial departures.  This resulted in a global 
accident rate of 2.1 accidents per million departures, down by 25 per cent 
from the 2015 rate of 2.8 accidents per million departures. It all started in 
2010 when at the High-Level Safety Conference it was decided that there was 
a need for a new annex to the Chicago Convention dedicated to safety 
management. The decrease in the accident rate would have been difficult to 
achieve without the introduction of Safety Management Systems (SMS). The 
conference concluded that the management of safety should fall under the 
responsibility of the state to monitor the civil aviation safety under a State 
Safety Program (SSP), covering all aspects of civil aviation and a SMS is a 
requirement for each organization specific to their area of activity.  
1.1 Background 
A number of aviation accidents, such as the Dryden accident, Air France 447, 
and Helios 522 accidents, seems to reflect the “Swiss Cheese” model 
described by Reason (1990) which suggest that these accidents were not the 
result of one factor but a combination of several factors. These accidents 
suggest that a combination of factors may be present in system several years 
prior to the event.  This theoretical framework suggests an accident trajectory 
may result from a combination of organizational and managerial decisions 
which interact with various conditions in the workplace and with other 
personal and situational factors, leading to errors and violations. Only when 
these active and latent failures penetrate or bypass the organization’s multiple 
layers of defences will an accident occur. 
In order to reduce the accident rate, aviation organizations are now required 
to have an SMS (ICAO, 2013). According to the ICAO (2013), this is a system 
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to ensure the safe operation of aircraft through effective management of risk. 
To achieve this, the SMS is designed to continuously improve safety by 
identifying hazards, collecting and analysing data and continuously assessing 
risks. The primary objective of an SMS is to contain and mitigate risks 
proactively and prevent resulting incidents or accidents (Stolzer et al.,2018). 
Arendt and Adamski (2011) state: “Sound safety planning including hazards 
identification, risk management and safety assurance must be based on a 
thorough understanding of the processes and activities of people in the 
system and the other components of the systems and environments in which 
they work.”  
Organizations need to be able to determine whether their SMS is effective 
and working properly and to do this they need to have a reliable and valid 
instrument for measuring SMS effectiveness. Measuring and controlling 
performance is an essential part of the process. Setting goals, identifying 
activities to reach those goals and improving performance are all 
subcomponents. This requires measuring performance against pre-
established performance-level expectations and implementing changes to 
adjust performance to acceptable levels. The size and complexity of the SMS 
should be scaled to suit the size of the organization and it should incorporate 
a mechanism for maintaining and evaluating its effectiveness based on the 
four components of an SMS (ICAO, 2013; FAA, 2015).  These are:  
1. Safety policy and objectives. The safety policy establishes senior 
management’s commitment to continually improve safety. It defines the 
methods, processes, and organizational structure needed to meet 
safety goals.  
2. Safety risk management (SRM). SRM determines the need for and 
adequacy of new or revised risk controls based on the assessment of 
acceptable risk.  
3. Safety Assurance. Safety assurance evaluates the continued effectiveness 
of implemented risk control strategies and supports the identification of 
new hazards. 
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4. Safety Promotion. Safety promotion includes training, communication, and 
other actions to create a positive safety culture within all levels of the 
workforce.  
Although different manuals are published to assist in the implementation of 
the four components as mentioned in Annex 19, nevertheless, the ICAO SMS 
approach assumes a North American/ Western European perspective and 
ICAO assumes that the organizations implementing the SMS requirements 
are relatively large organizations with all the necessary resources. It is 
increasingly important that regulators understand the effects of national 
culture on attitudes and behaviour when designing programs in one country 
but which are required to be implemented in other countries. This research 
addresses the gap between regulatory requirements and reality, identifying 
the problems such organizations are facing while attempting to implement 
their SMS. 
Successful implementation of an SMS depends on the active participation of 
every employee in fulfilling their designated roles and emphasizes the active 
engagement of the entire organization serving as one team to proactively 
manage safety (Chen and Chen, 2014). Organizations have to evaluate SMS 
performance in terms of its effectiveness. Mathis (2014) suggests early 
metrics for measuring the effectiveness of programs were failure metrics; that 
is, they were reactive and measured accidents or incidents after they 
occurred. To achieve the main objective for measuring safety performance, is 
to provide an ongoing assurance that risks are controlled. 
The effectiveness of an SMS is evaluated by reviewing data and monitoring 
trends, and this can be performed quarterly by top management and monthly 
by the middle management. In some cases they will intervene when problems 
arise above the established acceptable levels of incidents. As long as they are 
not observing excessive numbers of adverse indicators, management 
operates under the assumption that their SMS is performing effectively 
(Stolzer et al., 2018). A literature review shows that some efforts have been 
made towards the development of SMS evaluation tools but close 
examination of these tools reveals short-comings. Thomas (2012) reviewed 
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year 2009 articles and found only 18 studies all of which used self-report 
metrics about the perceptions of safety within the organization to examine the 
effectiveness of the SMS.  He also found that there was general consistency 
in the relationship between SMS and safety. 
Deficiencies in organizations’ safety management practices, may result in 
SMSs that are not successful, yielding misleading results and impeding the 
organization from improving their safety performance.  
Several studies (Erikson, 2009; Oien et al., 2011b; Harms-Ringdahl, 2009; 
Hopkins, 2009a) have addressed the development of safety performance 
indicators (SPIs) and suggested what the quality characteristics of a safety 
performance indicator should be. ICAO (2013) defines an SPI as “a data-
based parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance”. 
Since the process of safety management involves the use of data, the quality 
of the data that are used to enable effective decision making must be 
considered throughout the development and implementation of an SMS. 
Unfortunately, many databases lack the data quality necessary to provide a 
reliable basis for evaluating safety priorities and the effectiveness of risk 
mitigation measures. Failure to account for the limitations of data used in 
support of safety risk management and safety assurance functions will result 
in flawed analysis results that may lead to faulty decisions and discredit the 
safety management process (ICAO,2013). 
This may suggest that good quality data will contribute in developing more 
reliable SPIs, which will yield better safety performance measurement and 
increase the success of the SMS. The scope of the work in this thesis is to 
identify those factors may impede the quality of the data used for the 
development of SPIs, particularly in smaller Mediterranean countries. The 
work involves interviews from safety managers and safety department 
employees, and a questionnaire survey of other employees such as air traffic 
controllers, pilots, cabin crew and engineers in aviation service providers. 
This thesis addresses the question concerning the quality of data the 
organizations rely on for the development of their SPIs and emphasizes the 
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importance of quality data in safety management systems in order to provide 
an accurate, reliable and representative picture of safety in the organization. 
The implementation of SMSs is quite recent, and organizations are still facing 
challenges with the collection of data to be used for the development of SPIs 
and measuring their performance. Hence, by using a combination of practical 
experience and theoretical knowledge, this thesis contributes by making a 
step forward towards identifying the factors may impede an organization from 
getting a clear image about safety in their organization. Safety performance is 
measured with same tools and techniques as those used in quality 
management and the standards by which they are measured are global in 
nature (Janicak, 2009). Evaluating the effectiveness of the SMS should be 
based on the four components of any SMS, and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of an SMS in aviation service providers, the audit questions developed reflect 
these four components of the SMS. While this thesis is concerned solely with 
aviation, some ideas presented in this document are applicable to other safety 
critical organizations such as oil and gas, and nuclear that are all required to 
have a safety management system for their operations. 
 
1.2 Objectives and research questions 
The objective of this PhD is to identify the factors that impede organizations 
from obtaining the data to be used for the development of their SPIs that they 
need to have as part of their SMSs for measuring and monitoring their safety 
performance. Particular emphasis is placed upon the implementation of SMSs 
in small Mediterranean aviation service providers.  
The literature review presented in Chapter 2, suggested that in accidents such 
as that at Dryden, had the required effective and adequate resources, 
regulations, procedures, training and policies been in place in March 10, 1989 
it is possible, and indeed likely, that the event sequence resulting in the 
accident would have been interrupted.  
This current work extends the work of Gerede (2015) who performed a two-
day workshop using nominal groups and brainstorming to identify the 
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problems with the implementation of the SMS. This study attempts to acquire 
deeper knowledge of the factors impeding the effectiveness of their SMS by 
performing, an extensive in-depth interview based study, followed by a 
structured questionnaire survey. 
To address the related research questions concerning the development of 
SPIs for implementation in aviation service provider SMSs, the following steps 
were taken: 
 A preliminary study which identified the factors that either individually 
or in combination impeded the successful collection of data used to 
develop the SPIs to measure the effectiveness of their SMS. 
 A follow-on larger interview-based study used the findings from the 
preliminary study as themes for further interview questions to uncover 
what safety managers perceived to be the hindering factors of the 
quality of their safety data and the effectiveness of their SMS. 
 A survey study used the theoretical framework to develop a 
questionnaire for aviation service providers’ employees.  This used 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and path analysis to validate the 
findings of the earlier interview-based, qualitative studies. The findings 
suggested that top management influenced the culture of the 
organization, and the presence of a just culture, resistance to change 




1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 considers the motivation for the thesis and its objectives. 
Then, Chapter 2 turns to the description of the theoretical framework 
underlying most aviation SMSs. The chapter is introduced by the Air Ontario 
accident to demonstrate the effect of latent failures in a system and discusses 
the need for SMSs and the use of SPIs.  
 25  
Chapter 3 discusses the research paradigm and the four elements that 
comprise the paradigm namely, epistemology, ontology, methodology and 
axiology.  
After this, Chapter 4 introduces the preliminary study in which safety 
managers expressed their views about SMSs and SPIs. Based on the data 
derived from the interviews, using a grounded theory approach, factors 
impeding the development of SPIs were identified.  
This is followed by Chapter 5 a larger interview study based upon the model 
derived in the previous chapter which identifies in depth the factors impeding 
the success of SMSs and the development of SPIs in aviation organizations.  
Chapter 6 is a questionnaire study which surveys the views of a wider number 
of employees related to the success of the SMS, again building on the 
theoretical model developed in the preceding chapter.  
Chapter 7 presents the general discussion, the Dryden accident and safety 
management today, and recommendations for safety management based on 
the findings of the accident. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of all three studies, conclusions, the research 
contribution and the suggested further research. 
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Figure 1 structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Air Ontario 1363 
At 11:55 EST (Eastern Standard Time) Air Ontario Flight 1363 departed 
Thunder Bay about one hour behind schedule. The aircraft landed at Dryden 
at 11:39 CST (Central Standard Time). The aircraft was being refuelled with 
one engine running, because of an unserviceable APU. Since no external 
power unit was available at Dryden, the engines couldn't be restarted in the 
case of an engine shutdown on the ground.  Although a layer of 1/8-1/4 inch 
of snow had accumulated on the wings, no de-icing was done because de-
icing with either engine running was prohibited by both Fokker and Air 
Ontario.  
At 12:09 CST the aircraft started its take-off roll using the slush-covered 
runway 29. The Fokker settled back after its first rotation and lifted off for the 
second time 5,700 feet down the 6,000-foot-long runway. No altitude was 
gained and the aircraft mushed in a nose-high attitude, striking trees. The 
aircraft crashed and came to rest in a wooded area, 3,156 feet past the 
runway end and caught fire. (Aviation safety network). 
When someone comes across to an accident scenario like the above, it is 
impossible that the reader will not begin to ask questions. Why did such an 
experienced crew, exposed throughout their career to similar conditions like 
Dryden, ignore all the tale-tale indicators presented to them the day of the 
accident? Why did two healthy, competent and properly certified professionals 
allow their fully equipped aircraft head to destruction taking them with it? Why 
do humans make such obvious and damaging errors (Maurino et al., 1995)? 
The answers to these questions will not be found by simply determining that it 
was human error but further away, within organizations, training departments 
and regulators (Maurino et al., 1995). A Commission of Inquiry was formed 
and the honourable Mr. Justice Virgil P. Moshanksky was appointed 
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commissioner. Moshansky disregarded what was considered to be obvious-
human errors and asked a multi-disciplinary team of investigators, safety 
specialists, Human Factors specialists, pilots, researchers, engineers and 
regulators, over a period of 20 months, to try to find answers behind the 
decisions taken by the flight crew (Maurino et al., 1995). 
Mr. Justice Virgil P. Moshanksky interpreted his mandate in this sense: 
 The mandate of this Commission was to investigate a specific air crash and 
to make recommendations to the interest of aviation safety. In carrying out 
this mandate it was necessary to conduct a critical analysis of the aircraft 
crew of Air Ontario, of Transport Canada and of the environment in which 
these elements interacted… I have adopted a system-analysis approach, with 
emphasis on an examination of human performance. (Moshansky, 1992, pp 
xxv) 
The commission did not try to produce any probable cause statement, neither 
did it try to condense the complex processes as presented in most aviation 
accidents. Instead, the commission produced a report blending 
recommendations and the identification of the latent failures with the potential 
to generate accidents similar to that at Dryden. The report identified the 
preconditions that may trigger the active failures of operational personnel in 
similar contexts (Maurino et al., 1995). The investigation of the Air Ontario 
crash was one of the first large scale investigations to take a systemic, 
organizational approach to the investigation of an accident. 
This statement from Moshansky reflects the analytical approach based upon 
Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model used in the analysis of Air Ontario 
flight 1363, which determined that the accident trajectory’s penetration of the 
system’s defensive layers, barriers should be kept in mind: 
The pilot in command made a flawed decision but the decision was not made 
in isolation. It was made in the context of an integrated air transportation 
system that, if it had been functioning properly, should have prevented the 
decision to take off…there were significant failures, most of them beyond the 
captain’s control, that had an operational impact on the events at Dryden…the 
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regulatory, organizational, physical and crew components must be examined 
to determine how each may have influenced the captain’s decision 
(Moshansky, 1992, p. 1102). 
The analysis of the accident was worked backwards: from the accident and 
the surrounding events to the latent failures and flawed organizational 
procedures. The analysis was built around four major areas: failed defences, 
unsafe acts, error- producing conditions and latent organizational failures 
(Maurino et al., 1995). 
Accidents like Dryden and similar accidents, teach us that even if we remove 
from the accident the active failures meaning that the crash wouldn’t have 
happened, the flawed organizational processes and the latent failures would 
still remain in the system (Maurino et al., 1995). Removal of active failures 
does not mean that the accident would not happen somewhere else, given the 
degree of ‘sickness’ and the numerous pathogens remaining hidden in the 
system. On the contrary, based on experience from other accidents in 
complex sociotechnical systems, if we remove the latent failures and the 
organizational pathogens, the active failures may disappear. 
When the time came to conclude the report after 20 months of investigation, 
Mr Justice Moshansky concluded: 
Captain Morwood, as the pilot in command, must bear the responsibility for 
the decision to land and take off in Dryden on the day in question. However, it 
is equally clear that the transportation system failed him by allowing him to be 
placed in a situation where he did not have all the necessary tools that should 
have supported him in making the proper decision (Moshansky, 1992 p. 
1131). 
This statement plays an important role in the subsequent improvement of 
safety and effectiveness in modern, complex sociotechnical systems. The 
flight crew, cabin crew, Systems Operations Controls dispatchers, ground 
handlers any other personnel involved in context surrounding the crash of the 
Air Ontario failed and the last line of defence also failed to prevent the 
accident. But if we are seeking improvements in safety and effectiveness in 
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sociotechnical systems, rather than hide everything under the rug, we need to 
examine the organizational processes that generate the holes in these 
defences. The report has taught us an important lesson: although there is no 
substitute for a properly trained and professional flight crew, no matter how 
hard they try, no matter how professional they are, no matter how concerned 
they are and how much they care, humans can never outperform the system 
which bounds them and constrains them (Maurino et al., 1995). It’s only a 
matter of time, and sooner or later system flaws inevitably will defeat 
individual human performance. 
Moshansky (1992) in the introduction of his findings wrote: 
“The accident at Dryden on March 10, 1989, was not the result of one cause 
but a combination of several related factors. Had the system operated 
effectively, each of the factors might have been identified and corrected 
before it became significant. It will be shown that this accident was the result 
of an overall failure in the air transportation system”. 
2.2 Theoretical framework: this “Swiss Cheese” model 
A survey of the Human Factors literature (Hollnagel, 1993) revealed that the 
contribution of human error in the breakdown of hazardous technologies has 
increased to more than 80% and it has become apparent that these 
contributory factors were not restricted to the sharp (operational) end.  
Accidents such as that at Dryden indicate that the human contributions to 
major accidents are distributed widely within the organization as a whole and 
may be present several years prior to the final event. Those concerned with 
analysing the causes of such organizational accidents are faced with the 
challenge to develop a theoretical framework that could be meaningfully 
applied retrospectively to particular events (such as the Dryden crash) as well 
as proactively to complex socio-technical systems (Maurino et al., 1995). 
2.2.1 The accident trajectory 
Reason (1997) suggests that there are two kinds of accidents: the ones that 
happen to individuals and the ones that happen to organizations. 
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Organizational accidents are comparatively rare but when they happen, they 
are often catastrophic events that occur within complex modern socio-
technical systems such as nuclear power plants, aviation, the petrochemical 
industry, marine, rail, transport. Organizational accidents have multiple 
causes involving many people operating at different levels within their 
organization. Organizational accidents may be truly accidental in the way in 
which the various contributing factors combine to cause the bad outcome but 
there is nothing accidental about the existence of their precursors nor in the 
conditions that created them. All organizational accidents entail breaching of 
barriers and safeguards. 
In the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Reason, 1997), an organization’s layers of 
defenses against failures are characterized as a series of barriers, 
metaphorically represented as slices of cheese. The holes in the cheese 
slices represent individual weaknesses in individual parts of the system that 
are shifting around, shrinking, expanding continually varying in size and 
position in all the slices. For an organizational accident to take place, it is 
necessary that a rare conjunction of a set of holes in successive defences 
(represented) as slices of cheese, allow hazards to come into damaging 
contact with people and assets (Reason, 1997). These “windows of 
opportunity” are rare because of the multiple defences and the mobility of the 
holes.  The system as a whole produces failures when holes in all of the slices 
momentarily align, permitting "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a 
hazard passes through holes in all of the defenses, leading to an accident. 
Active failures in the defences can create holes in at least two ways: front line 
personnel may deliberately disable certain defences to achieve local 
operational objectives or they may unwittingly fail in their role as one of the 
system’s most important line of defence. Latent failures, such defensive 
weaknesses, will be present from the very beginning of a system’s productive 
life, or will develop unnoticed or uncorrected during its subsequent operations. 
The framework traces the development of an accident sequence from 
organizational and managerial decisions, to various conditions in the 
workplace and to personal and situational factors leading to errors and 
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violations. The Swiss cheese framework (Reason, 1990) suggests that 
accidents in which pre-existing and often long-standing latent failures arise in 
the organizational and managerial sectors, combine with local triggering 
conditions on the flight deck, in the air traffic control centre and/or in 
maintenance facilities, to penetrate or bypass aviation system’s multiple 
defences (Maurino et al., 1995). The framework suggests that active and 
latent failures breach the system’s various defences (or bypass some or all of 
the defences or safeguards) leading to an accident (Maurino et al., 1995). 
Researchers and practitioners are now concerned with specifying these 
organizational preconditions to enhance crisis management, safe 
performance and risk handling in complex and hazardous situations (Pidgeon, 
1997).  Turner’s case study work (1978) revealed that there are always many 
preconditions in the lead up to a disaster some originating several years prior 
to the actual event itself. 
2.3 Aviation Accident rates 
Accident statistics in the ICAO 2017 Safety Report, for the last five years 
show, a decrease in both the overall number of accidents as well as the 
accident rate. In 2016 the downward trend in the number of accidents 
continued with 75 accidents reported, representing an 18 per cent decrease 
from 2015. Over the same period there was in increase in scheduled 
commercial departures which resulted in a global accident rate of 2.1 
accidents per million departures, down by 25 per cent from the 2015 rate of 
2.8 accidents per million departures.  
According to Aviation Safety Network (2017) data, despite several high-profile 
accidents, 2016 was a very safe year, showing a very low total of 19 fatal 
airline accidents resulting in 325 fatalities and making it the second safest 
year ever, both by number of fatal accidents as well as in terms of fatalities. 
Commercial air transport accidents in 2016 resulted in 182 fatalities, which is 
a return to a similar level as 2013 when there were just 173 fatalities. The two 
intervening years saw a spike in fatalities due to a number of acts of unlawful 
interference that resulted in a large number of casualties. In 2015 Aviation 
Safety Network recorded 16 accidents and in 2014, 21 accidents (including 
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terrorism) with 990 fatalities, while in 2013, 29 accidents were recorded and a 
total of 265 lives were lost. Given the expected worldwide air traffic of about 
35,000,000 flights, the accident rate was one fatal passenger flight accident 
per 3,200,000 flights (Aviation Safety Network).  
The low number of accidents comes as no surprise.  According to Aviation 
Safety Network President Harro Ranter: “Since 1997 the average number of 
airliner accidents has shown a steady and persistent decline, for a great deal 
thanks to the continuing safety-driven efforts by international aviation 
organizations such as ICAO, IATA, Flight Safety Foundation and the aviation 
industry.” (Aviation Safety Network, 2017) 
In point of fact, ICAO recognizing the need to carry out aviation activities 
safely and that the public’s perception of aviation safety was based on the 
number of aviation accidents rather than the accident rate, issued a resolution 
in 2003 to reduce the number of accidents (ICAO, 2003:67). Nevertheless, 
despite the reduction in the accident rate, the expected increase in the volume 
of international civil aviation will result in an increasing number of aircraft 
accidents unless the rate is further reduced. Improvements in the accident 
rate will require new approaches on the part of all participants in the aviation 
industry, including ICAO, member states, aircraft manufacturers and 
operators, and in particular by adopting a pro-active, risk analysis-based 
approach that recognizes that the human element in the aviation system is of 
paramount importance to accident prevention initiatives and aviation safety 
(ICAO, 2003:67).  As such, SMSs are expected to significantly improve 
aviation safety (Gerede, 2015b). 
2.4 Safety Management Systems 
2.4.1 Traditional safety management approaches 
Based on the assumption that the aviation system operates as it should do, 
the traditional safety paradigm sees the world as it should be, providing a 
description of the ideal world and argues that aviation service providers need 
to comply with the prescribed order (Gerede, 2015a, b). Compliance with 
prescriptive regulations is the tool that is used for safety improvement (ICAO, 
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2009:2-32; ICAO, 2013:3-13,3-11; Zimmermann et al., 2011; Maher et 
al.,2011). Traditional safety management approaches that use audits in their 
practices to ensure compliance fail to see the system as a whole, disregard 
subsystem interactions and depend upon reactive tools for analysis (ICAO, 
2013a: 2-32; ICAO, 2009:3-10,3-11, 3-13). Prescriptive regulations are 
generic tools used by all aviation service providers at regional, national and 
international level. Because these are generic tools, these regulations may 
not be able to address all the specific hazards that are likely to be present in 
individual aviation organizations and in different contexts and may be 
ineffective against the hazards that arise. Although regulatory compliance is 
achieved, there might still be unique organizational and contextual factors that 
contribute to people making errors and as a consequence, diminish safety 
(Safety Management International Collaboration Group, 2010).  
2.4.2 Performance based approaches 
ICAO realized that as the aviation system has become more complex, with 
human performance and limitations and the impact of organizational 
processes, it was no longer be possible to exert control using simple 
regulations that would be sufficient to ensure safety (Transportation Research 
Board, 2009:7; ICAO, 2009:3-13). Experience has shown that to reduce the 
likelihood of an accident reactive changes in regulations need to be changed 
to a pro-active system which attempts to anticipate potential safety risks, 
rather than waiting for something to happen and then developing the 
necessary regulations. ICAO therefore introduced Annex 19, Safety 
Management Systems (EU:COM/2011/0670). The civil aviation authority of 
New Zealand describes SMSs as a formal risk management framework 
to improve safety. In an SMS, organizations have systems for hazard 
identification and risk management, safety targets and reporting processes, 
procedures for audit, investigation, and implementing remedial actions to 
improve performance and safety promotion and training. 
This relatively new safety paradigm does not prescribe how the world should 
be but considers how it really is.  The paradigm goes beyond regulatory 
compliance and suggests a systems and performance-based approach 
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(ICAO, 2009:3-13; ICAO, 2012a: 2-5, 2-32; Oster et al., 2013; Zimmermann et 
al., 2011; Lofquist, 2010). The systems approach takes into consideration 
hazards and risks that might result from the interaction of hardware and 
liveware (Edwards, 1972). Using this approach, it is possible to determine the 
hazards and risks deriving from the interaction of systems and subsystems 
(Gerede 2015a; Lofquist, 2010). Seeing the world as it is also means 
evaluating the role of human factors, which is the most important component 
of the system (Lofquist, 2010). It makes it possible to detect organizational 
and contextual hazards and risks which go unnoticed by prescriptive 
regulations covering more general hazards and risks (Gerede, 2015a). 
A performance-based approach combines prescribed standards with the 
performance standards expected from aviation organizations to demonstrate 
continuous improvements in safety performance but while at the same time 
complying to the regulations (ICAO, 2013:2-5, 2-32).  Any SMS will need to 
provide in a timely manner accurate and rich data proactively to measure the 
organization’s performance and for future prediction (United Kingdom Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2014). To be proactive, measure safety performance and 
make future predictions, organizations need both top-down and bottom-up 
organizational communication, a reporting culture, a learning culture, top 
management commitment, participation of employees, safety commitment 
and a positive safety culture (Gerede, 2015a). All of these safety management 
activities are important for the effectiveness of an SMS. 
Although different manuals are published to assist in the implementation of 
Annex 19, (e.g. Safety Management Manual - SMM 3rd edition, 2013; UK 
CAA, CAP 795), these manuals are considered to be guidance material to be 
used for regulatory compliance. Practitioners in the aviation industry use 
these materials to comply with the regulations. Nevertheless, the ICAO SMS 
approach assumes a North American/ Western European perspective and it is 
also assumed that the organizations implementing the SMS’s requirements 
are relatively large with the necessary resources. It is increasingly important 
that regulators understand the effects of national culture on attitudes and 
behaviour when designing programs in one country but which are required to 
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be implemented in other countries. This research addresses the gap between 
regulatory requirements and reality, identifying the problems that 
organizations from smaller Mediterranean countries are facing while 
attempting to meet these international regulatory requirements. 
2.5 Safety management practices for the success of safety management 
systems 
The use of SMS programs to manage major hazards were used in Nuclear 
power plants before it was introduced into aviation. The primary objective of 
an SMS program is to establish a safety culture which can detect and correct 
safety-related problems before these result in an accident (Lewis, 2008). The 
SMSs used in organizations comprise a set of policies and practices aimed at 
positively impacting workers’ attitudes and behaviours with regard to risk and 
thereby decreasing their unsafe acts, raising awareness, and increasing 
understanding and commitment (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007).  
Studies in other industries with similar safety management systems 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007) including construction (Aksorn & Hadikusumo, 
2008; Ismail et al., 2012), shipping (Bhattacharya & Tang, 2013), hazardous 
chemical industries (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2009), have identified common 
critical components for improving the performance of an SMS as well as 
barriers to its successful implementation. Findings from studies that have 
demonstrated a relationship between safety management practices and 
safety performance, although conducted in other socio-technical systems, can 
make beneficial contributions to improving the performance of SMSs in 
aviation organizations. 
Research as early as the 1970s suggested that the success of safety 
programs in organizations depended upon certain safety practices that could 
successfully deal with “people” variables. Cohen (1977), Cohen et al. (1975), 
DePasquale and Geller (1999), Griffiths (1985), Harper et al. (1997), Shafai-
Sahrai (1971), Shannon et al (1996, 1997), Smith et al. (1975), Lee, (1998), 
Ostrom et al., (1993) all observed that organizations with lower accident rates 
were characterized by just a few factors including: management showing 
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personal involvement in safety activities; high quality training for new 
employees and re-current training for existing employees; display of safety 
posters for identifying hazards; daily communication between workers and 
supervisors; frequent safety inspections; high priority to safety meetings and 
decisions concerning working practices; thorough investigation of accidents; 
and empowerment of the workforce. 
 Zohar (1980) found that management’s commitment to safety was a major 
factor influencing the success of SMSs in organizations. In the mid-1980s, 
after the Chernobyl accident, focus was placed on safety culture due to 
several safety deficiencies in the Chernobyl power plant such as ambiguous 
operating procedures, flawed designs and safety features, breaching of safety 
rules by operating staff, lack of competence, and pressures to meet 
production goals.  
Worker involvement has been considered as a decisive factor in safety 
management by Lee (1998), Rundmo (1994), Dedobbeleer and Belard 
(1991), Shannon et al., (1996), and Cox and Cheyne (2000). There are 
different degrees of employee participation, ranging from no participation to 
full participation. Since employees are the ones who are actively involved in 
their work, they are also the best qualified people to make suggestions for 
improvements. It was suggested that management should consult with them 
before taking the final decision, especially for decisions that affect these 
employees (Vredenburgh, 2002). Employee involvement is a behaviourally-
oriented technique used in the bottom-up communication and decision-
making processes in an organization. Several studies (Vredenburgh, 2002; 
Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Mearns et al., 2003) have shown that safety 
performance was influenced by the level of communication within 
organizations and that regular communication about safety issues between 
management, middle management and the workforce was an effective 
practice to improve safety. Communication also includes feedback, hazard 
reporting systems, an open-door policy for safety issues, and the opportunity 
to discuss safety in meetings. Vredenburgh (2002) also included worker 
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participation, safety training, reward systems, management’s commitment and 
communication feedback. 
The use of incentives, awards and recognition to motivate employees to 
report and perform safely is an accepted organizational practice to improve 
safety management (Hagan et al., 2001). A well-designed reward system 
offering recognition can help to modify behaviour (Vredenburgh, 2002). This 
study also suggested that these safety management practices helped to 
improve safety performance and safety promotion policies.  Rewards and 
incentives for reporting hazards further created employees’ awareness by 
organizing programs, safety week promotions, and inducing healthy 
competition to report hazards and unsafe conditions, encouraging supervisors 
to make workers report safety matters. 
Galotti (2006) suggested that even though it has been a number of decades 
since Cohen’s research (1977), successful safety management programs still 
depend on those practices that can deal with employees’ participation. One of 
the important ways to achieve the successful implementation of an SMS is to 
ensure that all employees participate in the system and fulfil their role, as the 
system is comprised by a set of processes which manage safety across intra-
departmental boundaries (Galotti, 2006).  
Findings from studies suggest that the implementation of safety management 
practices benefit organizations’ safety performance (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 
2010). Research has been on-going in an attempt to identify all the 
management practices that can enhance safety management programs. 
There have been a number of studies attempting to identify specific safety 
management practices that can predict safety performance (Vinodkumar and 
Bhasi, 2010). Safety training provides the means to make accidents more 
predictable (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010). Training as a safety management 
practice included training of new employees, recurrent training for existing 
employees, discussion of safety issues in training sessions, training for 
emergency situations, encouragement to attend training and hazard 
assessment training (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010). 
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Employees’ perceptions about the SMS practices of their companies can be 
interpreted as their insights concerning how greatly their airline (or other 
aviation organizations) values safety and their perceptions of the 
effectiveness of adopting such a proactive safety approach in the organization 
(Chen and Chen, 2014). Their findings suggest that the more positively the 
employees perceive the SMS practices within their airlines, the stronger the 
motivation they have to perform the required safety-related behaviours.  Chen 
and Chen (2014) revealed that positive perceptions of their airline’s SMS 
practices had significant and positive effects on their safety motivation, 
compliance and participation. This implies that the more effort aviation 
organizations make in the implementation of their SMS, the more likely that 
the employees will acknowledge the benefits that the SMS has in enhancing 
the organization’s operational safety. When employees appreciate the efforts 
that their organization is making, they will work even harder to meet their job 
requirements and will have more incentives to participate in safety-related 
activities and safety programs (Chen and Chen, 2014).  
A better understanding of employees’ viewpoints regarding SMS practices in 
their organization will help to improve SMS practices. But one thing that is 
accepted by all is that safety management practices play a vital role in forming 
the safety culture in the organization (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010). Zohar 
(2010) claims that research over the past 30 years has demonstrated safety 
culture is a robust predictor of safety outcomes across industries and 
countries. 
2.5.1 Safety culture and safety relevant behaviour 
2.5.1.1 Safety culture 
Organizational climate is described as the enduring and perceived quality of 
the inner environment and features of an organization, which can be 
influenced by people working within the organization (Von Rosenstiehl & 
Nerdinger, 2011).   
Organizational safety climate has been suggested as having a fundamental 
effect on safety behaviours (Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Fogarty and Shaw, 
 40 
2010).  Reviews of safety climate literature (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 
2007) suggest that management’s attitudes and behaviours to be the 
predominant safety climate factors.  
Organizational culture is different from organizational climate and reflects the 
usual and habituated way of thinking and acting in organization.  
A popular theoretical notion that arises from the world of risk management, is 
that of an organizational safety culture. Safety culture was first mentioned in 
the investigation of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 where 
a poor safety regime was declared as a major contributory factor 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986). The interest in safety culture can 
be traced back to this accident and to the human preconditions prior to that 
event (Pidgeon, 1991).  Human preconditions that contributed in part to the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster were considered by some, in hindsight to be 
evidence of a poor safety culture. However, some authors (Olson, 1987; 
Wagenaar et al., 1994) note that there are formidable measurement 
difficulties associated with demonstrating whether safety improvements will be 
unambiguously reflected in accident statistics. 
Safety culture can be assessed based on the presence of a number of 
underlying components including: an informed workforce (shared safety 
information), incident/accident/hazard reporting (open communication of 
mistakes), just culture (fair treatment of employees), learning organisation 
(continuous improvement) and flexible culture (adaptation to unexpected 
situations), management safety attitudes (a genuine commitment to safety), 
safety-relevant behaviour (involvement, teamwork, responsibility) and risk 
perception (awareness of operational threats); (Ek, Akselsson, & Johansson, 
2003; Ek & Arvidsson, 2002; Guldenmund, 2000; Hopkins, 2006; Reason, 
1997; Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
Good safety culture might both reflect and be promoted by at least four facets: 
top management safety commitment to safety, shared care and concern 
about hazards and a solicitude over their impacts upon people; realistic and 
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flexible rules about hazards; and continual reflection upon practice through 
monitoring, analysis and feedback systems (Pidgeon, 1997). 
Organizational practices affecting the performance and reliability of safety 
systems are the ways in which safety is managed in aviation organizations 
which lead to either a positive or an apathetic safety culture (Reason 1993, 
1997). Aspects of safety culture are found in the shared attitudes of care and 
concern throughout the organization (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 1995) and in the 
visible commitment to safety of senior management (Droste, 1997). 
2.5.1.2 National culture in aviation 
Aviation statistics suggest that more than 70% of aviation accidents are 
caused by human error (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). The aviation industry 
has expanded human factors training beyond the human-machine interface to 
embrace psychological areas such as communication, leadership, 
performance under stress, interpersonal relations and decision making 
(Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich, 1993). Evidence suggests that these areas are 
all influenced by national culture (Bond, 1988; Hofstede, 1991; Berry, 
Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992). National culture is defined as the attitudes, 
values, behaviors, beliefs, symbols and customs associated with a national 
group membership (Meshkati, 1994).  Understanding the effects of national 
culture on attitudes and behaviour has always been important in global 
aviation. It is becoming increasingly important as international mergers 
become more commonplace, as more airlines employ personnel from different 
backgrounds and as training programs or regulations which are designed in 
one country but implemented in other countries (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). 
Empirical findings have demonstrated large cross-national differences in 
attitudes regarding task performance across several work domains including 
aviation (Hofstede, 1980; Merritt, 1996; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). Despite 
these findings, it seems that aircraft manufacturers, training organizations and 
airlines still operate under the assumption that the flying task is generic and 
that all pilots view automation and the use of automation similarly, whatever 
their background. Studies in aviation (Helmreich et al. 2001), more relevant to 
the cockpit, have shown that three sub-cultures can influence crew 
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performance: professional culture of the pilots, the culture of the organizations 
and the national culture surrounding individuals and the organizations. 
National culture may be responsible for differences in attitudes toward 
automation and as well differences in attitudes toward interpersonal 
interactions on the flight deck (Foslin et al.,1979; Moghaddam, Taylor and 
Wright, 1993; Yamaguchi,1994; Helmreich, Merritt, & Sherman, 1996; Merritt 
& Helmreich, 1996, 1997). The three cultures, professional, organizational 
and national can have both positive and negative impact on the safe 
operations and its responsibility of the organizations to minimize the negative 
components of each type of culture while emphasizing the positive.  Geert 
Hofstede’s four-dimensional model of culture was the starting point of 
examining the effects of national culture on behaviour. A significant amount of 
data suggested that there were substantial differences in the way pilots 
performed their work influenced by their national culture and those areas of 
difference had implications for safety. (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Johnston, 
1993; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996a; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996b; Sherman, 
Helmreich, & Merritt, 1997). Research into the effects of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training has shown that attitudes about the conduct of 
flight are amendable through training but on the contrary, attitudes that are 
related to strong cultural norms are more difficult to modify because they are 
deep rooted in strong value systems (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1991; Sherman, 
Helmreich & Merritt, 1997). 
2.5.1.3 Attitudes and Behaviour 
Major accident investigations such as the Baker report (2007) on the 
Deepwater Horizon, have showed that top management has a particular 
influence on organizational safety (Fruhen et al., 2014b). Top management 
can influence up to 45% of an organization’s performance (Day and Lord, 
1988) and can have a significant influence on organizational safety (Clarke, 
1999).  Other studies (Beus, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009) identified the 
perceptions of management’s safety commitment as one of the most 
influential safety climate components in relation to organizational safety 
performance.  
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There are a number of studies showing that attitudes and behaviours are 
significantly associated with each other (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 
1988). Managers’ attitudes affect behavioural intentions and managers’ 
behaviour is related to the achievement of safe working practices (Rundmo 
and Hale, 2003). Attitudes affect the decisions of the top and middle 
management and also influence the conditions under which employees will 
take a decision. Management attitudes affect priorities, such as policy about 
safety, and they also affect, either directly or indirectly, employee attitudes 
and behaviour (Rundmo and Hale, 2003).  The attitudes demonstrated by 
managers that are considered as ideal by Rundmo and Hale (2003) are the 
ones that the managers have for detecting and controlling hazards, prioritizing 
them, choosing good solutions, implementing these solutions, and monitoring 
and learning from them. They also need to have the relevant knowledge to 
carry out the required steps and they need to make available resources such 
as time, money, competence and equipment for the tasks, giving them priority 
and without shifting their responsibility to others. The ideal safety attitude 
(Rundmo and Hale, 2003) is the one that contributes to enhancing safety by 
encouraging appropriate behaviours.  Management that is committed and 
involved in safety promotion leads to lowering the frequency of 
accidents/incidents.  
2.6 Reporting culture/systems, just culture and criminalization of human 
error 
2.6.1 Reporting systems and just culture 
The main advantage of critical incident reporting is the opportunity to act to 
prevent accidents before losses have occurred (Tarrants, 1963). Reporting 
means collecting data for proactivity, which is a crucial element of an SMS 
(ICAO, 2013a: 2-16, 2-17). However, Hopkins (2009a) argued that there are 
circumstances in which there is no need to make use of precursor events to 
evaluate the effectiveness of an SMS. Precursor events are warning signs; 
companies need to seek out these warnings and act on these signs. 
Organizations need to develop reporting systems to capture such information. 
Research shows that virtually every major accident is preceded by such 
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warning signs and that the accident would not have occurred had the 
organization concerned responded to these warnings (Turner, 1978).   
Gerede’s study (2015b) has shown that a poor reporting culture is one 
possible challenge to the implementation of an SMS. If people report their 
honest mistakes in a just culture, they will not be blamed (Dekker, 2007b). 
The reason for not being blamed is that the organization can benefit much 
more by learning from the mistakes that were made than they can from 
blaming the people who made them (Dekker, 2007b).  As a result, people 
should feel free to report. The problem is that often, they don’t feel free and 
they don’t report. This is because they perceive reporting as being risky. Many 
things are not clear: who is going to read the report and how are they going to 
report? What are the rights and obligations of the reporter? Will the reported 
information stay within the organization or will other parties such as media 
and will the prosecutor have access to it (Dekker, 2007c)? People fail to 
report, not because they want to be dishonest, but because they fear the 
consequences, or they believe that nothing meaningful will be done as a 
result. Other reasons why people fail to report may be that either people do 
not know the consequences of reporting, fear of the unknown, or the 
consequences of reporting really can be bad and people fear invoking such 
consequences.  Alternatively, people know the consequences but feel that 
there is no point in reporting because the organization will not do anything 
with the report anyway.  
In the aftermath of an incident, judicial proceedings can make people stop 
reporting incidents. Dekker (2007c) discusses the instance where an air traffic 
service provider reported a 50 per cent drop in reported incidents in the year 
following the criminal prosecution of the Controllers involved in a runway 
incursion incident. The threat of criminal prosecution can make people 
hesitant about coming forward with safety information and this can create a 
climate of fear, making people reluctant to share information. Judicial 
proceedings can help to stigmatize personnel and present an incident as 
something shameful. This sends the message to everyone in the industry that 
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incidents are something professionally embarrassing and if it is not possible to 
avoid them, they should be hidden (Dekker, 2007a).  
Challenges related to reporting can also become an obstacle in organizational 
learning. To be able to learn from lessons in the past and to assure safety in 
the future, it is necessary to collect safety-related data and extract information 
from this data (Gerede, 2015b). Incident data is an important element of an 
SMS as from incident data, safety metrics can be derived and quantitative risk 
assessments can be conducted (Wilke et al., 2014). Yet, the quality of the 
incident data resident in an organizational database influences the results.  
The output of any data analysis is limited by the quality of the data collected 
(Wilke et al., 2014). Unsuccessful reporting is likely to hinder hazard 
identification and risk analysis, risk mitigation measures the measurement of 
safety performance (including safety performance monitoring over time), 
finding root causes of factors that compromise safety, predicting the future, 
and taking measures for the management of change (Gerede, 2015b).  The 
most significant challenges are those affecting reporting which are derived 
from a poor reporting culture. 
Sagan (1993) suggests that there is a catalogue of political barriers to active 
learning, as parochial conflicts lead to faulty reporting of incidents, secrecy 
and the normalization of errors in the face of external accountability (Rijpma, 
1996). What seems to be at the centre of this issue is the institutional notion 
of ‘blame’. Douglas (1992) pointed out that ‘danger’ and ‘blame’ have been 
ubiquitous features in societies over the years used as a means to defend 
favoured institutional arrangements. Ironically, nowadays, risk management 
and its assessment are also concerned with the possibilities for blame 
(Pidgeon, 1997). Knowing that responsibility brings accountability, 
consequently blame for accidents will be apportioned with possible legal 
sanctions invoked; organizations and individuals might need to examine their 
activities and act in good faith. On the other hand, if a “culprit” has to be found 
whenever an error has occurred, the process of political sensemaking will 
emphasize the avoidance of blame rather than open critique and honesty. 
Therefore, efforts to motivate people to act safely through sanctions may be 
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self-defeating and result in poor or incomplete information, which is a 
precondition to vulnerability. If politics and blame do corrupt the possibilities 
for organizational learning, then the most important challenge resides in the 
ways by which such actions might be counteracted (Sagan, 1994). The 
question is how to embed successfully into a reporting system the social, 
political organizational and national context (Pidgeon, 1997). 
Beck (1992) suggested that there has been a reduction in the acceptance of 
risk altogether, with the expectation that some safety-critical activities are 
accident free, with zero tolerance of failure. The increasingly flawless 
performance of some systems may have created a societal belief in their 
infallibility and intolerance of failure (Amalberti, 2001). Experts are expected to 
analyse and make accidents comprehensible, which often means explaining 
which factors were not controlled and by whom. The accident has to go on to 
someone’s account (Douglas, 1992). 
2.6.2 Criminalization of error 
Aviation and healthcare sectors are both reporting an increase in the 
criminalization of human error (Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou, 2010; 
Michaels, 2008; Pandit, 2009; Ter Kulle, 2004; Thomas, 2007) and automatic 
criminal prosecution after an aviation accident has become a common 
practice in most countries (FSF, 2006; ICAO, 2007). In aviation, the criminal 
prosecution (mostly of front line operators) after an aviation accident has 
occurred in the Netherlands (Ruitenberg, 2002), England (Wilkinson, 1994), 
Spain (Brothers and Maynard, 2008), France (Esler, 2009), Italy (Learmount 
and Modola, 2004), Greece, Cyprus (Mail, 2009), the United States (Michaels, 
2008) Taiwan (Thomas, 2002) and as well in other countries (Dekker, 2011). 
Dave Adams, a partner at Chicago-based aviation litigators 
Prangle & Schoonveld said in a speech to the Flight Safety Foundation’s 
Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar (CASS) in San Antonio, “Since 1955, there 
have been 55 accidents resulting in criminal trials.” However, 28 of them have 
occurred since 2000, confirming this increase. A major percentage of those 
prosecutions have taken place in Europe, Asia and Africa (AIN online, 2012) 
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In the aftermath of several accidents and incidents (Wilkinson, 1994; 
Ballantyne, 2002; Ruitenberg, 2002), the people involved (pilots and air traffic 
controllers) were charged with criminal offences such as professional 
negligence or manslaughter (Dekker, 2003). Criminal charges differ from civil 
lawsuits mainly because the target is not an organization but individuals (e.g. 
flight crew, air traffic controllers, mechanics) who were involved in the 
accident or incident (Dekker, 2002). The fear and threat of criminal charges 
will make employees stop sending safety related information and incident 
reporting will then stop (Ruitenberg, 2002; North, 2000). In fact, blaming and 
punishing individuals does not make the individual act more safely; indeed, 
the very idea that vicarious learning or redemption through criminal justice is 
universally controversial (Dekker, 2003). 
After the Valuejet accident (NTSB, 1996), it was believed that the failure to put 
caps on the oxygen generators constituted wilful negligence and prosecutors 
were right to bring charges (Dekker, 2002). North (2000, p.66) suggests that 
there has to be some fear that not doing one’s job correctly could lead to 
prosecution.  Human Factors research agrees (Reason, 1997; Palmer et al., 
2001; Woods and Cook, 2002) that progress on safety depends on taking a 
systems perspective: accidents are not caused by failures of individuals but 
are the result of an alignment of contributory system factors. The route of the 
accident is in the system, not its component parts. Progress in safety depends 
upon moving beyond blame: blame leads to defensive behaviours, 
obfuscation of information, protection of oneself and mute reporting systems. 
As Sidney Dekker (2002) said: “You can either learn from an accident or 
punish the individuals involved in it, but is probably very difficult to do both the 
same time”. 
Wilkinson (1994) presents a case study where a pilot, after allegedly narrowly 
missing a hotel at Heathrow in thick fog, was the subject of criminal 
proceedings.  The authorities subsequently determined that this pilot would 
need to be punished, demoted. To make it even worse, the media, had a 
large share in dramatizing the case and promoted the captain’s 
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dehumanization to the point where his suicide was the only way out (Dekker, 
2003). 
2.6.3 Media and populism 
The media doubtlessly plays a strong role in promoting certain accidents, 
while being able to ignore others (Dekker, 2007b; Ditton and Duffy, 1983; 
Ödegård, 2007; Palmer et al., 2001). A study (Miyazawa, 2008) linking 
cultural and political populism to the punitiveness of a country’s criminal 
justice system and media coverage of an event has been shown to animate 
social reactions to the point of construction anti-heroes (Elkin, 1955; McLean 
and Elkind, 2004) and their crimes (Dekker, 2007b; Ericson, 1995; Innes, 
2004; Jacobs and Henry, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). The coverage of and 
discourse surrounding social issues such as hate crime, recently extended to 
accidents and human error, has been linked to political populism, judicial 
responses and criminalization of new categories of human action 
(Blackwelder, 1996; Engbersen and Van der Leun, 2001; Husak, 2008; 
Jacobs and Henry, 1996; Phillips and Grattet, 2000). 
 This study attempts to identify the factors that impede the collection of quality 
data used for the development of SPIs, which are developed based upon the 
information derived from reporting systems. The role of the media in aviation 
accidents, cultural populism and the punitive system of each country, 
criminalization of human error and social issues surrounding an aviation 
accident can all have an impact on the quality and quantity of reports an 
organization collects through its reporting system.  Fear of punishment and 
the feeling of being stigmatized will result in a decrease in the number of 
reports and a lower quality of data that do not provide insight or useful 
information. 
2.6.4 Interference with safety reporting and disclosure of errors 
The negative consequences of the criminalization of safety, particularly its 
detrimental effects on honest disclosure (Berlinger, 2005) and incident 
reporting (Ruitenberg, 2002) has been observed more in healthcare and 
aviation than in other contexts. The biggest concern with judicial action after 
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accidents in aviation and healthcare has focused on how it interferes with 
independent safety investigations and destroys the willingness of people to 
voluntarily report errors and violations (Berlinger, 2005; Brous, 2008; 
Chapman, 2009; Dekker, 2007a, 2009, 2011; FSF, 2006; Thomas, 2007).  
Willingness to report their errors and violations is a critical ingredient for the 
creation of a safety culture, an organizational culture which encourages the 
honest disclosure and open reflection on their own practices with the aim to 
constantly improve quality and safety of their products and services (Lauber, 
1993). Learning from failure is encouraged across industries through 
independent safety investigations and is hampered when a professional 
mistake is criminalized (Dekker, 2011). Professionals seem to face two 
alternatives: either they report a mistake and get into some kind of trouble for 
it (stigmatized, reprimanded, fired or even prosecuted) or they do not report 
the mistake and keep their fingers crossed that nobody else will do so either 
(Dekker, 2007b). When a professional mistake is criminalized, a common 
response enacted spontaneously by individuals is to become better at making 
the evidence disappear and not to report errors (Dekker, 2011): “practicing 
under the threat of prosecution, can only serve to hide errors” (Chapman, 
2009). 
2.6.5 Consequences of criminalizing human error 
Criminalization typically leads to detrimental psychological consequences for 
the people involved (Dekker, 2011). The memory of an error stays with the 
individual for many years (Serembus et al., 2001). Guilt and self-blame are 
very common, with professionals denying the role and contribution of the 
system or the organization to their error and blaming themselves entirely 
(Meurier et al., 1998; Snook, 2000). This sometimes includes hiding the error 
from their family, thereby distancing themselves from any possible support 
(Christensen et al., 1992). Criminalization might also have consequences for 
the person’s livelihood, as a license to practice may be revoked automatically 
which in turn can generate a whole new layer of anxiety and stress (Dekker, 
2011). Naturally, victims may derive some sort of consolidation, if not a sense 
of retribution, with the criminalization of professional mistake (Dekker, 2011). 
From the victim’s point of view, criminalization of an individual can also be 
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seen by them as being unfair, counterproductive or as scapegoating 
(Mellema, 2000). Even victims might interpret this as getting the organization 
or government regulators off the hook and oversimplifying the complexity of 
contributory events (Dekker, 2011). This is also covered in the safety literature 
(Perrow, 1984) where condensed explanations of failure and associated 
criminalization are used to protect elite interests (Levack, 1987) and help 
avoid fixing a system (Goode, 1994). Criminalizing an individual will not give 
the confidence to the victims that a similar incident will be prevented in the 
future (Dekker, 2007c; Dekker and Hugh, 2009; Merry and McCall Smith, 
2001). 
2.7 Measuring safety in civil aviation 
Safety margins within the Norwegian air transport sector had been 
significantly reduced, therefore the Norwegian Ministry of Transport instructed 
the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board to conduct a review of the civil 
aviation industry (Lofquist, 2010). The study was entitled “Safety in Norwegian 
Civil Aviation during Change Processes” (HSLB, 2005). The study concluded 
that safety levels were “high” but the report also included this conclusion: 
“The generally high safety level and the correspondingly low number of 
accidents and serious incidents, makes it difficult if not impossible on a 
national level to utilize accident statistics to ‘measure’ or prove that flight 
safety has become better or worse due to the prior years of 
reorganization/changes. Research and experience from other countries show 
that eventual negative effects of flight safety-related consequences seldom 
materialize in the form of accidents for several years after changes are 
implemented. It is, therefore, necessary to use as a basis, other types of 
indicators to be able to evaluate how flight safety is evaluated” (HSLB, p. 6). 
Considering that the likelihood of a serious accident today is approaching an 
ultra-safe level, with the accident rate currently one fatal passenger flight 
accident per 3,200,000 flights (Aviation Safety Network), providing a 
meaningful measure of safety becomes a difficult task (Amalberti, 2001, p. 
111; Lofquist, 2010). The problem is summarized by Reason (1990) who 
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stated that “safety is defined and measured more by its absence that its 
presence”. When accidents happen, there is a measurable indication that 
things are not safe, but where nothing happens or there is nothing to pay 
attention to (Weick, 1987; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), it is unknown if this is 
due to properly functioning safety processes or due to good fortune (Lofquist, 
2010). Nothing to measure, at least by current industry metrics, equates to the 
notion that there is no change to safety.  This is contrary to the common-
sense expectations, since in this environment examples are known of 
organizational change contributing to a sudden and unexpected system failure 
(Weick, 1993; Vaughan, 1996; Gehman, 2003; Johnson, 2004). 
2.7.1 Safety Performance Indicators 
Major hazard organizations, including nuclear industries, oil and gas, 
hazardous chemical plants, shipping and the aviation industries have been 
required to develop SPIs to provide assurance that major hazard risks are 
under control and that systems and procedures continue to operate as 
intended. Safety performance evaluation is an essential part of SMSs since it 
provides the organization with information about the system’s quality in terms 
of development, implementation and results (Sgourou et al., 2010). An 
indicator can be considered as any measure, quantitative or qualitative that 
seeks to provide information on an issue of interest. SPIs are needed to be 
able to monitor the current level of safety in safety critical organizations such 
as aviation organizations, hospitals, refineries and nuclear power plants. 
These are needed to follow the proactive safety work as well as to anticipate 
emerging vulnerabilities within the system (Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). All 
these organizations rely heavily on failure data to monitor their safety 
performance. The consequence of this approach is that improvements or 
changes are only determined if something has gone wrong. Often the 
difference between whether a system failure results in a minor or catastrophic 
outcome is purely down to chance.  Data derived from such auch accidents 
would be characterized as lagging indicators. On the other hand, effective 
management of major hazards requires a proactive approach to risk 
management, so information to confirm critical systems are operating as 
intended is essential. The development of leading indicators aims to confirm 
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that risk controls continue to operate as intended and are an important step 
towards the management of major hazard risks (HSE, 2006).  
2.7.2 Lagging indicators 
The traditional approach to evaluate safety performance is through the 
measurement and statistical analysis of incident-related data, such as the 
number of injuries, accident frequency and severity rates, accident costs, 
number of near misses or of the damage associated with poor safety 
performance.  These are often referred to as lagging indicators (Sgourou et 
al., 2010). Lagging indicators are a form of reactive monitoring requiring the 
reporting and investigation of incidents and events to discover weaknesses in 
the system (HSE, 2006). Lagging indicators show when a desired safety 
outcome, has failed or has not been achieved (O’Connor et al., 2011). 
Lagging indicators have been criticized as measuring failures without 
revealing the cause-effect relationships that would contribute to system 
improvement, therefore, they appear to have little predictive value (Carder 
and Ragan, 2003; Cooper and Phillips, 2004).  
2.7.3 Leading indicators 
Indicators should be able to identify organizational practices and processes 
that antecede (lead) change in the safety performance of the organization. 
Leading indicators are a form of active monitoring that require a routine 
systematic check that key actions or activities are undertaken as intended 
(HSE, 2006). The leading indicator helps to identify the “holes” (see the Swiss 
Cheese model) in vital aspects of the risk control system discovered during 
routine checks on the operation of a critical activity within risk control (HSE, 
2006). Hale (2009,) emphasized that an indicator was leading or lagging in 
respect of whether “it leads or lags the occurrence of harm, or at least the loss 
of control in the scenario leading to harm”. 
When the indicators depend on injury rates as a measure, under reporting can 
lead to minor events not being reported to appear to maintain performance. 
Additionally, as safety has improved and the frequency of undesired events 
has declined, accident or incident rates have ceased to be a useful metric of 
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safety performance (O’Connor et al., 2011). In an attempt to improve safety 
performance even more, given the low numbers of accidents that occur in 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs), these organizations started to develop 
“leading indicators” (O’Connor et al., 2011). Leading SPIs such as safety 
inspections, audits, behavioural observations and safety culture/climate 
surveys provide information that does not necessarily result from accident and 
incident-based measurements.  These keep the organisation up to date with 
organizational and safety measurement trends. Leading indicators reveal how 
well the organization is performing with respect to those safety management 
activities that prevent injuries. Safety management activities include audits, 
hazard identification, training, employee activities (such as observable safe 
behaviours), supervisor activities (such as communicating safety, conducting 
inspections) and management activities (such as management commitment 
and involvement in safety; Sgourou et al., 2010). Leading indicators provide a 
more proactive way to gain insight into the safety performance of the 
organization, identify the areas in which efforts should be made to improve 
safety, and are more responsive to change (O’Connor et al., 2011). 
2.7.4 The accident trajectory and leading/ lagging indicators 
In the Swiss Cheese model, (Reason, 1997) an organization’s layers of 
defense against failures are modeled as a series of barriers, metaphorically 
represented as slices of cheese. Each slice represents a risk control system, 
an important barrier or safeguard. The system as a whole produces failures 
when holes in all of the slices momentarily align, permitting "a trajectory of 
accident opportunity", so that a hazard passes through holes in all of the 
defenses, leading to an accident. For each slice or barrier, the leading 
indicator identifies failings or “holes” in vital aspects of the risk control system 
discovered during routine checks on the operation of a critical activity within 
the control system. A lagging indicator reveals failings or holes in that barrier 
discovered following the incident or adverse event. 
2.7.5 Functional areas and purpose of safety performance indicators 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) embarked on developing an SPI 
system for use at Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in the 1980s. In this initiative, 
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IAEA held many consultant and Technical meetings and came up with an SPI 
framework. The development of the IAEA framework began with the 
consideration of the concept of NPP safety performance. The objective of the 
IAEA framework was to manage safety at individual NPPs in accordance with 
their vision of excellence. SPIs, if properly developed and analyzed, are a 
good input to the decision-making process. Using these attributes as a 
starting point, each attribute’s overall indicators were established. (IAEA, 
2000).  
 Øien et al., (2011a) suggested that leading indicators should be established 
in the following functional areas: 
1. Management, organization and administration 
2. Design of facility and processes 
3. Training and qualification 
4. Operations 
5. Maintenance 
6. Emergency preparedness planning 
These indicators will also change over time, which means that it is necessary 
to re-evaluate them regularly. Identification of new indicators should be based 
on assessments of existing operational experience and research concerning 
the underlying causes to unwanted events that have occurred (Øien et al., 
2011b). IAEA (1999) suggested the following quality characteristics for SPIs: 
1. Direct relationship between indicator and safety 
2. Necessary data should be available or capable of being generated 
3. Able to be expressed in quantitative terms 
4. Unambiguous 
5. Significance should be understood 
6. Not susceptible to manipulation 
7. Meaningful 
8. Able to be integrated into normal operational activities 
9. Able to be validated 
10. Able to be linked of the cause of a malfunction 
 55 
11. Accuracy of the data at each level to be capable of quality control and 
verification 
12. Local action able to be taken on the bases of the indicators 
The main purposes of performance indicators are (Øien et al., 2011a): 
1. To monitor the level of safety in a system (or a department, a site or an 
industry) 
2. To decide where and how to take action and 
3. To motivate those in position to take the necessary action to actually 
do it. 
In addition to these characteristics, IAEA (2000) suggested that indicators 
chosen to support an operational safety monitoring program should include a 
combination of lagging indicators that reflect actual performance and leading 
indicators that provide an early warning of declining performance. Specific 
indicators should capture lower level problems to allow for timely identification 
and intervention that can prevent more significant events. When properly 
used, indicators are a valuable tool for controlling hazards and managing risk. 
Improper use of operational safety performance indicators can result in 
actions that are not in the best interests of reactor safety. The effectiveness of 
managing SPIs as a tool for improving the organization’s performance is vital 
to the success of any operational safety performance-monitoring program.  
According to HSE (2006) organizations that have developed and implemented 
SPIs have reported that they have: 
 Increased assurance on risk management and protected reputation; 
 Demonstrated the suitability of their risk control systems 
 Stopped collecting and reporting performance information which was 
no longer relevant, thereby saving costs; and 
 Made better use of information already collected for other purposes, for 
example quality management. 
OECD (2008) guidance suggests the following steps for establishing an SPI 
program and for evaluating the effectiveness of its initial implementation, 
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including how to adjust an SPI program to incorporate new knowledge and 
meet changing requirements. The process of establishing a SPI program 
includes seven steps: 
1. Establish an SPI Team;  
2. Identify the key issues of concern; 
3. Define relevant outcome indicator(s) and related metrics;   
4. Define activities indicator(s) and related metrics; 
5. Collect the data and report indicator results; 
6. Act on findings from SPIs;  
7. Evaluate and refine SPIs. 
 
The effort required to complete these steps and implement an SPI Program 
will vary depending on a number of factors specific to organization, including 
the nature of the hazards, the roles within the organizations for managing 
safety, the availability of data and the degree of precision required for the 
indicators to be useful. The challenge might be whether in a specific 
timeframe, there are enough instances of the events being counted to be able 
to talk meaningfully about a rate (Hopkins, 2009a). If there are, then 
developing indicators over time will provide evidence of whether the SMS is 
performing as required. On the other hand, if after a number of years the 
occurrence of only a single countable event is recorded, it will not be possible 
to include the event in a meaningful annual rate, nor possible to conclude 
from one occurrence that safety is deteriorating.  
Using the “zoom” effect as Hopkins (2009a) defines it, regulators can treat the 
fatality rate as an indicator of how well safety is being managed in that 
industry and seek to drive it down by encouraging generalized, industry wide 
safety initiatives. It may be observed that some organizations can go for years 
without a fatality. Under these circumstances, it will not make sense to treat 
the fatality rate of that site as an indicator of safety. Management in such 
organizations needs to identify more frequently occurring events to be able to 
judge how well they are managing safety over time.  
 57 
Hopkins’ (2009a) analysis of SPIs clearly demonstrates that the ideal 
indicator(s) have yet to be found. In short, where harmful events are occurring 
frequently enough to be able to talk about a rate, this rate can measure 
safety; where harmful events are rare, more frequently occurring precursor 
events need to be found to be able to measure safety (Hopkins, 2009a). 
Researchers (Guastello, 1993) have tried to establish general relationships 
between safety performance and contributing factors, such as the quality of 
the safety management elements or the adequacy of the safety climate.  
However, any positive relations between these have been weak because of 
the general nature of contributing factors and the high level of aggregation of 
accident data. 
 2.8 Safety management practices creating challenges in the production 
of data to be used for the development of safety performance indicators 
A successful SMS based on a performance-based approach will need a great 
deal of quality safety-based data. Fear of punishment and doubts about the 
usefulness of their report will inhibit staff reporting. The reporting culture of the 
organization may be weakened by a poor just culture and hamper the 
production of timely, adequate and well-qualified safety-related data. 
Problems associated with the lack of a just culture may result in a lack of data 
for hazard and risk analysis, which are proactive tools and hence cause 
measurement problems and impair the management of change. As a result, it 
will be difficult to detect organizational factors and any underlying issues in a 
timely and appropriate manner. Lack of reporting will have an impact on 
safety measurement, hazard and risk analysis, mitigation of risks, learning 
from the past and organizational learning. In such cases, it will be impossible 
to produce information that will permit the organization to improve safety 
proactively or measure accurately their safety performance (Gerede, 2015b). 
Feedback problems reduce the success of the reactive and proactive hazard 
analyses and risk management, result in safety measurement problems, avoid 
safety assurance activities and inhibit the identification of chronic or 
underlying latent problems in the organization (Gerede, 2015a).  
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Measuring safety as an outcome variable within the ultra-safe civil aviation 
industry during periods of organizational change is a difficult and often 
fruitless task (Lofquist, 2010). Anticipating the erosion of safety processes 
based on measuring nothing happening over time does not actually capture 
the true state of an evolving safe system (Lofquist, 2010). Gray and 
Wiedeman (1999) suggest the inherent difficulty with indicators is that they 
are selective. This means that there is always room for discussion and even 
disagreement about whether they really represent what one wants to 
measure; whether all people want to measure the same thing; and whether 
the measure is understandable to non-experts. No single indicator is able to 
express all relevant aspects of health, environment and safety. Sometimes 
there is the misconception that it is possible to express risk levels through a 
set of indicators in a fully objective way (Skogdalen et al., 2011). This implies 
that expressing the “true” risk level is just a matter of identifying the right 
indicators.  However, it is argued that there is no “true” risk level (Aven and 
Vinnem, 2007; Vinnem, 2007).  
2.9 And what’s next? 
Accidents such as that at Dryden, or in other industries including in oil and 
gas, for example the BP Deepwater Horizon or in the nuclear industry, 
Chernobyl, indicated that had signals or early warning indicators been 
detected and managed in advance, the accident would have been avoided. 
High Reliability Organizations (HRO) were required to implement a Safety 
Management System to use effectively process safety indicators that provide 
ongoing assurance that risks are controlled. Similarly, ICAO with the 
publication of Annex 19 requires States and organizations to implement an 
SMS to monitor proactively their performance. Organizations are required to 
develop leading and lagging indicators to measure and improve their 
performance. Flight data monitoring (FDM), statistics from monitoring trends, 
audits, training and surveys are sources of data that can be used by 
organizations when developing their leading indicators. Other sources of data 
are human generated data of a qualitative nature that can support quantitative 
data. This research focuses on such human generated data, as these capture 
 59 
challenges not reflected in quantitative data.  These are considered to be 
more difficult to collect and can give an insight into the safety perceptions of 
employees. The success of SMSs in organizations depends on certain safety 
practices that could successfully deal with such “people” variables.  It was for 
this reason this study focused on human generated data.  
As presented in the ICAO 2017 Safety Report, both ICAO and IATA continue 
to work closely together and, through their respective expert groups, provide 
greater alignment in their analysis methods and metrics for the future. This 
ongoing work will be shared with the Global Safety Information Exchange 
participants, States, international organizations and safety stakeholders in the 
interest of promoting common, harmonized safety reporting at the global level.  
Regulators and international organizations work closely on an international 
level to suggest better ways for improving safety and measuring performance. 
To be able to share the success stories about safety management systems 
that are capable of yielding benefits and find ways to better measure their 
performance, organizations first need to understand the factors that impede 
them. ICAO requested that the states and organizations comply with the 
requirements of Annex 19, and the publication of the Safety Management 
Manual (SMM) assists in its implementation. Nevertheless, standards and 
recommended practices (SARPs) are regulatory requirements and do not 
consider the challenges small countries face when implementing Annex 19. 
This study attempts to fill in the gap between regulatory practice and the 
challenges related to the implementation of SMS as faced by small 
Mediterranean organizations.  By using interviews and questionnaires it 
identifies the factors that impede the performance of an organization’s SMS 
and the factors that become an obstacle to the collection of the data to be 
used for the development of their SPIs.  Knowing the factors that can become 
an obstacle to the performance of an SMS, especially in small countries, and 
sharing this information with the regulators, gives the regulators and 




3. Overview of Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the research paradigm and follows with 
a description of the three main components to the thesis. Chapter 4, 
describes a preliminary pilot study.  Chapter 5 expands upon this with a large-
scale qualitative interview-based study which was developed based on the 
findings of the preliminary study. Chapter 6 presents a questionnaire-based 
study developed from the findings of the previous interview-based, qualitative 
study. 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, American philosopher Thomas 
Kuhn (1962) first used the word paradigm to mean a philosophical way of 
thinking. Lather (1986) explains that a research paradigm inherently reflects 
the researcher’s beliefs about the world that s/he lives in and wants to live in. 
The researcher’s worldview suggests that a paradigm constitutes the abstract 
beliefs and principles that shape how a researcher sees the world, and how 
s/he interprets and acts within that world. It is the lens through which a 
researcher looks at the world and how they examine the methodological 
aspects of their research project to determine the methods that will be used 
and how the data will be analysed. A paradigm comprises four elements, 
namely, epistemology, ontology, methodology and axiology (Lincoln and 
Guba,1985). 
3.2.1 Epistemology of a paradigm 
In research, epistemology is used to describe how there is knowledge about 
something, whether that’s the truth or reality and how a researcher can 
possibly  acquire such knowledge so as to be able to extend, broaden and 
acquire a deeper understanding of the research field in question. Schwandt 
(1997) defines it as the study of the nature of knowledge and justification. 
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When considering the epistemology of the research the researcher should 
reflect whether knowledge is something acquired or experienced, and what 
may be the relationship between the researcher and the field of study.  
In the epistemological paradigm for the current research, knowledge is 
something to be acquired. The implementation of an SMS is a regulatory 
requirement and aviation organizations are required to implement and monitor 
the effectiveness of their SMS. The aviation industry lacked the knowledge 
about the difficulties aviation organizations, and especially those from small 
countries, were facing with the implementation of their SMS. The researcher 
used interviews and questionnaires to uncover the employees’ perceptions 
about the effectiveness of their SMS and the factors impeding the collection of 
quality data for the development of their SPIs. Although the implementation of 
the regulations ensures regulatory compliance and seems straightforward, it 
also seems that the regulator does not take into consideration any problems 
organizations are facing when implementing these regulations.  These 
problems might be having an impact on the effectiveness and performance of 
the SMS. 
3.2.2 Ontology of a paradigm 
Ontology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the assumptions we make 
in order to believe that something makes sense or is real or assess the very 
nature or essence of the social phenomenon we are investigating (Scotland, 
2012). It is the philosophical study of the nature of existence of reality, of 
being or becoming, as well as the addressing basic categories of things that 
exist and their relations. It is concerned with the assumptions we make in 
order to believe that something makes sense or is real, or the very nature or 
essence of the social phenomenon that is being investigated. Philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of reality are crucial to understanding how the 
researcher will make meaning of the data gathered. These assumptions, 
concepts or propositions help to orientate the researcher’s thinking about the 
research problem, its significance, and how the researcher might approach it 
so as to contribute to its solution. Ontology is essential to a paradigm because 
it helps to provide an understanding of the things that constitute the world, as 
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it is known (Scott and Usher, 2004). It seeks to determine the foundational 
concepts which constitute themes that are analyzed to make sense of the 
meaning embedded in research data. In the process of this research, the 
researcher was asking herself the question, it the SMS too good to be true? Is 
it as good as the regulatory authorities are suggesting, is it the perfect system 
that can deliver the safety outcomes and manage safety as it is suggested? 
Can it actually measure performance and does the measurement reflect 
reality, the actual safety level of the organization? Does the SMS actually do 
what it says? All these assumptions and concepts oriented the researcher’s 
thinking about the research problem and the approach towards the research 
problem to answer the research question. In order to address this question, 
the questions in the interviews were oriented towards finding the factors that 
impeded the quality of human generated data, used by organizations when 
developing their SPIs. It was assumed that low quality and quantity data will 
impact the quality of any output from these data, thus the organization might 
be receiving misleading results about their performance. The aviation industry 
lacked the knowledge about the difficulties aviation organizations and 
especially small countries were facing with the implementation of their SMS. 
The researcher used interviews and questionnaires to uncover the 
employees’ perceptions about the effectiveness of their SMS and the factors 
impeding the collection of quality data for the development of their SPIs. 
3.2.3 Methodology of a Paradigm  
Methodology is the broad term used to refer to the research design, methods, 
approaches and procedures used in an investigation that is well planned to 
find out something (Keeves, 1997). For example, data gathering, participants, 
instruments used, and data analysis, are all parts of the broad field of 
methodology.  
The methodology articulates the logic and flow of the systematic processes 
followed in conducting a research project, so as to gain knowledge about a 
research problem. In considering the methodology for the research, the 
researcher needs to ask himself/herself the question: How shall I go about 
obtaining the desired data, knowledge and understandings that will enable me 
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to answer my research question and thus make a contribution to knowledge? 
The following section explains which research methodologies were believed 
to be appropriate for each part of the study to answer the wider research 
question and make a contribution to the knowledge. 
The scientific paradigm rose to prominence during the Enlightenment. Comte 
popularized the term positivism (Crotty, 1998, p. 19) when the scientific 
paradigm, which originated studying the natural world, was applied the, to the 
social world (Cohen et al., p. 9).  
The ontological position of positivism is one of realism. Realism is the view 
that objects have an existence independent of the knower (Cohen et al., 2007, 
p. 7). Thus, a discoverable reality exists independently of the researcher 
(Pring, 2000, p. 59). The positivist epistemology is one of objectivism. 
Positivists go forth into the world impartially, discovering absolute knowledge 
about an objective reality. The researcher and the object of the research are 
independent entities. Meaning solely resides in objects, not in the conscience 
of the researcher, and it is the aim of the researcher to obtain this meaning. 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 8).  Thus, phenomena have an independent existence which 
can be discovered via research. Positivistic statements are descriptive and 
factual. The scientific paradigm is foundational as scientific propositions are 
founded on data and facts (House, 1991, p. 2).  
Positivist methodology is directed at explaining relationships. Positivists 
attempt to identify causes which influence outcomes (Creswell, 2009, p. 7). 
Their aim is to formulate laws, thus yielding a basis for prediction and 
generalization. In this positivist methodology, the model produced in the 
qualitative research represents and abstraction of reality, identifying the 
causes that influence the outcomes. This model allows a generalized 
application that may apply in aviation organizations, in different geographical 
locations but with these relationships between the factors may have varying 
magnitudes for each organization. A second data collection and analysis of 
interviews was performed to verify the findings of the first qualitative study.  
Correlation and experimentation are used to reduce complex interactions their 
constituent parts. Verifiable evidence sought via direct experience and 
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observation; this often involves empirical testing, random samples, controlled 
variables (independent, dependent and moderator) and control groups.  
Similarly, post-positivists seek to understand causal relationships; thus, 
experimentation and correlational studies are used. However more than 
sense-data is collected, participants’ perspectives are often sought. The 
scientific paradigm seeks predictions and generalizations; thus, methods often 
generate quantitative data such as the closed ended questionnaire (Pring, 
2000a, p. 34). Inferential statistics allow sample results to be generalized to 
populations.  
 
The findings of the initial qualitative studies were used to develop a 
questionnaire to capture employees’ perceptions about the SMS in their 
organizations. Results were then built into a statistically verifiable model 
demonstrated how a hypothetical construct influences other hypothetical 
constructs. The numbers on the links are just a representation of the strength 
of the relationship. Furthermore, as knowledge is tentative, hypotheses are 
not proven but simply not rejected (Creswell, 2009, p. 7).  
Research is deemed good if its results are due to the independent variable 
(internal validity), can be generalized/transferred to other populations or 
situations (external validity), and different researchers can record the same 
data in the same way and arrive at the same conclusions (replicable and 
reliable). Several of the features of the model were consistent with the 
findings of Gerede (2015 a,b). Additionally, the model produced is a generic 
model representing the views of many of the participants and it is unlikely to 
represent the view of any one person. The current research suggests that this 
model may apply in other geographical locations but the strength between the 
relationship of the constructs may vary. 
3.2.4 Axiology 
Axiology refers to the ethical issues that need to be considered when planning 
research. It addresses the question: What is the nature of ethics or ethical 
behaviour? What ought to be done to respect all participants’ rights? What are 
the moral issues and characteristics that need to be considered? How shall I 
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secure the goodwill of participants? How shall I conduct the research in a 
socially just, respectful manner? (ARC, 2015).  In order to demonstrate best 
ethical conduct by showing an understanding of the ethical considerations, a 
research approval was required (see Appendix F). Implementation of ethical 
considerations focuses on four principles which are required to uphold when 
dealing with participants and their data: privacy, accuracy, property and 
accessibility. In this respect participants were assured that any discussions 
with the researcher would not be passed on to their organization. Data would 
be safeguarded and will be analyzed in such a way as to maintain the 
anonymity of the interviewees. Participants were asked to feel free and 
answer in a manner that made them comfortable, without the researcher 
exerting pressure for an answer.  
Accuracy considers the authenticity and accuracy of information. Participants 
felt comfortable to participate in the interview knowing that the researcher was 
external to the organization and they felt they could trust the researcher. The 
interviewees were reassured that their data would not be distributed to the 
management.  
Property of the data considers the question of who will own the data? The 
participants were informed that the researcher will own the data as part of 
their research data collection and anonymity of the participants would be 
maintained. The research findings will be shared with the participants of the 
research and all data are de-identified to preserve anonymity.  
Accessibility considers the question of who will have access to the data. The 
participants were reassured that only the researcher will have access to the 
data and the data are stored in a manner that they are de-identified. 
3.3 Preliminary study 
In research, epistemology is used to describe how there is knowledge about 
something, whether that’s the truth or reality and how can a researcher can 
possible acquire so as to be able to extend, broaden and acquire a deeper 
understanding of the research field in question. It has been suggested that 
SMS can significantly reduce aviation accidents and compliance to the 
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regulations can improve the performance of aviation organizations. In the 
epistemological paradigm for the current research, knowledge is something to 
be acquired. The implementation of an SMS is a regulatory requirement and 
aviation organizations are required to implement and monitor the 
effectiveness of their SMS. The aviation industry lacked the knowledge about 
the difficulties aviation organizations and especially small countries were 
facing with the implementation of their SMS. To broaden this knowledge, 
participants from aviation service providers were asked to participate in an in-
depth structured interview followed by a semi-structured interview session. In 
the ontological paradigm of the current research the philosophical 
assumptions that some small countries might be facing challenges with the 
implementation of their SMS contributed in understanding the data gathered, 
the significance of the problem and the approach to be taken to contribute to 
the solution. For this reason, the preliminary study a grounded theory 
approach was decided to be used for the analysis of the narrative data 
derived from the interviews with the safety managers. As defined by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990b) the theory is derived from the study of the phenomenon it 
represents. The researcher does not begin with a theory and then attempt to 
prove the theory. Instead, the theory is discovered, developed and verified 
through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that 
phenomenon. The research begins with an area of study and what is relevant 
to that area is then allowed to emerge. The preliminary model derived from 
the data analysis of this study identified the factors that could impede the 
quality and quantity of data, delay and/or mislead an organization in creating 
their lagging SPIs.  
3.4 Qualitative Interview Study 
Using the research epistemology, the preliminary study, described the 
knowledge that there are challenges organizations in small countries are 
facing when implementing their SMS and monitoring their performance using 
SPIs. The research epistemology of the second, in-depth study was used to 
extend, broaden and acquire deeper knowledge, building on the previous 
knowledge from the preliminary study. During the preliminary study 
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(presented in Chapter 4), the participants were informed during their 
interviews that there would be a second phase of interviews would take place 
in the near future and they would be invited to participate if they wished. The 
qualitative in-depth interview study was based on the themes elicited from the 
preliminary study. Participants were asked to participate in a semi-structured 
interview session. The aim was to provide further insight into aviation 
organization’s SMSs and discover the factors that impeded the production of 
quality data used for the development of SPIs. Interview data were elicited 
from safety managers and personnel from the safety departments of aviation 
organizations. Building on existing theory and the output of the preliminary 
study, and developing ideas from linked pieces of research, this study used 
these a priori themes that can ensure focus on key areas relevant to a study. 
The ontology of the paradigm for this study, helped to provide an 
understanding of the things that constitute the world, using themes that are 
analyzed to understand the meanings of embedded research data. Thematic 
analysis, used to analyze the interview transcripts, encompasses a broad 
category of approaches to qualitative analysis that sought to define themes 
within the data and organize those themes into some type of structure to aid 
interpretation (Brooks et al., 2015). Template Analysis has been used in 
qualitative psychology research from a range of epistemological positions 
(Brooks et al., 2015) and can be used in research concerned with 
“discovering” underlying causes of human action and particular human 
phenomena, an analytical approach which fitted with the objectives of the 
second study. 
3.5 Questionnaire study 
The two previous studies provided a theoretical framework describing the 
relationship between the factors that can directly influence the performance of 
the SMS in aviation service providers. The questionnaire items were 
constructed based on the findings of the two previous studies. The main focus 
of the set of items in the questionnaire was to capture the respondent’s 
perceptions regarding the role that top management played in safety 
management activities, their demonstration of commitment to ensure safety, 
 68 
and their perceptions about the safety culture and the reporting systems in 
their organization.  
Structured questionnaire data were collected in this study, which described 
the perceptions of aviation organization employees.  This was developed into 







4. Preliminary study 
4.1 Introduction 
The ICAO states that as aviation systems are becoming more and more 
complex, human performance will no longer be able to be controlled using 
simple regulation intended to ensure safety. As a result, in 2011, the ICAO 
mandated the introduction of Annex 19, Safety Management Systems (EU: 
COM/2011/ 0670, ICAO, 2009, 2013). A safety management system (SMS) is 
a formal risk management framework for enhancing safety. An SMS should 
contain systems for: hazard identification and risk management; safety targets 
and reporting processes; procedures for audit; investigations; remedial 
actions to improve performance; and safety promotion and training. The size 
and complexity of an SMS should be tailored to suit the size and activities of 
each organization (Civil Aviation Authority New Zealand, 2015). However, 
implementing SMSs is not straightforward and there are often organizational 
obstacles (Gerede, 2015a).  
SPIs are an important part of the SMS as these allow for the establishment, 
implementation, and follow-up of policies related to safety (Øien, Utne, 
Tinmannsvik, & Massaiu, 2011). Organizations have to set targets and need 
to evaluate and manage the outcomes of their safety-related activities in order 
to be able to anticipate any vulnerabilities in their system (Hollnagel & Woods, 
2006). Traditionally, safety performance measurement is achieved through 
the collection of data such as near misses, incidents, or damage associated 
with poor performance. These data are used as SPIs (Sgourou, Katsakiori, 
Goutsos, & Manatakis, 2010). These safety outcomes are known as lagging 
(or reactive) indicators, providing historical information, such as accident 
frequency and severity rates (one accident, 150 fatalities in 2015) or near 
misses (11 serious incidents in 2015; European Aviation Safety Agency 
[EASA], 2016; Sgourou et al., 2010; Toellner, 2001). Owing to the nature of 
lagging indicators, they cannot predict future performance, nor do they give 
sufficient information as to why something happened. In contrast to lagging 
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indicators, leading (or proactive) SPIs can be used to identify underlying 
causes and contributing factors of accidents, such as inappropriate or 
inadequate training or a lack of resources and can be used as predictors or 
early warning indicators (Hinze, Thurman, & Wehle, 2013; Øien et al., 2011; 
Sgourou et al., 2010). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) uses the term “indicators” for the observable measures 
that provide insight into concepts that are related to safety and are difficult to 
measure directly (Harms-Ringdahl, 2009; OECD, 2014).  
Management activities, guidelines, industry standards, organizing, planning, 
audit, performance measurement, and quality principles are the basic 
components in any SMS (Santos-Reyes & Beard, 2008). The effectiveness of 
any SMS depends on the strength and the maturity of the system (Civil Air 
Navigation Services Organization [CANSO], 2014; Heese, 2012). An 
organization’s safety culture and management’s commitment to safety are the 
driving forces behind an effective SMS (CANSO, 2009; European 
Commission, 2012; Flemming, 2000; Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006; 
Schwarz & Kallus, 2015; Zohar, 1980).  
Challenges identified as impeding the successful implementation of an SMS 
are the absence of a positive safety culture and the presence of a blame 
culture and punishment following error, which results in a lack of reporting. 
Although improvements in these areas can be a step forward for the 
management of safety, they are not sufficient for an SMS to be effective. 
Studies in other industries with similar systems have identified critical 
components for improving the performance of an SMS as well as barriers to 
its successful implementation (Aksorn & Hadikusumo, 2008; Bhattacharya & 
Tang, 2013; Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Ismail, 
Doostdar, & Harun, 2012), although, there have been very few studies related 
to SMSs in the aviation industry (Gerede, 2015b). Gerede (2015a) found that 
the most significant challenge for the successful implementation of an SMS is 
the problem of establishing a just culture. He further discusses the challenges 
resulting into a poor safety culture and the consequences if these problems 
are not addressed.  
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Studies have demonstrated a relationship between safety management 
practices and safety performance. Safety management practices can include, 
but are not limited to: management showing personal involvement in safety 
activities; provision of high-quality training for new employees and frequent 
training for existing employees; safety promotion for identifying hazards; 
higher priority for safety in meetings and in decisions concerning work 
practice; in-depth investigation of accidents; empowerment of the workforce 
(Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). When employees are involved in safety matters 
and are encouraged to work safely, this approach to managing safety at work 
may improve the desired outcomes (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011).  
Hopkins (2000) and Baker et al. (2007) expressed the need for the industry to 
develop and implement improved SPIs. There are various reasons as to why 
such indicators are required. One of the reasons is to shape the behavior of 
management and staff. Effective indicators can drive the required 
performance while ineffective indicators will lead to misleading figures in 
performance measurement and may not give information concerning the real 
issues under consideration (Hudson, 2009). Valid safety knowledge is derived 
from data collected from appropriate SPIs, hence reliable and valid indicators 
(both prospective and retrospective) need to be identified and implemented 
for any SMS to be effective. Indicators should be both valid, that is, measure 
what we want them to measure, and reliable, that is give the same 
measurement result when used in the same situation but by different people 
(Hale, 2009).  
Øien et al. (2011a) suggested the different functional areas that the leading 
indicators should be established in the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(Hale, 2009; IAEA, 1999) suggested that SPIs should possess a number of 
characteristics (see Chapter 2). 
SPIs need to be carefully selected and reviewed and re-evaluated over time. 
Manipulation of indicators by managers was evident in the Baker report for the 
BP refinery accident in Texas, contributing to a false sense of security. 
Manipulation implies changing the indicator to show a better score but without 
changing the underlying situation the indicator reflects (Hale, 2009). 
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Inconsistencies and incoherence can exist in the approach taken for the 
selection of indicators. Two problems can be linked to the choice of SPIs: 
either too many possible indicators are utilized, reducing the mapping of 
safety-critical activities, or there is a failure to select correct and useful 
indicators. A systematic approach needs to be used to identify the proper 
indicators and how we can use these indicators to drive the SMS toward 
achieving its safety goals (Hudson, 2009).  
The objective of this PhD is to identify the factors that impede organizations 
from obtaining the data to be used for the development of their SPIs, which 
are required as part of their SMSs for measuring and monitoring their safety 
performance. This preliminary study was performed to identify the key 
organizational factors in a number of small aviation companies in the 
Mediterranean that may play a role in promoting or hindering the 
implementation of an SMS and the collection and analysis of data for the 
development of SPIs. A qualitative approach was utilized as the emphasis 
was on insight, discovery, and development of a theory rather than the testing 
of a hypothesis (Cronbach, 1975; Merriam, 1988; Silverman, 1993). 
4.2 Method  
4.2.1 Participants  
Interview data were elicited from safety managers from different aviation 
organizations from Mediterranean countries. Involvement of these managers 
in the development and selection of the organization’s SPIs was used as a 
criterion. Another criterion was to select safety managers from aviation 
operations of different kinds. The sample consisted of the safety managers 
from five aviation organizations (two medium – large airlines, two airports, and 
one navigation service provider). All participants were trained in the operation 
of SMSs.  
4.2.2 Data Gathering  
An introductory letter was sent to the participants by e-mail to inform them 
about the research, with a follow-up telephone call before the commencement 
of data collection. They were informed that the objective of the study was to 
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investigate the effectiveness of the implementation of their SMSs and the 
factors that might have an impact on the data collection for the development 
of effective SPIs. Participants were asked to participate in a semistructured 
interview session. The in-depth semistructured interview contained 33 
questions: three to learn and know about the organizational factors that affect 
the safety of the organization; five to learn and know about the safety 
knowledge of the participants; 14 questions about their SMS; and 11 
questions about SPIs. Examples of questions included: “How do you think the 
top management of an organization can affect the safety of an organization?” 
and “How does management promote the safety policy and the SMS?” (these 
examples were derived from the section of the interview related to safety). An 
example from the part of the interview related to the SMS was: “How are the 
employees trained in identifying hazards?” An example from the part of the 
interview related to SPIs was: “Does the reporting system give a clear picture 
of the most important risks in your work and does it help you manage them 
effectively?”  The interview questions from the preliminary study are provided 
in Appendix A. 
The data collection was performed in two phases between June 2014 and 
August 2014. The duration of the semistructured interviews was 
approximately 2.5–3 hr. During the interview, the interviewer took notes of the 
interviewees’ answers. At the end of each interview, the interviews were 
transcribed and saved into word processor files for subsequent analysis. The 
data were then coded by hand. Data were treated ethically, maintaining the 
confidentiality of the participants.  
4.3 Analysis  
A grounded theory approach was used for the analysis of the narrative data 
derived from the interviews with the safety managers in the five aviation 
organizations, using the procedures and techniques described by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990a). Strauss and Corbin (1990b) defined grounded theory as:  
One that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it 
represents. That is, it is discovered, developed and provisionally verified 
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through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that 
phenomenon... One does not begin with a theory then prove it. Rather, one 
begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is then allowed 
to emerge. (p. 23)  
The collection and method of analysis of the data are outlined in the following 
steps (Strauss & Corbin, 1990a): 
 Data gathering 
 Open coding  
 Axial coding 
 Selective coding  
Each interview report was broken down into individual sentences or small 
groups of sentences that referred to a single observation from each 
interviewee.  
4.3.1 Open Coding  
Open coding was defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 61) as: “The 
process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and 
categorizing data.”  
The comments produced by the line-by-line analysis of transcripts were 
analyzed to generate categories into which they could be grouped. Concepts 
were developed using a continuous dialogue with the empirical data. 
Concepts are ways of summarizing data and they should be adapted to the 
data (Becker, 1998, p. 109). The application of this method to the set of 
comments yielded an initial set of coding categories or dimensions. The 
comments were then re-coded using these categories to check for interrater 
reliability. Differences in coding were discussed and resolved to produce an 
agreed list of categories.  
4.3.2 Axial Coding  
Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 96) defined axial coding as: “A set of 
procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open 
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coding, by making connections between categories.”  
This stage of analysis yielded a set of higher-order categories describing the 
connection or common properties between the lower-order categories. 
Comments were then re-evaluated within each category.  
4.3.3 Selective Coding  
Selective coding was defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 116) as: “The 
process of selecting the core category [and] systematically relating it to other 
categories.”  
Strauss and Corbin (1990a) pointed out that this process is essentially similar 
to axial coding, but was conducted at a higher level of abstraction. A core 
category that emerges is the overarching phenomenon or concept that links 
each of the categories or phenomena that are developed during axial coding. 
After the core category was identified, further analysis of the comments in 
each category revealed the links between the categories identified during 
axial coding. Once all the categories were linked together to form a complete 
model, a narrative description was developed.  
4.4 Data Analysis and Model Development  
Open coding identified 15 dimensions containing factors that can influence the 
production of high-quality data to be used for the development of SPIs and 
hinder the performance of the SMS grouped under three properties.  
Following up on the process of open coding, the comments produced from the 
line-by-line analysis of interview narrative data were grouped into three 
emergent main categories, namely, “Top management’s decisions influencing 
safety”; “Lack of safety culture”; and “Impractical and fearful data collection 
approach” (see Table 1).  
Table 1 shows that the broad category “top management’s decisions 
influencing safety” includes one property namely “management’s decisions” 
with six dimensions. Management’s decisions influence the allocation of 
resources (either financial or human resources), the allocation of time, and 
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removing the safety officers from the roster to perform the safety activities. 
Management’s decisions influencing safety also includes the dimension 
“failure to participate in the safety activities” and “not interested to know 
anything related to safety” as it is for the management to decide whether they 
want to be involved or not. Delay in the investigation of accidents was a 
dimension placed under the management’s decision property as it is for the 
management to decide how and when to remove the safety officer from the 
roster in order to conduct the incident investigations.  
Seven dimensions were grouped under the property that reflected a lack of 
safety culture. Lack of safety promotion, lack of safety training, lack of just 
culture, luck of mutual trust between employees, lack of what the employees 
are saying, lack of encouragement to report and resistance to change all were 
thought to contribute to a poor safety culture.  
The third and last broad category in the table, was “impractical and fearful 
data collection approach” which included one property, namely “reporting 
system”. This had dimensions namely “fear of punishment that impairs 
reporting and “impracticality of reporting system that hinders the reporting 
process” both of which might influence the quality and quantity of data 
collected in reporting system. 
4.5 Top Management’s Decisions Influencing Safety  
During axial coding “allocation of resources,” “allocation of time,” “failure to 
clarify safety commitment,” “failure to participate in safety activities,” “not 
interested to know,” and “reluctance of management to allocate human 
resources for the investigation of incidents” were placed in the “managements’ 
decisions” category (Table 1).  
4.5.1 Allocation of Resources  
From the interviewees’ transcripts it was observed that some safety managers 
shared the perception that management would not allocate the money, extra 
working hours, or resources for hiring additional personnel:  
In order to perform the investigations people should be removed from 
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the roster or work during their days off and this causes a delay in the 
investigation of incidents.  
4.5.2 Allocation of Time 
Based on the following comment it was noted that the management of some 
aviation companies would not allocate time for the risk assessments and 
employees needed to work on their days off in order to complete the risk 
assessments:  
Risk assessments are not effectively performed; they are problematic 
as there is a delay because people need to be removed from the roster 
or work during their days off or work overtime.  
4.5.3 Failure to Clarify Safety Commitment  
On the basis of the comments, it was noted that interviewees perceived that 
management was not committed to safety as the company management did 
not show that they were at all interested in safety:  
When it comes to (top) management’s commitment to safety they don’t 
want to know, they don’t have the knowledge or they don’t want to 
show that they are interested.  
4.5.4 Failure to Participate in the Safety Activities  
On the basis of the following comment, it was perceived that management 
does not show an interest in the safety activities or want to know about these 
activities, and it was middle management who handles the safety issues:  
When it has to do with needs in the safety department, they [top 
management] don’t want to know, they don’t want to show they are 
interested. Only middle management handles operations and safety.  
4.5.5 Not Interested to Know or Learn Anything About Safety  
From the next statement, it was indicated that middle management perceived 
that top management did not care and at the same time top management 
does not prioritize safety issues within the organization:  
 78 
(Top) management either doesn’t want to know, or they do not have 
the knowledge, or they do not want to show the least interest in safety 
matters. It’s the middle management who handles the safety issues.  
From these statements, it was indicated that the middle management from 
some aviation service providers perceived that top management did not care 
and at the same time top management did not prioritize safety issues within 
the organization.  
4.5.6 Delay in the Investigation of Accidents  
On the basis of the following comment, “delay in the investigation of 
accidents” was placed in the top management’s decisions category as this 
could have facilitated investigations and made the findings available sooner 
(Table 1).  
In order to perform the investigations people should be removed from 
the roster or work during their days off and this causes a delay in the 
investigation of incidents.  
 
Table 1 Dimensions of the impeding factors of data collection used for 
the development of SPIs derived from the Open Coding process.  






Allocation of resources 
Allocation of time/roster 
Failure to clarify safety 
commitment 
Failure to participate in 
safety activities 
Not interested in 
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knowing/learning 
anything related to 
safety 
Delay in the 
investigation of 
accidents 
Lack of safety culture Just culture Lack of safety 
promotion  
Lack of safety training  
Lack of just culture  
Lack of trust between 
personnel  
Lack of attention to 
what workforce is 
saying  
Lack of encouragement 
by top management to 
report  




Reporting system Fear of punishment that 
impairs reporting  
Impracticality of 
reporting system that 
hinders the reporting 
process  
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4.6 Lack of Safety Culture  
During the axial coding stage, “lack of safety promotion,” “lack of safety 
training,” “lack of just culture,” “lack of trust between personnel,” “lack of 
attention to what personnel is saying,” “lack of encouragement by top 
management,” and “resistance to change” were all placed in the “safety 
culture” category.  
“Lack of just culture” was identified as a common property, which hindered the 
successful collection of safety data from the reporting system. To illustrate, 
one interviewee commented:  
[Employees] don’t know what is acceptable and unacceptable in terms 
of judicial authority taking over.  
4.6.1 Lack of Safety Promotion  
On the basis of the following comment from one participant, it was noted that 
top management was not promoting the SMS:  
The [top] management doesn’t really promote the SMS...  
The following comment indicates that the organization did not promote the 
safety policy and SMS to their employees, and the employees have asked 
from the safety manager to make a presentation.  
Employees do not completely understand the safety policy. We know 
because they asked the safety manager for a presentation. SMS and 
Safety Policy, is very little promoted by top management.  
4.6.2 Lack of Training  
The following statement implies that the employees did not receive training to 
identify hazards and employees were required to use their common sense to 
identify hazards:  
Employees were not trained to identify hazards, this is based on their 
instinct and their common sense.  
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The next statements indicate that some organizations pre- sent an overview 
of how the SMS works and do not provide recurrent training to their 
employees even if it is stated in the manuals that the employees need to 
receive recurrent training.  
Training in safety and SMS, an overview how the system works [is 
provided], we still have room for improvement. Recurrent training is 
only written in the manuals.  
The following statement indicates that some organizations do not use the 
information from the reporting system to train employees and it depends on 
the manager of each unit to feed back the information given to him/her by the 
safety manager.  
We don’t have an official ‘lessons learnt’ process; it depends on the 
manager of each unit to inform the people.  
4.6.3 Lack of Trust Between Personnel  
On the basis of the following comment, it was regarded that the employees 
might be reluctant to report anything because they do not trust their 
colleagues since other employees might be able to identify the reporter.  
Reporting is not encouraged because other employees can identify the 
reporter especially if one or two people were working on that particular 
shift the time when the event took place.  
4.6.4 Lack of Attention to What the Employees Are Saying  
Lack of attention to what aviation service provider’s safety managers were 
saying was identified as a common component in the “safety culture” and 
“reporting systems” categories (see Table 1).  
Every time we ask them to give a campaign on reporting they keep 
saying that they will do it the following week and they never do it.  
The employee in the statement above believed that top management did not 
care about what they were asking, and this has a great effect on safety 
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culture. Management did not care and they showed it. This is even more 
obvious from the following comment from one employee:  
What management shows us is that we will do something if we have 
time, when we have time.  
As implied, in some organizations, management was not regarded as 
promoting the SMS and also did not provide training for the identification of 
hazards. Workers needed to use their common sense, but this of course 
depended on the perceptions of each individual concerning what he or she 
considered to be a hazard. Lack of training also resulted in a lack of 
knowledge of the benefits of making contributions to the reporting systems. In 
addition, if personnel were trained more on how they could benefit from the 
reporting hazards and how this could reduce the rate of incidents, they would 
have cared more about reporting the hazards and cared less about who did 
what.  
The following comment indicates that when middle management wanted to 
discuss the safety needs of the organization, top management did not want to 
know and they did not show any interest.  
When it has to do with needs in the safety department, they don’t want 
to know, they don’t want to show they are interested. Only middle 
management handles operations and safety.  
4.6.5 Lack of Encouragement to Report by Top Management 
After discussion it was decided that “lack of encouragement to report” was 
best categorized under “safety culture” because encouragement can be a 
characteristic of the safety climate and a feature of the organization that can 
be influenced by the people working within the organization (Schwarz & 
Kallus, 2015; von Rosenstiel & Nerdinger, 2011).   
Several statements indicate that employees are not encouraged to report 
issues, and they only receive an overview of how the SMS works. It was 
indicated that although recurrent training is mentioned in the manuals, the 
organization does not give recurrent training to employees to encourage them 
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to report.  
When it comes to reporting there is no encouragement and there are 
bureaucratic procedures.  
The next statement indicates that the actions of top management fail to 
encourage employees to report.  
Instead of using the reporting system for improvement, they are using it 
to penalize.  
The next statement indicates that when the organization was not in the same 
facility, some departments might have received less encouragement to report, 
especially if the safety department was not located in the same facility in order 
to promote reporting. Bureaucratic procedures might also cause lack of 
encouragement and this is emphasized when the organizations are in 
different locations.  
There are units that are isolated from the whole system, without any 
information on reporting, there are bureaucratic procedures.  
4.6.6 Resistance to Change  
Resistance to change was found to be one of the dimensions best placed 
under the “safety culture” category. Interviewees expressed their opinion that 
remedial actions became a difficult task as it involved a number of people and 
sometimes the action to be taken depended on other people.  
It is a matter of how easy something can be done and you have to wait 
for the others; it’s not that easy, it has to do with the number of people 
involved.  
4.7 Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach  
Comments about reporting systems were further decomposed into “fear of 
punishment that impairs reporting” and “impracticality of reporting systems 
that hinders the reporting process” (see Table 1).  
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4.7.1 Fear of Punishment That Impairs Reporting  
The following statement indicates that when personnel worked by themselves, 
knowing that no one saw them committing an error, they would not report 
because they were afraid of punishment.  
The disadvantage of reporting is that sometimes you work by yourself, 
so in that case you would not report yourself.  
The next statement indicates that in the organization of this interviewee, 
higher management is using the reporting system to penalize the reporter or 
to ask for explanation.  
Instead of improvement, they use it to penalize or ask for explanations.  
4.7.2 Impracticality of Reporting System That Hinders the Reporting 
Process  
The following statement demonstrates the impracticality of one particular 
reporting system.  
Reporting is not encouraged because other employees can identify the 
reporter especially if one or two people were working on that particular 
shift the time when the event took place.  
The following statement again implies there is a lack of just culture that affects 
the reporting system and as a result the organization lacks safety-critical 
information used for the development of SPIs.  
The reporting system is just a book in the other room where the 
employee would go and report the event.  
The previous statements are indications of the impracticality of the reporting 
system. In these two cases, workers were effectively discouraged or even 
embarrassed to report because this action would be obvious and at the same 
time, they could be identified by the other workers because of the small 
number of people who were working on the same shifts.  
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4.8 A Model of Factors Impeding the production of quality data for the 
Development of SPIs  
Selective coding is the process by which all the categories are combined 
around a single “core” category that represents the central phenomenon or 
that can be identified by asking the question, “What is the main analytic idea 
presented in this research?” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The main objective in 
this study is identifying factors that can influence the reporting systems and 
the collection of quality data used the development of SPIs and hence hinder 
the performance of safety management systems in aviation. The importance 
of this stage of grounded theory development is the development of an overall 
model. The core category identified was the “obstacles in developing SPIs.” 
The connection between “top management decisions influencing safety,” “lack 
of safety culture,” and “impractical and fearful data collection” may be 
summarized as follows: The decisions of top management influenced the 
safety culture of the organization and the lack of a safety culture has a 
subsequent impact on the reporting systems making them impractical to use 
and creating a fear of reporting in employees. The model in Figure 2 
suggested that top management’s attitude toward safety has an impact on the 
decisions taken about the allocation of resources for the provision of training 
to clarify to employees what was considered as acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour. For this reason, and because of the fear of being punished by the 
management, employees choose to hide their errors, and hence these unsafe 
acts go unnoticed, not reported and the organization does not know about the 
presence of the hazard. Top management also demonstrated resistance to 
change and did not encourage the employees to report. Top management 
influences the culture of the organization and because of the culture of the 
organization, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is not understood by 
the employees.  There is a fear of punishment, people hide their errors and 
unsafe acts remain unnoticed. As a further aspect of the culture, there is 
resistance to change and employees are not encouraged to report, resulting 
in a low quantity of data. As a result, the reporting system fails, hazards 
remain hidden and there is no mutual trust between employees. Figure 2 
suggests that these factors, either individually or in combination, influence the 
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quality and quantity of data organizations are required to collect and analyze 
for the development of their SPIs. 
4.9 Results and Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe factors that may 
promote or impede the production of quality data used for the development of 
SPIs in small Mediterranean aviation organizations and service providers.  
Figure 2 shows the model derived from the interview data and grounded 
theory analysis of the factors that can impede, delay, and/or mislead an 
organization in creating their SPIs. Several features of the model were 
consistent with the findings of Gerede (2015a), who also showed how the 
success of the safety management systems could be impeded. Gerede 
(2015a) identified the failure of the reporting system, acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior not being distinguished, fear of punishment, and 
hazards that remain hidden as the main factors contributing to the success or 
failure of an SMS. Gerede’s study (2015a) used a two-day brainstorming 
workshop to identify the factors impeding the performance of SMSs. This 
current study built on the work of Gerede, expanded this work and also 
attempted to acquire deeper knowledge by performing individual, three-hour, 
in-depth interviews with each participant to gain a better understanding of the 
factors impeding the effectiveness of their SMS. The model developed in the 
current study also suggests that top management, culture, and data collection 
processes are significant factors that could either individually or in 
combination influence the success of the SMS by impeding the development 
of the appropriate practice.  
4.9.1 The Perceived Role of Top Management  
While attempting to uncover the factors that impede the production and 
collection of the quality data required for the development of SPIs, it was 
found that the perception of the interviewees was that management showed 
little or no interest in knowing about safety issues was one such factor (Table 
1). The interviewees reported that employees said that management led them 
to understand that they (management) will take action about an issue only 
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when and if they have time. The employees’ perception about management 
was that they do not prioritize safety actions, and on the contrary they would 
only take an action at their convenience. However, for top management to 
demonstrate commitment to safety the manager will be required to possess 
high levels of safety knowledge to act appropriately with respect to safety 
matters and communicate the facts to the personnel. As a result, the safety 
knowledge will enable managers to understand safety-related information, 
draw meaningful conclusions from it, and then demonstrate their commitment 
to safety by their actions (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014a).  
Figure 2 Factors impeding the production and collection of the quality 
data required for the development of SPIs showing the gaps between 
SMS and actual performance 
 
Employees feel that when it comes to safety, management does not want to 
know, does not have the knowledge, and/ or is not interested in knowing. 
Because of this, it would seem that management does not prioritize safety. 
Neal and Griffin (2004, pp. 15–34) define the safety commitment of 
management as, “the extent to which management is perceived to place a 
high priority to safety and communicate and act on safety issues.” Zohar 
(1980) also found that management’s commitment to safety is a major factor 
that can affect the success of an organization’s safety management system. 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University. 
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Studies have shown that senior management can influence 45% of the 
organization’s performance and have a significant influence on organizational 
safety (Clarke, 1999; Day & Lord, 1988; Fruhen et al., 2014b).  
If sufficient resources are not allocated, SPIs cannot be developed. Personnel 
in the interviews said that management would not allocate the necessary 
funds for increasing the number of personnel. This meant that people had to 
divide their working time between working their shift and performing SMS 
activities. Lack of available personnel was forcing people to concentrate on 
their primary job, having no time to perform SMS activities. As a result of this, 
incidents were not investigated, analyzed and assessed in a timely manner 
and hazards remained hidden, often until an employee was able to perform 
the work during their day off. The success of the SMSs declines when 
management fails to allocate resources or show a willingness to improve the 
system (Gerede, 2015b).  
On a related topic, delays in the performance of risk assessments and 
incident investigations were also related to the development of SPIs (Table 1). 
Employees said that risk assessments were also not effectively performed. 
This again means that hazards and risks remained in the system until they 
were eventually identified and addressed. SPIs were not developed as soon 
as the hazards and risks were identified; they had to wait until the safety team 
was removed from the roster or worked overtime or during their own free time, 
meaning that there was a gap between the hazard identification and the 
development of the SPIs, leaving the system exposed to these hazards. Even 
if all the other components of the SMS are working effectively, if risk 
management fails, then it is likely that the SMS will be unsuccessful (Gerede, 
2015b).  
Another important factor contributing to an unsuccessful SMS was lack of 
promoting the SMS. Interviewees said that management does not promote 
the SMS and they have to use their instinct and common sense to identify the 
hazards. This means that what constitutes a hazard for someone might not 
necessarily constitute a hazard for someone else, leaving this to the 
subjective opinion of each individual. As a result, hazards can be left 
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unreported, because the individual might not have considered the event as 
hazardous. Various studies have identified that specific safety practices, such 
as initial and recurrent training for employees, display of safety posters for 
identifying hazards, communication between workforce and managers, 
personal involvement of management in safety issues, and making a high 
priority of safety in meetings predict safety performance. Organizations having 
these safety practices have lower accident rates (Cohen, 1977; Cohen, Smith 
& Cohen, 1975.; DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Griffiths, 1985; Harper et al., 
1997; Shafai & Shahrai, 1971; Shannon et al., 1996; Shannon, Mayr, & 
Haines, 1997; Smith, et al.,1975).  
Employee involvement in safety activities is a key element for the success of 
an SMS. But to achieve this, people first need to be trained. In the current 
study, it was found that people did not receive training on the SMS. 
Interviewees reported that they did not receive SMS training, and they were 
not trained to identify hazards. They used only their common sense for their 
identification. As previously mentioned, not knowing what a hazard can be 
means that hazards go unnoticed, not reported, and not developed into SPIs. 
A key element for the success of an SMS is effective safety training. Safety 
training provides the means for making accidents more predictable 
(Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010). Studies have shown that organizations that do 
not receive adequate training on risk assessment do not perform it adequately 
(Gerede, 2015a).  
Another finding was the lack of attention by top management to what the 
workforce was saying. Interviewees have been asked by the workforce to 
provide them with training on reporting systems or launch a campaign about 
reporting. The interviewees reported that every time they ask top 
management for these courses for the employees, management tells them 
that they will give them training but they never do. This gives employees the 
impression that management does not pay attention to what they are asking, 
and this can have a negative effect on the organization’s safety culture and 
discourage people to adopt a safe behavior. Regular communication about 
safety issues between top management and the workforce is an effective 
 90 
safety management practice that can improve performance (Vinodkumar & 
Bhasi, 2010). Studies by Cohen (1977), Cox and Cheyne (2000), Mearns, 
Whitaker, and Flin (2003), and Vredenburgh (2002) all showed that the safety 
performance of an organization is influenced by the level of communication.  
Lack of encouragement by top management to report issues was another 
factor that was mentioned in the study. Participants said that they were not 
encouraged to report issues. One reason was because they felt that other 
people could identify them. Another reason was that because they did not 
know what was acceptable and unacceptable, they were afraid to report. A 
third reason was that they felt that the reporting system was impractical, 
allowing other people to identify the reporter. Such a lack of encouragement 
impairs the reporting system and safety data collection of the organization, 
leaving hazards unidentified and not investigated. The use of incentives and 
recognition in motivating personnel to perform safely can add interest to the 
hazard control program of an organization (Cohen et al., 1975; Hagan, 
Montgomery, & O’Reilly, 2001). Vredenburgh (2002) also recognizes that 
safety promotion in terms of creating awareness for reporting hazards 
encourages workers to report safety matters.  
4.9.2 Lack of Safety Culture  
The findings also suggest that there may be a lack of just culture. Employees 
reported that it is not clear what should be acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior. Because it was not clear for them what the organization and juridical 
authority considers as being acceptable and unacceptable, they were 
reluctant to report their actions for fear of prosecution. As a result, 
occurrences that should have been investigated to find out what happened, 
why it happened, and how to prevent it from happening again now go 
unnoticed. The biggest concern with judicial action following an aviation 
accident or incident was focused on how it interfered with independent safety 
investigation and undermined the willingness of people to voluntarily report 
errors and violations (Berlinger, 2005; Brous, 2008; Chapman, 2009; Dekker, 
2007, 2009, 2011; Flight Safety Foundation, 2006; Thomas, 2007).  
A lack of trust between personnel was also reported as a factor impeding 
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reporting and thus the production and collection of data to be used for the 
development of SPIs. Interviewees said that reporting was not encouraged 
because other employees could identify the reporter, especially if it was only 
two people working on the shift when the incident took place. Because people 
were reluctant to report occurrences, this inaction gave the opportunity for 
hazards to remain unreported. A common response of professionals was to 
become better at making the evidence go away and not reporting errors: 
“Practicing under the threat of prosecution can only serve to hide errors” 
(Chapman, 2009, pp. 57–59; Dekker, 2011).  
Certain characteristics of the national culture of the participants, such as the 
lack of trust between employees or demonstrating resistance to change, 
suggest that these may influence the safety culture of the organization. 
Research suggests that beyond human factors, social psychological areas 
such as communication, leadership, interpersonal relationships and decision 
making are all influenced by national culture (Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich, 
1993; Berry et al., 1992; Bond,1988; Hofstede, 1991). 
Resistance to change was also found to be a factor delaying the development 
of SPIs. Employees interviewed stated that even if things or situations could 
easily be changed the situations would still not change because they had to 
wait for someone’s approval or because other people were involved in the 
change. Depending on others to make changes, or having a large number of 
people involved to approve the recommendations, allocate resources, or 
communicate with other parties, involved delays in the improvement of the 
situation. In fact, this can be a long process and take time until some action is 
taken. An SMS will not be implemented successfully in organizations where 
there is a culture of only acting through habit and where there is resistance to 
change (Gerede, 2015a).  
4.9.3 Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach  
Fear of punishment was identified in this study as a factor impeding reporting 
processes and the data collection, which is required for the development of 
SPIs. Employees said that reporting is not encouraged by management as 
they were not given training on the reporting system including acceptable and 
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unacceptable behavior. This meant that because people were not informed of 
what was acceptable and unacceptable behavior and because they were 
afraid that reporting their error could result in their prosecution, they were 
reluctant to report their errors.  
Findings suggest that the impracticability of the reporting system can hinder 
the reporting process and the production of quality data to be used for the 
development of SPIs. Employees said that in several cases the reporting 
system was merely a book in which the employee would report the 
occurrence. Because of the nature of the reporting system, the person 
reporting could be easily identifiable especially in the case where only two 
people were working on a shift. Employees knew that others could trace the 
reporter by checking the roster system. This impracticality of the reporting 
system hinders its success because employees are reluctant and discouraged 
from reporting. Incident data are a key element for the function of the SMS. 
From the data on incidents taken from the reporting systems, safety metrics 
can be derived and risk assessment can be conducted; however, the quality 
of the data can influence the results (Wilke, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 2014).  
4.10 Conclusion  
On the basis of interviews with safety managers in the aviation industry about 
safety practices in their organizations, a model of factors that may impede the 
effective functioning of an SMS and the SPIs was developed (see Figure 2). 
The main factors in the less-than-optimal functioning of an SMS may be: the 
role of top management, the lack of safety culture, and the effectiveness of 
the data collection approach, either individually or in combination. When 
present in aviation organizations, these factors are believed to impede the 
production and collection of data required for the development of SPIs and 
thus the effectiveness of the SMSs. Organizations should use both leading 
and lagging SPIs to measure their safety performance. The reported factors 
may be indicative of practices in other aviation service providers as well. 
Knowledge of these impeding factors may help organizations to improve the 
quality and quantity of safety data required for developing their SPIs and for 
measuring the success of their SMS. Addressing the factors that impede the 
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development of quality data required for the development of SPIs can help 















































Chapter 5  
5. Interview Study 
5.1 Introduction 
The present study aims is to investigate the factors that hinder the production 
and collection of the good quality safety data, in sufficient quantities, for the 
development of SPIs in aviation service providers. Dey (1993) suggests that 
qualitative research is an attempt to discover the meaning that people 
attribute to events using their subjective perspective. Creswell (2013) stated 
that qualitative research is used to explore a problem or a subject. Qualitative 
research was preferred for this part of the study, since it attempts to explore 
the explanations that safety managers and employees (part of the safety 
team) attribute to the possible difficulties in producing and collecting safety 
data. 
The main purpose of the study was to validate in a larger sample the main 
factors that hindered the production and collection of data used for the 
development of SPIs in aviation service providers and the factors hindering 
the performance of the SMS. Another aim was to identify the central problem 
and the underlying factors deriving from the main problem. Table 1 (in the 
previous chapter) shows the categories, themes and subcategories of the 
factors that were thought to hinder the production of safety data used for the 
development of the SPIs. 
The preliminary study reported in the previous section was the framework for 
this study and the basis on which the interview questions for this study were 
developed. In the preliminary study, a model of factors that may impede the 
effective functioning of an SMS and the SPIs was developed based upon 
interviews with aviation safety managers about the safety management 
practices in their organizations. The main factors that were believed to be an 
obstacle in the effectiveness of the SMS were: the role of top management, 
the lack of safety culture, and the effectiveness of the data collection 
approach, either influencing individually the effectiveness or in combination. 
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When present in aviation organizations, these factors are believed to impede 
the production of safety data for the development of SPIs and thus the 
effectiveness of the SMSs. Figure 2 in Chapter 4 shows the model derived 
from the preliminary study and interview questions were formed for each main 
category (top management, culture, data collection, just culture, resistance to 
change, reporting systems) 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants  
In qualitative research, the aim is to collect in depth data from events or 
people that constitute the topic of research. The scope of this study covers 
five aviation organizations, including two airlines, three departments of air 
navigation services providers and two airports. Interview data were elicited 
from safety managers and safety officers from five aviation organizations 
(airlines, air traffic service providers, airports). The 23 participants in these 
organizations, selected through purposive sampling, were the safety 
managers of these organizations, employees of the safety department and 
employees responsible to assist the safety manager in the activities of the 
SMS. Another criterion was to select employees involved in the safety 
activities from different kinds of aviation operations.  
A letter was sent to the participants explaining to them the purpose of the 
research and asking the participants if they would be interested in 
participating. Participants who demonstrated an interest in participating were 
contacted further and a meeting was arranged for the interviews.  In order to 
preserve the anonymity of the participants, it is sufficient to mention that 
participants came from the smaller Mediterranean countries, with small to 
medium air navigation providers and airports; a medium to large European 
Airline and a medium sized Middle Eastern airline. 
5.2.2 Data Gathering  
During the preliminary study (presented in Chapter 4), the participants were 
informed during their interviews that there would be a second phase of 
interviews that would take place in the near future and they would be invited 
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to participate if they wished. A month before commencing the second phase 
of the data collection, an introductory letter was sent to the participants by e-
mail to inform them about the research, with a follow-up telephone call before 
the commencement of data collection. They were informed that the objective 
of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of the implementation of their 
SMSs and the production of safety data used for the development of effective 
SPIs and that this research was based on the results derived from the 
preliminary study.  
Participants were asked to participate in a semi-structured interview session. 
The interview questions were printed on a set of papers (one set for each 
interviewee) with sufficient space left for the purpose of taking notes during 
the interview. The in-depth semi-structured interview contained 21 questions: 
four questions to learn about what do these safety managers/ officers think 
about the effectiveness of the SMS; four questions to learn and know about 
the safety commitment of the top management, involvement and safety 
knowledge; three questions about top management and just culture; one 
question about the safety culture based on Reason’s (1997) definitions of 
safety culture; three questions about culture and resistance to change; three 
questions about the data collection process; and three questions about the 
reporting culture and data collection. Examples of the interview questions 
from the qualitative study are presented in Appendix B. 
The data collection was performed between June 2015 and December 2015. 
The duration of the interviews was approximately 2.5–3 hr. During the 
interview, the interviewer took notes of the interviewees’ answers. At the end 
of each interview, the interviews were transcribed and saved into word 
processor files for subsequent analysis. The data were then coded by hand. 
Data were treated ethically, maintaining the anonymity of the participants. The 
Ethical Approval is provided in Appendix F. 
5.3 Analysis  
Thematic analysis encompasses a broad category of approaches to 
qualitative analysis that seek to define themes within the data and organize 
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those themes into some type of structure to aid interpretation (Brooks et al., 
2015). Template Analysis is a form of thematic analysis which emphasizes the 
use of hierarchical coding but balances it with a relatively high degree of 
structure in the process of analyzing textual data with the flexibility to adapt to 
the needs of a particular study. What is important in this technique is the 
development of a coding template, usually on the basis of a subset of data, 
which is then applied to further data, revised and refined. It encourages the 
researcher to develop themes more extensively where the richest data in 
relation to the research question are found. The data involved in template 
analysis are usually interview transcripts but may also include any kind of 
textual data. Template Analysis can be used in qualitative psychology 
research from a range of epistemological positions (Brooks et al., 2015). The 
flexibility of the technique allows it to be adapted to the needs of a particular 
study and that study’s philosophical underpinning. Template Analysis can be 
used in research concerned with “discovering” underlying causes of human 
action and particular human phenomena. When used in this way, one could 
expect to see the use of strong, well-defined a priori themes in analysis and 
concerns with reliability and validity prioritized and addressed. This current 
study uses the themes that emerged from the preliminary study upon which 
this study is based on. The use of a priori themes can ensure focus on key 
areas potentially relevant to a study, building on existing theory (such as the 
one developed in the preliminary study) and developing ideas in linked pieces 
of research. 
5.4 Data analysis and model development 
The main procedural steps in carrying out Template Analysis are outlined 
below as described by King (2012). 
The first step was to become familiar with the accounts to be analyzed. The 
interview answers were read and then cut into pieces and were placed in a 
box.  
The second step was to carry out the preliminary coding of the data by 
highlighting anything in the text that might contribute toward the researcher’s 
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understanding. Using the a priori themes derived from the preliminary study, a 
set of carton boxes was prepared representing each factor (see Figure 2).  
The third step was to organize the emerging themes into meaningful clusters, 
and begin to define how they related to each other within and between these 
groupings. This included hierarchical relationships, with narrower themes 
nested within broader ones. Within each of the broader categories, 
representing a factor in Figure 2, a number of boxes with themes derived from 
each question were prepared.  
The fourth step was to define an initial coding template. Based on the themes 
derived from the preliminary study a coded label was prepared and attached 
to each box. Then each piece was read to decide into which box representing 
a theme was most appropriate for it to be placed. Taking one theme at a time, 
the pieces of paper were removed from the boxes one by one, read and the 
quotes derived from the interview were written under each theme. The main 
themes included “top management’s attitude towards safety”, “safety culture”, 
“reporting systems/ data collection” and “external factors”. 
The fifth step was to re-read the extracts from the interviews and decide 
whether the content could also represent another themed category. In the 
cases in which a quote was considered appropriate to fit in more than one 
theme, the codes of the other theme(s) were written on the piece of paper and 
it was then placed in the most appropriate themed box. This was performed 
for all pieces of paper containing more than one theme until all of the quotes 
were placed under all of the appropriate themes into which they could fit. 
Themes that included fewer than five quotes were deleted and some themes, 
which were considered similar to other themes, were merged. 
The last step was to finalize the template and apply it to the full data set. To 
finalize the template a paper scroll was prepared and each theme and 
subcategory was written on the scroll to represent the full data set. Once all 
the quotes were mapped down under the themes and subcategories, there 
was a further refinement merging some themes together and placing them 
under one chosen theme. 
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After this stage, the quotes underwent the process of triangulation.  Three 
independent people (two having an engineering background and one being 
an aviation professional) were asked to select quotes, read them and provide 
feedback about the placement of that quote under the category. The people 
read the quotes and were asked if they agreed with the decision to place the 
quotes they read under that category. A table classifying the quotes either as 
“negative”, “neutral” or “positive” for each interview question is provided in 
Appendix C. Since this thesis aims in identifying the challenges in 
implementing an SMS, quotes chosen in the analysis were derived from the 
neutral and negative categories. 
Table 2 shows how the quotes from the interviews were mapped under the 
main themes and subcategories of each theme.  The broad category “top 
management’s attitude towards safety”, includes two properties namely “top 
management’s commitment to safety” and “allocation of resources”. The first 
property, top management’s commitment to safety” has three dimensions 
namely “management not interested to know anything about safety”, failure to 
participate in the safety activities, and “failure to understand risks”. It was 
decided that these dimensions be placed under this category as they reflect 
the top management’s attitude towards safety. The second property 
(allocation of resources) in the broad category “top management’s attitude 
towards safety” includes three dimensions: “lack of financial resources”, “lack 
of staff”, “lack of time”. These were grouped under this broad category as it 
was management’s decision to allocate the resources.  
The second broad category includes the properties “just culture” and 
“resistance to change”. Out of these properties, “just culture” has two 
dimensions namely “blame culture” and “fear culture”. These were grouped 
under the broad category of “safety culture” as these properties and 
dimensions reflect the elements of a positive safety culture:  blame and fear 
culture might suggest a lack of a just culture and resistance to change 
suggests a lack of flexible culture.  
The third broad category is “Reporting systems/data collection” and includes 
two properties: “deficient reporting system” and “selective reporting” There are 
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only two dimensions namely “impracticality of the reporting system or 
reporting process” and “insufficiency of the reporting system” under the 
property “deficient reporting system”. These were placed under this broad 
category as they reflect the reasons that influence data collection and 
reporting systems.  
External factors is the last broad category and five properties are placed 
under this category: government, outsourcing, media, legal system, national 
culture. National culture is the only property that has a dimension namely 
“family effect”, this was a characteristic of the national culture of one of the 
Mediterranean countries. These properties were placed under this category 
as it was suggested that there were the factors outside an organization’s 
SMS, but which could influence the effectiveness of the SMS.  
Table 2 Categories and subcategories of the factors impeding the 
performance of the SMS 
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5.5. Top management’s attitude towards safety 
5.5.1. Top management’s commitment to safety 
During the thematic analysis it was discovered that “top management’s 
commitment to safety was one of the factors impeding the production of safety 
data required for the development of SPIs and thus the effectiveness of the 
SMS and this was reflected on eleven comments (see appendix C). 
This was exemplified by one interviewee who commented that he perceived 
that management took no action from the reports and people felt discouraged 
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seeing that management wasn’t involved in the safety activities of the 
organization. To illustrate this perception, an interviewee commented:  
“… it’s difficult to say that they are involved; when you do the reports 
and then nothing happens, people get discouraged”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
Employees also felt that the top management was not making any effort to 
promote safety and that the dissemination of safety information and 
encouragement to report was only performed by the middle managers, 
without any support from top management. The employees perceived that 
there was either a lack of (or insufficient) involvement in safety activities, and 
they perceived that the management was not leading by example.  Instead, it 
was only the middle management who was trying to engage employees in the 
safety activities of the organization. A participant commented that: 
“…they are trying only for the basics, only the safety manager informs 
people, but top management has nothing to do with it; One person is 
trying to inform [the employees] without any support”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
Interviewees also expressed the opinion that every time they asked the 
management for a change or safety improvement, the management replied by 
saying that there weren’t any resources to accomplish it. This was considered 
by the interviewees as simply an excuse for not wishing to allocate resources 
and proceed with the change, or to avoid taking some action to improve 
safety. The employee’s perception is illustrated by the following comment: 
 “they use the phrase ‘we lack resources’ as an excuse of doing 
nothing. Management has to cover their own back” (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee). 
According to one participant, failure by top management to take responsibility 
for their errors yet expecting workers to take responsibilities for their own 
demonstrated a lack of safety commitment that could be discouraging for the 
work force. As implied, the top management needed to demonstrate 
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leadership by example. Failure to take responsibility for their actions reflects 
on the actions of their employees who would also avoid taking responsibility 
and concealing their errors. As explained by the participant in the following 
comment: 
“We don’t want to take responsibilities of our errors, even management 
will not take the responsibilities of their errors; [top] management needs 
to be an example” said another interviewee”. (Safety Manager of 
airline) 
Based on the following comment from a participant, it was perceived that after 
the completion of a safety survey, the management did not take any actions to 
change the culture of the organization. The participant explained that when 
the safety survey was completed, the results were not released to the 
employees because the management perceived that the results derived from 
the survey were negative. The participants explained as follows: 
One of the interviewees commented that “I believe there are no actions to 
change the culture” and the other interviewee commented “management 
takes no action to change the culture of the organization”; “after the safety 
survey there were no results and they have done nothing”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employees) 
The comments from these participants suggest that they perceived that the 
management in their organization was not committed to safety. Top 
management safety commitment plays an important role in establishing a 
safety culture in the organization and a failure to demonstrate safety 
commitment will discourage and hinder employee’s own safety commitment. 
Poor safety commitment demonstrated by the top management reflects on the 
employees and results in difficulty engaging employees with the SMS. 
5.5.2. Management not interested to know anything about safety. 
Comments about the lack of safety commitment by the management were 
decomposed further into “management not interested to know anything about 
safety”; “failure to participate in safety activities”; and “failure to understand 
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risk”. The dimension of “not interested to know anything about safety” was 
placed under this category as this also suggested that a management that 
demonstrated a lack of interest in safety that was perceived as lacking safety 
commitment (see Table 2).  
Participants explained that they perceived that when the management was 
not interested in safety, this lack of interest in the safety of the organization 
was one of the contributing factors that affected the performance of the SMS.  
One participant explained as follows: 
 “[…] but sometimes they don’t want to understand some things” (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee). 
The previous statement suggested that workers believed that although the 
management understood risks, they chose to present to employees the 
impression that they did not understand risks to avoid taking any actions. 
When pretending that everything was working well, as it should have been, 
there was no reason for making changes. Workers perceived that when the 
top management actually understood the risks but chose to pretend ignorance 
about them, the management’s actions made employees perceive that they 
were not committed to safety. 
Another participant believed that the top management in his organization was 
not involved in the safety activities of the organization.  They felt that the 
middle management understood the risks better and were more encouraged 
to discuss these with them: 
” …we usually go to the manager of the department [to discuss] the top 
management is never involved” (Airline employee). 
The previous comment indicated that employees always preferred to discuss 
their concerns with the manager of their department (the middle management) 
rather than address them to the top management. Their decision to exclude 
top management from sharing their concerns could suggest a number of 
reasons: that workers perceived the management did not care about safety; 
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the management had showed in the past that they never listened to what 
employees had to say; the employees did not trust the management, or that 
employees knew that even if they approached the management to discuss 
their concerns the management was not going to take any action. 
Other participants explained it in the following comments: 
 “… we have meetings [with the top management] every three months 
to discuss the problems of the organization (Airline employee)” 
The comment from this participant suggested that they had the expectation 
that meetings would be held more often than every three months, and there 
would be the opportunity to discuss other themes besides just problems. 
While another participant added that:  
“we have meetings only when is needed” (Airline employee). 
Participants perceived that the top management was not open for discussion 
about safety issues. Failure by management to discuss safety issues in 
meetings made employees perceive that the matters of safety were not as 
important as the other organizational problems hence resulting in second 
place in the discussion board.  
Issues related to safety should be discussed daily. Employees should be 
encouraged to report as data gathering is an important element of the SMS 
and an SMS can’t be efficient without data. In organizations suffering from a 
poor safety culture, and especially in the cases where national culture 
influences the safety culture of the organization, there will be an impact on the 
reporting culture of the organization. The following comment implied that in 
addition to having a culture in which employees were encouraged to report 
and were not afraid, the organization needed to demonstrate to employees 
that there was an open-door policy. A participant explained this need as 
follows: 
 106 
“If you were in another country [In Europe] and in another company, 
you could talk more openly to the management” (Air Navigation Service 
Provider employee). 
5.5.3 Failure to participate in the safety activities 
The thematic analysis based on the interviewees’ comments showed that in 
some aviation organizations there was a failure of the management to 
participate in safety activities. This category was believed to be best placed 
under the property of “top management commitment to safety”. Failure of the 
top management to participate in the safety activities of the organization, 
while asking employees to be engaged in the safety activities of the 
organization but top management not leading by example, was perceived by 
the participants as a lack of safety commitment by the management. Twelve 
participants perceived that the management was not interested in participating 
in the safety activities (see appendix C). 
A participant explained this as follows: “I am not sure if they take part in safety 
or read the reports” (Air Traffic Service Provider employee).  
Another interviewee commented that “they are involved in the safety process 
at the very end” (Air Traffic Service Provider employee).  
The comments, suggested that the employees of the organization had doubts 
concerning whether management read the reports or participated in safety 
activities. These doubts suggested that they believed that management was 
demonstrating a lack of commitment, which discouraged the employees. Lack 
of commitment and failure to encourage workers to participate in safety 
activities resulted in a reduction in reports by the employees and impacted the 
safety behaviour of the employees. 
An interviewee stated that: “they [top management] are only there to give 
directions” (Airport employee). 
The previous statement indicated that the employees perceived that the 
management was not contributing to safety. Employees perceived that the 
management was asking employees to participate in safety activities while 
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they themselves did not express a willingness to contribute to the safety 
activities causing segregation between “them” and “us”.  
Workers perceived the lack of top management support as a demonstration of 
a poor top management safety commitment. They perceived that a lack of 
safety commitment by top management was having an impact on establishing 
a safety culture, impeded the development of a just culture and reporting 
culture, and affected the flexible culture of their organization. 
5.5.4 Failure to understand risks 
The interviewees commented that they felt that the management did not 
understand the risks or they felt that the management did not perceive the 
severity of some outcomes related to operations. Fourteen participants 
expressed their belief that the management did not understand risks to the 
extent they should.  One participant commented as follows: 
“Management does not understand the risks to the extent they should” 
(Airline employee). 
Similarly, another employee commented: 
“We see that people that came from the same environment don’t 
understand risks and this is a very negative aspect” (Air traffic service 
provider employee) 
Failure to understand risk by the management may cause them to 
underestimate risk and influence their decisions about the corrective actions. 
Interviewees felt that it was disappointing that the people who had worked in 
the same position and understood the risks while working in those positions, 
after their promotion, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the risks or 
forgot completely about these risks. 
Another interviewee suggested that promotion to a higher position caused 
management to view risks with a different perspective or caused them to have 
a different appreciation of risk.  Workers needed to discuss and communicate 
information clearly in order to make top management understand: 
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“They have different appreciation of the risk but you need good 
communication to convey and convert information to make them 
understand.” (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
Another interviewee commented that the management in his organization 
understood risk but due to external influences, the management had to 
prioritize corrective actions: 
“they understand but they face their own needs. So it’s like they have 
never existed in this environment. They have to do their own things. 
They have to serve their needs or themselves first and the 
responsibilities of their positions.” (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
This interviewee explained that he perceived that the management is his 
organization did not appreciate risks, and did not mirror the expectations of 
the employees. Employees perceived that the top management understood 
the risks, as before being promoted to managerial positions these people 
were working in the same position where these employees were currently 
working. The interviewee believed that the management in his organization, 
may understand risks, but they chose to pretend that they did not to avoid 
taking corrective actions as he perceived that there might be other external 
factors exerting pressure to the management. 
A participant explained in the following comment that top management and 
workers in the organization perceived risk in a different way. When 
management had a different appreciation of risks, employees perceived that 
there was a difference of understanding between them. Workers perceived 
that the top management was demonstrating a lack of safety commitment 
since they felt that the top management was not willing to learn more about 
the risks employees were facing in operations.  
“There are conflicts between employees of the organization and 
management because they have a different appreciation” (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee). 
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Failure by top management to understand risk can be an obstacle in 
establishing and maintaining a positive relationship between top management 
and employees. Employees will perceive that there is a lack of safety 
commitment by the management and a failure to understand risks influences 
the decisions of the top management for the allocation of the resources 
needed corrective actions. Lack of appreciation of risk by top management 
may be perceived by the employees as resistance to change. 
5.5.5 Allocation of financial resources 
The implementation and operation of any SMS will require human, financial 
resources, time and equipment. Lack of any of the above may pose 
challenges in the operation, effectiveness and safety performance 
assessment of the SMS. 
One participant explained in the following comment that management 
wouldn’t allocate resources easily and employees needed to convince top 
management to allocate the resources. The interviewee commented that 
whenever an employee asked for a change to be made, if the management 
estimated that it was not costly and did not require financial resources, it was 
more likely to happen. In contrast, if the change was perceived by the 
management as expensive it was probable that the management would not 
allocate the resources required for the change. 
An employee commented that “it’s a lot of work to convince them; depends on 
the money you want to spend; cheap things change easily” (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee). 
Another interviewee commented that “things can change but you need to fight 
a lot” (Air Traffic Service provider employee). 
Participants explained that every time they needed a change, convincing the 
management to allocate the resources was not an easy task. Employees 
perceived that the top management was demonstrating resistance to change 
by refusing to allocate financial resources. Employees also perceived this 
response as a lack of safety commitment since the management was not 
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willing to allocate the resources for the changes and resisting the changes 
demonstrated a failure of the top management to understand risks. 
Interviewees implied that although sometimes the organization was willing to 
make some changes, they could make changes only based on the available 
resources. Based on the comments that follow, it was believed that the 
organization was willing to make any required changes but due to the lack of 
resources the organization was not financially able to do so. Lack of, or 
constrained resources require organizations to prioritize changes. An 
organization will prioritize the actions to take, with preference given to the 
actions required for regulatory compliance and high-risk situations. Cultural 
transformation, safety training and promotion might not be considered as a 
priority. 
“We change things to the degree our resources allow us. The 
organization is willing to adopt a positive safety culture but “I want to” 
and I can do” are two different things.” (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
“Depends on the funding, since we are in the public sector, training is 
not a priority for example we need to get an approval for training for a 
specific task” (Air Traffic Service provider employee). 
The previous comments imply that organizations in the public sector have to 
depend on the government for the allocation of financial resources. The 
challenge lies in the fact that if the government fails to appreciate the risks 
correctly, this may influence their decisions about the allocation of resources. 
Failure to allocate the resources to the organization impedes the organization 
from accomplishing their safety outcomes or their safety performance 
measurement and hence the success of their SMS.  
Another participant made the following comment, that when the organizations 
were part of the government, the insufficient allocation of resources impacted 
their operations causing an inflexible culture, resistant to change and which 
resulted in a delay in corrective actions, prioritizing only the actions that were 
needed to meet the regulatory requirements. 
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“We don’t have a flexible culture because we depend on the ministry 
and there is bureaucracy” …“We cannot need something and have it 
exactly when we want it [bureaucracy makes us wait]…” Under the 
circumstances, everything is subject to the approval of funds” (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee) 
“We work in the framework of what we can do [with the available 
resources]. Something cannot be done if there are no resources, for 
example a unit might need more experts but there is no one available 
or no resources” (Air Traffic Service provider employee). 
The participant explained that due to the nature of the reporting system, the 
organization was suffering from a reduced number of reports. The interviewee 
explained that he asked the top management to allocate resources to promote 
the reporting system and emphasize the just culture of the organization in 
order to increase the number of reports. The interviewee added that the top 
management would not allocate the resources for improving the reporting 
system, but instead they suggested that the manager of each department 
should be willing to train his employees. Employees perceived this response 
as a lack of safety commitment by the management.  They perceived that the 
management was not committed to allocate the resources for improving the 
reporting system, hence increasing the number of reporting and establishing a 
safety culture.  
One safety manager of an organization commented that “we don’t have 
enough reports and because of the lack of resources, we have other things to 
prioritize. In the past we asked if someone can come and do a presentation 
(also mentioned by another interviewee in the pilot study in the previous 
chapter) and explain things, but this depends on the good will of the manager 
of each station”.  
The following statement indicated that the organization had limited resources 
and were trying to accomplish a cultural transformation within a framework of 
limited resources: 
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“We promote culture change under limited resources” (Safety Manager 
of Air Traffic Service provider).  
Another safety manager stated that: “we have priorities, first is what is 
imposed by regulations” (Airline Safety Manager) 
Due to insufficient resources the organization had to prioritize corrective 
actions and only change what was required for regulatory compliance. Actions 
that could have increased the levels of safety performance were secondary in 
the priorities list. 
5.5.6 Lack of staff-human resources 
Similar to the previous challenge “lack of time”, lack or insufficient human 
resources may impede the timely accomplishment of tasks. Lack of human 
resources resulted in prioritizing tasks and so some tasks were left 
unaccomplished.  
The following comments imply that the shortage of staff impacts on every day 
work. Employees have to take on additional tasks to compensate for the lack 
of staff. An employee commented as follows: 
“Shortage of staff is reflected everywhere” (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee).  
Additionally, employees need to prioritize tasks and perform those of highest 
importance first, such as the tasks assigned to them in their job description 
and only then work on additional tasks in their free time. 
The organizations that are understaffed might demonstrate a delay in the 
accomplishment of certain activities. People working in these organizations 
were required to perform their primary job and in addition to that, also perform 
safety activities. This caused a delay in the timely identification of hazards and 
in taking remedial actions. This was explained as follows by another 
participant: 
“A lot of hazards remain hidden because we have a shortage of staff. 
We cannot do [because of the lack of staff] a risk assessment” and 
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another interviewee commented that: “data collection consumes a lot of 
resources (time and people).” (Air Navigation Service provider 
employee) 
The safety activities of an organization such as data collection and risk 
assessment, consume resources. Risk assessment requires human 
resources and time. Workers in organizations that are understaffed and 
without dedicated personnel for safety activities needed to perform their 
primary job first and then safety activities. Due to the fact that they could only 
perform a limited number of tasks within a shift, employees perceived that 
there were delays in the accomplishment of safety activities. Lack of human 
resources and lack of dedicated personnel may result in additional workload, 
pressure on employees and exposure of the organization to the hazards until 
corrective actions are taken.  There were delays in risk assessments and 
corrective actions and which may also contribute to misleading results in 
safety performance measurement. 
One participant explained in the following comment, that although the 
organization was willing to take corrective actions, it was the lack of staff that 
impeded them from taking the corrective actions. 
“[…] only for a few circumstances, actions are taken to correct the 
situations because of the lack of personnel, not because there is no 
will.” (Airline employee) 
The following comment indicated that the shortage of staff did not permit the 
employees to perform risk assessments, and the people in the organization 
continued to work using outdated practices that were no longer appropriate 
and safe for the volume of traffic the organization was handling. 
“Shortage of staff: They cannot do the risks assessment. People are 
stuck in common practices, which are not always the safest. 
Procedures on towers Vs the volume of traffic: now the procedures 
don’t work because they introduced new risks. Complex airport traffic/ 
volume and the procedures and the environment do not contribute in 
the safe flow of traffic”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
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5.5.7 Allocation of time 
As previously commented on by the participants, insufficient resources had an 
impact on the performance of the safety activities of the organization. This 
meant that aviation organizations lacked dedicated personnel resulting in 
additional workload for employees. Employees had more tasks to accomplish 
in less time, hence they had to prioritize between their primary job and the 
additional activities assigned to them. As explained in the previous comment, 
due to the fact that the employee had to prioritize their normal duties for their 
job, they could only perform safety activities, such as accident investigation, 
whenever they had free time, resulting in a delay in the accomplishment of the 
tasks: 
“For example, if you have an investigation to do, you need to do it 
immediately, you cannot wait for another 9 months. It is important to do 
things on time.” (Air Navigation Service provider manager) 
This comment implies that lack of dedicated personnel may result in a delay in 
the accomplishment of safety activities; hazards remain hidden, remedial 
actions are not taken, and misleading results are provided in safety 
performance measurement. 
Lack of dedicated personnel for the accomplishment of safety activities may 
also cause a delay in their performance. As a result, employees had to work 
overtime or work during their days off which could have demotivating effects. 
Delay in the accomplishment of the safety activities implies that until the 
hazards were identified and analyzed, the organization remained exposed to 
the hazards that remained hidden. This is illustrated in the comment below: 
“There should be a dedicated safety manager not someone who works 
on shifts”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
Another interviewee expressed his concern about the bureaucratic ways of 
doing things in the cases where the aviation organizations were influenced or 
operated by the government:  
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“Things are even slower in the government, there is resistance from the 
government or public sector”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
The participant explained that when the aviation service provider was part of 
the government or operated by a government agency, this caused a delay in 
taking decisions on the remedial actions and releasing a budget for the 
actions due to the fact that everything was subject to approval. It was possible 
that the government showed resistance for these reasons: because they did 
not understand the risks and the importance of the remedial actions; and 
secondly because they were trying to minimize costs.  
Lack of resources, (human, financial, time) results in the delay of certain tasks 
that are important to be accomplished on time, hence hazards will remain 
longer in the organization and the organization cannot improve its 
performance. 
5.6. Lack of safety promotion 
5.6.1 Lack of encouragement 
The following comments from interviewees implied that it was perceived by 
employees in the organization that the top management was not promoting 
the safety culture of the organization and it was only the safety manager who 
was making all the efforts to promote safety. The employees perceived that 
the top management was not leading by example and this was demotivating 
for the employees, as they perceived that the management was not taking 
part in promoting the safety culture. Eleven participants felt that the 
management was not promoting the safety culture (see appendix C). The 
participant explained this as follows: 
“But the management has nothing to do with the safety culture. Only 
the safety manager informs the people. One person is trying to inform 
everyone without any support”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
“Only the safety manager and the investigation team encourage 
reporting” (Airline employee). 
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The next comment implied that the safety culture was not promoted equally 
throughout the organization. In some departments, the organization was not 
promoting they safety culture. Lack of safety promotion impeded employees 
from taking part in safety related activities such as reporting. Lack of safety 
promotion will also have an impact on the just culture, on the reporting culture 
and the safety culture of the organization as a whole, resulting in a reduced 
number of reports.  
“In the office they don’t see the benefits [of reporting] they don’t have a 
safety culture. They don’t see that their report is used to create a better 
workplace” (Airline employee). 
Based on the next comment it was perceived by the employees that the 
management did not practice what they preached and was not taking any 
actions to change the culture of the organization. 
“Management said they encourage the change of the culture of the 
organization but I don’t think they are taking any measures” (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee). 
The following comment implied that the management did not encourage 
reporting and every time the employees had the opportunity to avoid reporting 
they would take that opportunity. The interviewee commented as follows: 
“Management does not encourage reporting. If you are not obliged or 
you have another choice you will not report” (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
As implied in the statements, the employees felt that top management to did 
not encourage them to report and they perceived that the top management 
was not committed to safety. Lack of encouragement to report contributes to a 
lack of safety promotion, impacts the reporting culture of the organization and 
the effectiveness of the SMS. 
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5.6.2 Lack of training. 
Providing training to employees is essential for their day to day work and as 
well to increase the participation and commitment of the employees in the 
safety of the organization. Lack of training implies that the employees don’t 
possess the required skills for the task, or ignorance, uncertainty and fear 
might also impede them from participating in the safety activities. 
Based on the comment below it was perceived that the organization was not 
promoting safety: the employees felt that in their organization, the top 
management provided them with less training than was provided in most 
organizations. The fact that the organization was reducing training time, from 
one year to a few weeks was perceived by the employees of the organization 
as a lack of safety commitment. The participant commented as follows: 
“Instead of giving us radar monitoring training which is in most 
organizations approximately one year, they give it to us in a few 
weeks”. Commented an air traffic service provider employee. (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee) 
5.6.3 Just culture 
The dimensions “blame culture” and “fear culture” were placed under the 
property of “just culture”. This part discusses how employees perceived that 
they were blamed directly or indirectly in their organization and expressed a 
concern that they were working in an atmosphere of fear. This fear culture 
may have a direct impact on the reporting system, impeding reporting. 
5.6.4 Blame culture 
One interviewee suggested in the following comment that employees got into 
trouble when they made a voluntary report. Blaming employees was 
discouraging, especially when they voluntarily made a report to improve the 
safety performance of the organization. It was implied that this might have an 
impact on the reporting system, as more and more employees would be 
discouraged to report especially if there was peer pressure:  for example, a 
person who was already blamed and ended up getting into trouble 
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encourages another person not to report. This resulted in the organization 
missing important information from both mandatory and voluntary systems. 
Employees would choose not report in the voluntary system just to minimize 
the possibility of getting blamed and they would also try to avoid reporting in 
the mandatory system. This is illustrated in the next comment: 
“Something that has to do with you and you end up into trouble just 
because you made a voluntary report”. (Airline employee) 
Based on the comment below it was perceived that the management indirectly 
blamed the employees who reported using the voluntary reporting system. 
This action discouraged employees to report and the employees who were 
blamed advised other employees intending to report, not to report to also 
avoid being blamed. Employees perceived that their efforts and willingness to 
report was not appreciated by the management and instead they were 
accused that they were only reporting to create a problem to the 
management. 
“If it’s a voluntary report they will say that you are doing it on purpose 
just to create an issue”. (Airline employee) 
As implied by the comments in the next sub-section, it was perceived that 
some employees would only report because they were afraid that a failure to 
report would have got them fired. It was implied that the employees did not 
trust the management and they were afraid that when they reported, the 
management wouldn’t understand the circumstances underlying the event 
and blame them. 
5.6.5 Fear culture 
Fear culture is an obstacle impeding the reporting and safety culture of the 
organization. The organization’s approach to handling errors can result in fear 
and uncertainty which will make employees reluctant to report. 
“[They are] willing to do the reports because they might be afraid that 
they will lose their jobs. Yes there is lack of trust [this is why] they don’t 
report”. (Airline employee) 
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“For some cases you wouldn’t do a report, you are not sure if they will 
understand you”. (Airline employee) 
Based on the comment from the manager below, it was implied that although 
the organization never punished any of the employees, the employees were 
still afraid of punishment. It was perceived that the employees did not trust the 
management. One participant explained this in the next comment: 
“They don’t trust us they think that we will use their report to punish them 
although we have never done this. But this is what they think. They will 
also involve their union and their union will come against us”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider manager) 
5.7 Resistance to change 
Employees and top management in aviation organization demonstrated 
resistance to change for different reasons. Seventeen participants 
commented that the organization was demonstrating a resistance to change 
toward the adoption of a positive safety culture (see appendix C). 
The employees refused to change their working practices to adopt those that 
were safer and more appropriate for the task. Outdated practices, no longer 
appropriate for the operations of the organizations might imply that there were 
hazards that were hidden. An interviewee explained about the resistance to 
change commented as follows: 
“No I cannot do it and I don’t want to do it.” (Airline employee) 
“Habits do not change easily, they are deeply rooted.”  (Airline 
employee) 
As illustrated below, one employee commented that the middle management 
was making efforts to change the habits of people in the organization but 
employees resisted these changes: 
“Small efforts but they find resistance from people.” (Airline employee) 
Another employee commented that: 
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“When you are working don’t change anything, until they tell you to 
change.” (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
As implied, employees sometimes acknowledged that their working practices 
were not safe nevertheless, they continued to work with these practices just to 
avoid the hassle of changing the way the worked (see Appendix C).  This 
continued until someone asked the employees to correct their working 
practices. Bringing the wrong working practices to the attention of the safety 
manager would have meant that the manager would need to change the 
procedure and as a consequence ask them to change them. Keeping quiet 
implied that the safety manager would not ask them to change the way they 
worked. 
The following comment illustrates the perception that employees in the 
organization were afraid to change things that were deeply rooted in that 
organization.  
“In the past there was the fear of changing things that were 
established.” (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
Fear of changing things may result from the perception that time would be 
required to adjust to the new conditions, constant reminders that the working 
practices have changed and fear of uncertainty. Moving towards uncertainty 
causes fear of the unknown so people tend to prefer to choose the safe route, 
the one they know. For this reason, according to their experience, they do not 
want to change anything since they already know that they can make it work 
that way. 
Based on the comment that follows, some departments of the organization 
showed resistance to change, as they perceived that if they changed their 
way of working, the new working practices could cause their performance to 
drop. The fear that their performance would drop caused these particular 
departments to resist the changes. This was illustrated in the next comments: 
“The organization is willing [to change] however there are departments 
that have resistance because they have learned to work in a specific 
 121 
way and it’s difficult for them to change the mentality or way of thinking 
and to a small extend the fear that their performance will drop”. (Airline 
employee) 
As the comments suggest, both the management and the employees may 
demonstrate resistance to change. It is possible that the management may 
not have asked for changes to be made because changes require the 
allocation of resources for employee’s overtime, new equipment and new 
training. Employees avoided asking for changes so they would avoid the 
hassle of retraining, examination and adaptation. If everything was working, 
the employees felt that there was no reason to ask for any improvements. 
One participant commented as follows: 
“The things are stable. We don’t ask, they don’t ask”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
Resistance to change has caused a hindrance to changing things for a 
significant period of time in the next participant’s organization. Only during the 
last year with the development of the SMS requirements things started to 
change in that organization. To illustrate this one employee commented that: 
“It has been 15 years things do not change. Only the last year things 
change.” (Airline employee) 
In the next comment one employee perceived that working habits only 
changed because the management impressed on the employees that they 
had to change. It was perceived that employees resisted the changes 
because they didn’t understand the reason of change and thus refused to 
change their working habits. When employees felt that management, without 
any justification or explanation, was imposing on them a change in the way 
they worked they resisted.  They exhibited a negative reaction because they 
felt that they did not want someone to impose on them the way of doing their 
job. This participant explained this in the next comment: 
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“Different habits change by imposing:” I want it this way. Because I am 
using this method and I get what I want”. (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
One participant explained in the following comment that in his organization, 
employees had to accept how things were, and do their work without asking 
for anything to change. Employees perceived this absence of change as an 
unwillingness to improve.  They perceived that resistance to change was deep 
rooted in the culture of the organization. Resistance to change became 
embedded in the culture of the organization (“this is the way we work here”) 
and employees had to accept that things were this way and the organization 
couldn’t do anything to change them. To illustrate this an interviewee 
commented: 
“The culture of “accept how things are and mind your own business”. 
(Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
As implied by the following comment from an interviewee, it was perceived 
that it was not easy to change the habits of employees because they are 
deeply-rooted and efforts were needed to change these habits. 
“It needs efforts to change habits” (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee). 
Comments from the interviewees indicated that national culture (the culture 
from the small Mediterranean countries they came from) might have affected 
the organizational culture. The next comment implied that the national culture 
of the employees had an impact on the organizational culture. The employees 
perceived that it might have been ethically wrong to comment on someone 
who was more senior than them. Another explanation is that the employees 
might have perceived that it would have been difficult to change the way a 
senior employee worked, as working all these years in a specific way would 
be difficult for them to change that way of work. Not informing a senior 
employee about his incorrect work practice meant that the employee 
continued to work in this way (since no one was correcting him) until when a 
specific working practice had to be put into practice, this became evident and 
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was identified during a simulator session. As implied in the comment from the 
interviewee, in their organization they identified mistakes during the simulator 
session and tried to change the habits in training courses. Nevertheless, 
because simulator examinations were not conducted often (usually once or 
twice a year) this implied that for almost one year – or even more - errors 
remained in working practices.  This continued until the person was asked to 
put in practice the specific procedure which was incorrect during the 
simulator. The fact that simulator examinations were not undertaken often 
made identifying errors more difficult. 
“If there is someone who is senior in terms of more years at work, I 
cannot change his mistakes.” (Airline employee) 
“Different ways to change habits: the first time with the refreshing 
courses. Bad habits come to surface. Only in the simulator mistakes 
will be discovered.” (Airline employee) 
When a safety manager interviewee was asked how they changed habits in 
their organization, they commented that they were changed through training. 
Feedback given to them on their performance or feedback during work 
supervision by the safety manager was not taken into consideration and was 
thought to be insufficient to change the habits of the employees. This was 
illustrated in the following comment:  
 “Training. Feedback but they don’t take them too much into 
consideration”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
This participant in his following comment implied that the organization was 
avoiding changes by changing only what was required in the safety 
assessment. This implied that the organization was trying to reduce changes 
to the minimum. 
“[We] Avoid changes, we do not change things other than those in 
safety assessment.” (Airport employee) 
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As a specific example, in the following comment, the employees perceived 
that the management did not give them the opportunity to express their 
opinion in this matter even if it was the employees who were actually going to 
use the headsets. These actions made them perceive that the management is 
not thinking of their employees: 
 “For example, it was decided that we were going to use headsets. 
From EASA they gave us the choice whether to use the single or the 
double. We were thinking to buy a single headset and a double, so 
each person would use the one he wanted. Although EASA gave us 
enough budget to buy both of them for each person, the management 
imposed to is that we will use the double”. (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
One participant commented that the management was trying to make 
changes in the organization. However, it was perceived by the employees that 
the changes the management were making were not made in a way to please 
the employees.  The changes were seen more like a punishment. 
“They try to change but not in a way to please the staff. Not corrective 
meaningful corrective actions but [actions] to punish the staff.” (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee) 
5.8 Deficient reporting system 
Problematic reporting systems will yield low quality data that are not suitable 
for the development of SPIs. Poor and insufficient reporting can be a result of 
an insufficient and impractical reporting system. 
5.8.1 Inadequacy of the reporting system 
As implied by the following comment, the interviewee perceived that the 
reporting system was insufficient and did not give a complete picture of the 
hazards. Twenty-one participants commented that the reporting system didn’t 
give a clear picture of all the hazards (see appendix C). As a result it would 
not give indications of the existence of hazards until they were realized. The 
participant commented as follows: 
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“The reporting system is reactive, indicates the trouble areas”. (Airline 
employee) 
Based on the following comment, the reporting system by itself was not 
thought to be sufficient to identify all the problematic areas of these service 
providers. Hence this implied that organizations that relied only on the 
reporting system for data were not getting the complete picture of the hazards 
and there were hazards that remained unidentified (see Appendix C). Only 
when the reporting system was used in combination with other data collection 
systems could the organizations have had a more complete picture. The 
participants commented as follows: 
“Other safety tools used to have a clear picture (TOKAI, ASMT RAT)”. 
(Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
“Reporting is incomplete. Most important is FDM” (Airline employee) 
“Does not take into consideration all the hazards of an airport. It needs 
to be expanded”. (Airport employee) 
“Gives a good picture but not the whole picture”. (Airline employee) 
“For example, unstable approaches: the picture does not come from 
the reporting but from the FDM”. (Airline employee) 
“It depends, ex bird strike. If you have a bird strike you don’t require 
additional information. If there is not only [external] damage because of 
bird strike, and maintenance is involved, maybe you need more info 
from the maintenance to classify the event in order to know what action 
to take”. (Airline employee) 
Based on the next comments, it was perceived that by only using the 
reporting system, the organization was not able to get a clear picture where 
the risks were. Hazards were in some cases unidentified and not reported 
because the employees might not have realized that their working practices 
were not correct but these hazards could have only been identified through 
other activities. One interviewee commented as follows: 
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“There is a blurred, not clear picture where the risk is. [We] Find out 
[where the risk is] through other activities: capacity exercises, failures, 
during the investigation you identify other failures”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
5.8.2 Impracticality of the reporting system/process 
All twenty-three participants commented that there were cases where hazards 
were not captured through the reporting system but were discovered by 
chance (see appendix C). One interviewee commented that due to the 
manner in which the reporting system worked the safety manager was not the 
only person to know about the occurrence; the top management was also 
informed about it. When management was informed about the occurrence, 
they removed the employees from their duty. As a result, other employees 
were able to know if an employee was removed from duty. Removing 
employees from the roster gives the impression to other employees that the 
person removed was involved in an occurrence. Employees perceived that 
the reporting system and the process were impractical as it permitted 
employees to identify the reporter as a consequence of the actions taken by 
management. Employees felt embarrassed when removed from their duties 
and from the roster as the felt that other workers discussed this behind their 
backs, resulting in discouragement from using the system. Employees felt that 
the nature of the reporting system was resulting in a lack of trust, as they were 
afraid of the unknown (for example: Who is going to read my report? I am 
going to get into trouble?). It was perceived that there was a lack of trust 
between employees as they thought that they could become the subject of 
discussion and gossip when someone read their report due to the nature of 
their reporting system. Employees knowing what could follow on after their 
report preferred not to report, rather than reporting and being the subject of 
gossip in the organization. One participant explained in the next comment: 
“They are afraid of the psychological exposure to the colleagues due to 
the employee’s withdrawal from duty by the board”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
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As implied by the following comment it was perceived by the employees that 
their reporting system was impractical. By perceiving that the reporting system 
was impractical, the employees were discouraged to make reports. Instead 
they preferred to write about an occurrence in the logbook.  The impracticality 
of the reporting system contributed to employees avoiding making a proper 
detailed report and instead making a less detailed report in the logbook.  
“A bit reluctant they are bored with the whole process. It might be 
easier to write the occurrence in the logbook rather than do a report. 
It’s more practical”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
Based on the following comment it was perceived that from the impracticality 
of the reporting system other employees knew who made the report. 
Employees knew that other employees could read their reports, and feared 
that other employees would discuss and gossip about them.  There was a 
lack of trust in the reporting system which discouraged them from reporting. 
This was illustrated in the next comment: 
“Every time there is a report this [the report] goes out”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee). 
5.8.3 Selective reporting 
The following comments implied that employees selected what to report and 
who to report. 
As implied by the following comment, it was perceived that when the 
employees were working with their friends, they did not report when their 
friend was involved in an occurrence. The employee seeing his friend 
committing an error would just advise him not to do it again. These errors 
went unnoticed since neither of them reported the occurrence.  
“If it’s between friends we will tell him not to do it again and not report 
him. If it’s a shift manager he can say “this will stay between us””. (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee) 
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The danger lies in the fact that the employee who committed the error, risked 
committing the same error again if he was working alone. If the error was not 
reported this could mean that the organization would be unaware and be 
unlikely to correct the employee’s knowledge. 
Based on the following it was found that when the employees reported, they 
selected what to report. Employees would not report an event in which they 
were involved. It was perceived that the employee only presented his/her 
version but often without mentioning his/her contribution to the event. This is 
illustrated in the next comment: 
“We report others. For example, “the pilot of that XXXX airline did this, 
this, this and this but we are not saying [reporting] that we made the 
pilot’s life difficult so when we report, we don’t mention our contribution 
to the event so the report has a gap”. (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
The following comment indicated that employees would report others but not 
themselves unless it was for their own benefit. In addition, when an 
interviewee was involved in an occurrence he would only report if he 
perceived that the other employee involved came from a company with a 
positive safety culture, which meant it was more likely that the other person 
would also report.  However, if the interviewee thought that the other 
employee wouldn’t file a report, then the interviewee wouldn’t report either. 
The participant explained as follows: 
“We don’t report ourselves. We don’t want to report our errors. I only do 
the report if it’s for my own benefit. If I knew that the pilot wouldn’t 
report I wouldn’t report either. For example, the other day I was 
involved in an incident with a pilot of xxx airline and because I knew 
they have a mature safety culture, I knew the pilot would report; that’s 
why I reported as well. But if I knew that he wouldn’t report I wouldn’t 
have reported either”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
Based on the following comment it was perceived that reporting depended on 
each individual and was subjective. There were individuals that might not 
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perceive an event as something that needed to be reported, while others 
might feel that they needed to report something minor. The danger behind this 
rests in the fact that the event could have gone unnoticed when the potential 
reporter worked by himself, assessed the event as minor and was not advised 
by someone to report. One participant explained in the following comment: 
“They will assess the seriousness [of the event] depending on 
Eurocontrol. For example, I might not consider something as important 
[and not report it] but someone else might tell me that I need to report it”. 
(Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
5.9 External factors 
An overview of the external factors is given in the following sub-section. 
External factors influencing the performance of the SMS may include the 
government, the media, the legal authorities and national culture (including 
the dimension “family effect”).  These are all factors that can have an impact 
on aviation service providers. 
5.9.1 Government 
The following comment implied that the employees in the organization were 
willing to make changes in the organization.  However, in some cases, the 
organizations who were financially dependent on the government or who were 
managed by the government, perceived that the government demonstrated 
resistance when allocating resources. The government resistance to  
allocating resources to aviation organizations had a negative impact on the 
organization’s SMS as it delayed the organization taking corrective actions or 
delayed the efforts to change the culture. Participants explained as follows: 
“Things are slower in the government. Managers and staff are capable 
and willing, but find obstacle [from the government]”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
“Things are moving slower in the government, there is resistance form 
the public sector/government.” (Air Traffic Service Provider employee) 
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“The organization is willing to change towards the adoption of a 
positive safety culture. Positive but because we are part of the 
government there are restrictions. You cannot make easily steps 
forward”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
“They are trying but there is resistance from the ministry”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
The following comments implied that external factors, such as financial 
dependence on the government, exerted pressure on organizations to 
prioritize certain actions taken in the organization. Due to restricted financial 
resources, the organizations were required to choose between regulatory 
compliance and safety performance. Restricted resources caused a need to 
prioritize what was required for regulatory compliance and to delay changes 
for cultural transformation. Organizations had to wait to become private 
organizations (not part of the government) to address safety issues. Delay in 
this may also cause delays in the implementation, effectiveness and 
performance of the SMS. Participants explained as follows: 
“We are waiting for the company’s privatization to change the culture- 
we belong to public sector and we are waiting to become private”. (Air 
Traffic Service provider employee) 
“They don’t change. They are waiting for prioritization”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
“The private company will deal with the actions to change the culture of 
the organization. The private company will deal with this”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
One participant explained in the following comment that when an organization 
is part of or managed by the government it was perceived that bureaucracy 
and waiting for approvals for the allocation of resources caused delays. 
Employees perceived the failure to allocate the resources needed to the 
organization as resistance to change from the government. This 
demonstrated to the employees that there was a lack of flexible culture in the 
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organization, introducing delays in managing changes and promoting the 
safety culture. 
“Not that flexible culture because we depend on the ministry and on the 
bureaucracy. We cannot want something and be able to have it 
immediately [when we want it]”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
The following comment indicated that the Ministry showed a resistance in 
allocating resources to aviation organizations. The organizations were facing 
difficulties in managing changes in their organization, which made it difficult to 
manage safety. This was illustrated in the next comment: 
“Not willing to do anything related to safety there is resistance from the 
ministry”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
The following comment implied that when organizations were part of or 
managed by the government, a lack of resources and operating within a 
budget had an impact on training. Because of restricted resources, training 
was not considered to be a priority. Employees explained that although the 
use of radar was required by the organization to be able to deliver services, 
lack of resources caused a delay in training people to use the radar. 
“Depends on the funding from the government, since we are in the public 
sector, training is not a priority, for example we need to get approval for radar 
training”. (Air Traffic Service provider) 
5.9.2 Outsourcing 
As explained by interviewees in the next comments, when organizations 
outsource activities, unsafe acts by the people from the outsourcing 
organization have an impact on their SMS. Organizations were able to change 
the habits of their employees, but it was more difficult to change the habits 
and monitor the corrective actions taken for organizations outside their SMS. 
“Great difficulties with the influences of people or organizations that are 
outside our SMS but we still have to deal with them.” (Airline employee) 
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Resistance to change has also been found in cases where an outsourced 
organization was been asked to perform a task in specific way but because 
the employees of the outsourced organization did not know how to perform 
the task in the way requested by their customer, they did not perform the task 
at all. Resistance to change was perceived from the fact that the outsourced 
organization did not know how to perform the task, but they did not make any 
efforts to learn how to do the task. Put more simply, when they did not know 
how to do the task, they would not do it at all. This was illustrated in the next 
comment: 
“Maintenance is performed by another company we outsource to 
another airline. We identified bad habits with the maintenance 
organization because they were not trained to do a task the way we 
asked them to do. When they didn’t know how to do it they would not 
try to do it at all. If they knew to do a task a certain way they would do it 
the way they knew, and they would not try to do the task the way we 
were requesting. For example, the PCMCIA cards. This issue was 
improved with good with communication”. (Airline employee) 
5.9.3 Media 
The media was one of the external factors that was perceived to have an 
impact on the organizational culture, influencing the safety culture of the 
organization. 
The following comment from one interviewee implied that the national culture 
of the small Mediterranean country the worker came from had an impact on 
the organization in which the employee was working as it was not ready to 
accept errors by professionals. As explained, because of the national culture, 
the legal authorities and media were not ready to treat reporters ethically and 
this fostered an atmosphere of fear and blame in the organizations. The 
employees perceived that due to the national culture, the media was looking 
for every opportunity write a headline where employees are blamed and 
punished. 
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“It has to do with the national culture. For example [a service provider 
which is] in the Netherlands whenever there is an incident, they will 
investigate it and they will say “there was an incident for example loss 
of separation, we have contacted the airline and the airline is taking 
their measures in order to avoid this from happening again” and the 
story ends there. If this happened here, the media would have jumped 
on us saying that we are not doing our job well”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
The participant explained in the following comment that if the reporting system 
was breached and information about the event reached the media, any just 
culture would have been compromised and employees would stop reporting. 
Perceiving that external factors, such as the media and the legal authorities, 
were not ready to accept professional error, this may have reduced their 
confidence in the reporting system of their organization: 
“There is an unofficial anecdotal agreement for data that says that if 
any external organization gets data the reporting system [of the 
organization], the reporting process and route will get a downward 
route will start from the moment the external organization gets the data. 
[we are concerned about the] treatment of data, external influences are 
the media, legal authorities. Because these entities are not ready yet 
for the fair treatment of reporters”. (Air Traffic Service provider 
employee) 
5.9.4 Legal authorities 
The following comments implied that the legal authorities had an impact on 
the organization’s safety culture and the performance of the SMS. Employees 
perceived that their national culture was not mature enough to accept 
professional error without blaming, targeting and punishing workers who 
committed an error. A disciplinary system that fosters an atmosphere of 
blame, punishment and fear will reduce the confidence in reporting. The 
employees explained as follows: 
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“The prosecutor is a barrier that affects the internal culture. The people 
from this organization are afraid of the external factor. If they were 
ready we could have achieved the implementation of the SMS sooner”. 
(air traffic service provider employee) 
“There is an unofficial anecdotal agreements for data that says that if 
any external organization gets data the reporting system [of the 
organization], the reporting process and route will get a downward 
route will start from the moment the external organization gets the 
data”. (air traffic service provider employee) 
5.9.5 National culture 
National culture may be responsible for some differences in attitude as well as 
interpersonal interactions. As mentioned previously in “Media” and “Legal 
authorities” employees perceived that some countries had a more mature 
national culture, ready to accept professional errors and treat the reporters 
ethically. Interviewees perceived that the matter becomes even worse when 
media inflated the events in which individuals were involved, blamed them 
and overemphasized their errors.  
Human Factors has expanded beyond the human-machine interface to 
include psychological areas such as communication, leadership, performance 
under stress, interpersonal relations and decision-making. Evidence suggests 
that these areas are all influenced by national culture (see Chapter 2). 
Evidence suggests that the national culture influences the implementation of 
SMSs in these Mediterranean service providers. This suggest that different 
national culture characteristic of each country might influence the way SMS is 
implemented by service providers in other countries. The following comment 
implied that one of the characteristics of the national culture of the small 
Mediterranean country the interviewee came from, was that after an employee 
reported a safety incident, other employees discussed this behind the 
reporter’s back. It was obvious to employees and they knew if they reported a 
safety incident that they were involved in, other people would talk about them 
and gossip behind their back. Knowing that this happened in their 
organization, employees avoided reporting and tried to hide their error. The 
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following statement implied that in certain countries, their national culture 
becomes an obstacle to the success of the SMS as the lack of trust between 
employees, the fear and punishment and the embarrassment employees felt, 
impeded them from reporting.  
“The will to change exists but the national culture draws us backwards. 
Because we know that people talk [between them] and discuss with 
other people”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
The comment that follows implied that as a result of their national culture, 
people did not like to be told what to do or were not willing to accept 
suggestions and advice from other people. The interviewee commented that 
although suggestions by other organizations or authorities might have made 
their work easier, due to the fact that they did not like other people asking 
them or imposing upon them the changes needed, this made them resistant to 
change.  
“People will resist to change for anything, any change even for the 
procedures that can reduce the workload [when these were asked to 
be implemented] people reacted: “we are not going to let the English 
do whatever they want”. [we are] Very resistant to change”. (Air Traffic 
Service provider employee) 
The following comment implied that the people from this culture were 
revolutionaries. Revolting against changes is an indication of resistance to 
change that could result in delays to the establishment of a safety culture and 
inhibit the effectiveness of the SMS.  One participant explained as follows: 
“We are a bit more anarchists for [safety] culture. It obliges you to do 
something out of the culture (national culture)”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
Based on the comment below it was perceived that the national culture of this 
small Mediterranean country impeded employees from changing their habits. 
Resistance to change habits could be an obstacle for organizations that were 
striving to improve their safety culture. The following comment may imply that 
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not changing work habits easily might be a characteristic of some countries 
and it could be a characteristic of this particular Mediterranean country. A 
participant commented: 
“We don’t change our habits easily it has to do with the national 
culture”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
5.9.6 Family effect 
The dimension of the “family effect”’ falls under the property “national culture”. 
Based on the following comments, it was considered to be one of the 
characteristics of the national culture of a small Mediterranean country. 
Participants defined “the family effect” as a situation where one of the two 
people working together committed an error but because they were good 
friends, they mutually agreed not to report the error. In the “family effect”, 
employees who were friends with each other, mutually covered each other’s 
back, without reporting the error.  The participants explained as follows: 
“if it’s my friend [working next to me] I will tell him “don’t do this again” 
and I will not report him”. A shift manager can say this will stay 
between us”. (Air Traffic Service provider employee) 
“The reporter will not report himself and will not report his friend either. 
The family effect is when someone does something [wrong] and then 
someone next to him who is his friend or they like each other the 
person will tell his friend “don’t do that next time”. (Air Traffic Service 
provider employee) 
5.10. Results and discussion 
One of the main purposes of this study was to identify the main problems and 
important underlying factors impeding the production and collection of the 
safety data required for the development of SPIs and the effectiveness of 
SMSs. The following figure describes the relationship between the themes 
elicited. 
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Figure 3 presents the proposed model showing the relationship between 
themes. As the model suggests, the “external factors” influence the “safety 
management’s safety commitment”, the “allocation of resources”, the “safety 
culture”, the “just culture”, “resistance to change” and the “reporting culture” of 
the organizations. “Top management’s safety commitment” influences the 
“reporting culture”, the “allocation of resources”, the “lack of safety promotion”, 
the “just culture” and “resistance to change”. The factors “allocation of 
resources influences” the “reporting culture” of the organization, the 
“deficiency of the reporting system”, “resistance to change”, “just culture” and 
the “lack of safety promotion”. The factor “lack of safety promotion” influences 
the “resistance to change”, the “just culture” and the “reporting culture” of the 
organization. The “just culture” influences the “resistance to change” and the 
“reporting culture”. The factor “resistance to change” influences the “reporting 




Figure 3 The final model showing the factors and the relationship 
between the factors impeding the production of data for the 
development of SPIs 
Table 3 is separated in three columns. The column on the left presents the 
factors leading to the main problem. The column in the middle describes the 
main problems, namely “top management’s lack of safety commitment”, 
“allocation of resources”, “ lack of safety promotion”, “just culture”, “resistance 
to change”, ”lack of data due to the nature of the reporting system and due to 
ta lack of safety culture” (see Table 3). The column on the right presents the 
factors deriving or resulting from the main problems.  
 5.10.1 Top management’s behaviour towards safety 
Top management can influence a significant percentage of an organization’s 
performance (Day and Lord, 1988) and can have a significant influence on 
organizational safety (Clarke, 1999).  Managers’ attitudes and behaviour are 
related to the achievement of safe working practices (Rundmo and Hale, 
2003). Attitudes affect the decisions of top and middle management and also 
influence the conditions under which employees will take a decision. 
Management attitudes affect priorities, such as policy about safety, and they 
also influence employee attitudes and behaviour (Rundmo and Hale, 2003).  
Management’s ideal safety attitude is being involved in safety promotion, 
committed to safety and encouraging safety behaviours, leading to lowering 
the frequency of accidents.  
5.10.2 Top management’s commitment to safety 
Since the research problem was based on the factors impeding the 
effectiveness of the SMS, this particular theme was of particular importance. 
Top management plays an important role in developing and maintaining an 
organizational culture (Schein, 2004:11;) and in developing a strong positive 
safety culture (McDonald et al., 2000; Hsu et al., 2010; Liou et al., 2008; Chen 
and Chen, 2012; Flin et al., 2000). 
The participants believed that the top management’s safety commitment was 
reflected in the management’s actions which included, management not being 
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interested in knowing anything about safety, management not participating in 
the safety activities of the organization and management not appreciating the 
risks (see Table 1).  Studies have demonstrated that top management’s 
safety commitment may influence an organization’s performance and safety 
culture of the organization (see Table 3). 
Major accident investigations showed that senior managers have an important 
influence on organizational safety (Baker, 2007; National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater horizon oil spill, 2011). Top management may influence up to 
45% of an organizations’ performance (Day and Lord, 1988; Clarke, 1999). 
Various studies (Cohen, 1977; Cohen et al.,1975; DePasquale and Geller, 
1999; Griffiths, 1985; Harper et al.,1997; Shafai-Sahrai, 1971; Shannon et 
al.,1996, 1997; Smith et al.,1975; Vrendenburg, 2002) revealed that 
organizations with lower accident rates were characterized by factors such as 
management showing personal involvement in safety activities, giving safety a 
higher priority in meetings and decisions concerning work practice, 
management commitment, thorough investigation of accidents and 
communication and feedback. Management’s safety commitment was also 
believed to be a factor that could negatively influence the safety culture of the 
organization, especially in cases where the employees perceived that top 
management failed to promote the safety culture of the organization. Some 
participants believed that the top management’s safety commitment 
influenced the safety culture of the organization as they believed that the 
management was not promoting safety or safety activities to the workers: 
these activities were promoted only by the safety manager of the organization. 
Poor or absent safety commitment from the management has a negative 
impact on the values and beliefs regarding learning, reporting, flexibility and 
allocation of resources all of which are required for safety improvement 
(Gerede, 2015b). A failure in promoting the safety culture of the organization, 
will also impact the reporting culture of the organization (see Figure 3). In 
organizations suffering from poor management safety commitment it will be 
difficult to engage employees and departments to support the SMS (Gerede, 
2015b). Participants believed that if the management did not care and 
promote safety, why should they care? Resulting from the poor safety 
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commitment, will be a reduction in the number of reports and because of the 
organization’s culture, hazards will remain hidden (see Table 3). 
5.10.3 Allocation of resources 
This qualitative study has shown that organizations found it difficult to put into 
practice an SMS without higher management’s support. Management is 
responsible for determining targets, planning how to achieve the targets using 
leadership and motivation, coordinating departments, carrying out audits to 
make sure targets are met, providing feedback and allocating the resources 
for those activities (Daft, 2008). Safety management requires all of the above 
activities to be performed to achieve targets which are related to safety 
(Gerede, 2015b). Top management’s safety commitment, values and beliefs 
about safety will influence the way the management will decide on how these 
activities will be performed.  
Some participants explained that the lack of financial resources, human 
resources and time to perform the safety related tasks, caused difficulties in 
the SMS (see Figure 4).  
Top management is responsible for making the decisions about the allocation 
of resources for the operation of the SMS (see Table 3). When top 
management is not committed to safety, they will regard the SMS as an extra 
cost or a financial burden and will attempt to optimize costs. A positive or poor 
safety commitment will be reflected in the decisions concerning the allocation 
of resources by the management. Failure to allocate the resources to 
accommodate the changes in the organization will additionally result into 
resistance to change as an indication of poor flexibility (Reason, 1997). 
Lack of financial resources allocated to the SMS can become a challenge, 
especially when the organization needs to be more flexible. As changes in the 
organization may bring new hazards and risks, the organization will have to 
allocate the financial resources to address these emerging hazards. Poor 
safety commitment from the management may have a negative impact on the 
values and beliefs regarding the improvement of safety in the organization 
and will result in the management demonstrating resistance in allocating 
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resources (see Figure 3). Lack of financial resources can lead to insufficient 
human resources, which is experienced by workers in terms of time pressure. 
A lack of sufficient human resources causes an increase in the workload of 
employees and in particular to the workers involved in safety tasks. This can 
cause a delay in safety actions, in investigating incidents and finding 
corrective actions as workers need to divide their time between their everyday 
work and safety activities.  
Poor safety commitment may also have a negative impact on the values 
related to reporting and learning. Participants mentioned that they perceived a 
lack of safety commitment from the top management, as the management 
would not allocate the resources for a recurrent training on reporting. With the 
lack of such resources the organization cannot use the data from the reporting 
system for learning and training. This has an impact on the learning and 
informing culture of the organization. Participants also mentioned that due to 
the lack of resources the organization was not able to promote the activities of 
the SMS and encourage reporting. 
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Table 3 Showing the factors leading to the main problem, the main problems and the results deriving from the main 
problem 
Factors leading to the main 
problem 
Main Problem Results deriving from the main problem 
Not interested to know 
anything about safety 
Top management does not 
participate in the safety 
activities 
Failure to understand risks 
Pressure of top 
management derived from a 
concern about the loss of 
income to support the SMS 
activities 
Top management lack of 
safety commitment/ 
poor safety commitment 
Actions, decisions and behaviour of top management 
influences the safety culture of the organization 
Lack of commitment impacts the decisions about the 
allocation of resources 
Impact on the learning, reporting, flexible culture of the 
organization 
Difficult to engage employees to participate in the safety 
activities 
Reduction in the number of reports 
Impact on the just culture of the organization 
Employees hide their errors 
Impact on the effectiveness of the SMS 
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Reluctance of the top 
management to allocate 
sufficient human resources 
for the activities of the SMS 
Failure of the top 
management to understand 
the significance of the SMS 
Failure to clarify and 




External factors responsible 
for allocating resources to 
the aviation organizations 
Lack of top management 
safety commitment 
influencing their decisions 
about the allocation of 




Insufficient allocation of human resources, financial 
resources and time 
Absence of dedicated personnel for the safety activities 
Delay in the investigation of incidents 
Difficulties in performing timely and effectively the SMS 
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resources 
Unwillingness of the top 
management to allocate 
sufficient financial 
resources for the SMS 
activities 
Reluctance of the top 
management to allocate 
sufficient human resources 
for the activities of the SMS 
activities 
Impractical reporting system 
Delay in performing the risk assessments 
Delay in taking corrective actions and monitoring 
performance over time. 
Increased workload 
Time pressure leading to human errors and violations 
Top management’s lack of 
safety commitment 
Reluctance of the top 
management to allocate 
sufficient human resources 
for the activities of the SMS 
Lack of safety promotion Employees don’t know what is acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour 
Impact on the just culture of the organization 
Employees are not encouraged to participate in the safety 
activities of the organization 
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Failure to practice what they 
preach. Failure to clarify and 
demonstrate by actions their 
safety commitment 
Failure to offer effective 
SMS training. 
Fear to report 
Lack of safety promotion causes a lack of strengthening the 
safety culture of the organization 
 
External factors: 
international and national 
practices, legal system, 
media 
Top management safety 
commitment 
Failure to establish a just 
culture 
Not clear for employees 
what is acceptable and 
Just culture Lack of just culture becomes an obstacle in the safety 
culture of the organization 
Impact on learning culture 
Impact on reporting culture 
Fear culture 
Employees will attempt to hide their errors 




Failure to share 
accountability and 
responsibility 
How the sanctions are 
determined by the 
organization 
Blame culture and 
punishment 
Top management’s safety 
commitment 
Insufficient resources 
External factors: national 
culture, the government not 
allocating sufficient 
resources to the aviation 
Resistance to change Organization works with outdated practices that might not be 
safe 
Weak positive safety culture 
Delay in performing the activities of the SMS 
SMS delays to yield the intended beneficial outcomes 
Increased workload causing increased pressure to 
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organizations 
Lack of understanding the 
need to change 
National culture causes a 
failure to change current 
habits  
employees 
Failure of the organization to provide training 
Impact on learning culture 
Impact on flexible culture 
Impact on reporting culture 
Employees hiding their errors 
Misleading results 
Top management’s safety 
commitment 
Insufficient allocation of or 
failure to allocate resources 
for the promotion of the 
reporting system and the 
just culture of the 
Lack of data due to the 
nature of reporting 
system and due to a lack 
of reporting culture 
Reporting system does not produce enough data about the 
effectiveness of the SMS activities  
Delay in the investigation of incidents, organization awaiting 
to receive more data to proceed with corrective action  
Lessons learnt process impaired, learning culture impaired 
Hazards remain unknown because they were not reported 
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organization 
Resistance to change the 
behaviour related to 
reporting 
Lack of a reporting culture 
Poor safety culture 
Lack of encouragement to 
report/ lack of safety 
promotion 
Lack of motivation and 
support to report 
Lack of just culture 
Insufficient data from 
reporting system 
Impractical reporting system 
Hazards remain hidden 
Hazards captured by chance 
Wrong impression of the safety performance 
Insufficient data can hinder hazards and risk analysis, risk 
mitigation, measuring safety performance, monitoring safety, 
finding root causes, unable to predicting the future and 
unable to manage change 
False impression about the performance of the reporting 
culture of the organization 
Insufficient data for the development of SPIS. 
Gaps in data that is to be used for the development of SPIs 
Misleading results 
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hinders the reporting 
process 
Fear of punishment impairs 
reporting 
Blame culture 
Lack of trust among 
employees 
The belief that reporting 
might not provide any 
benefits 
External factors such as the 
legal system and 
international practices 
creating a fear culture in the 
organization 
Not knowing what is 
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considered as acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior 
The sanctions the 
organization will take for the 
errors/ violations of the 
employees 
National culture creating a 
family effect in the 
organization 
Embarrassment to report/ 
fear of losing their 
reputation as professionals 
Peer pressure to hide the 
error 
Employees hiding errors 
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Selective reporting 
Psychological pressure by 
the legal authorities and 
media due to a lack of 
understanding human 




5.10.4 Safety culture 
Studies have shown that efforts to improve safety have focused on 
organizational factors (von Thaden et al., 2006; Reason, 1997). Dekker 
(2007c) considers that errors and violations or unsafe actions should be 
considered as symptoms related to the performance of the organization and 
should not be considered as outcomes causing accidents.  They are a result 
of organizational factors creating certain latent hazards, decreasing human 
performance, and influencing people’s behaviour and decisions. 
5.10.5 Lack of safety promotion 
Many studies have demonstrated that safety culture has an important role in 
improving safety and it is important for the effectiveness of the SMS 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997; Neal et al., 2000; Gerede, 2015 
a, b). Some participants felt that the organization was not promoting safety 
or encouraging employees to participate in the safety activities. The findings 
showed that in some cases, organizations failed to promote safety activities 
resulting in a lack of engagement and participation from the employees (see 
Figure 3).  Management needs to support the efforts of the organization’s 
safety department in engaging and encouraging employees to participate in 
safety activities. Management’s support is essential for the operation of the 
SMS (Gerede, 2015 a, b). 
Lack of safety commitment may be one reason which results in a lack of 
safety promotion (see Table 3). Top management’s values and beliefs with 
regards to safety will shape their decisions for safety activities. Management 
needs to be motivated to mobilize the organization and allocate the 
resources for these activities (Daft, 2008).  
Since a SMS is something quite new for the workers, lack of SMS training or 
lack of information about the activities of the SMS including hazard 
identification, analysis, reporting and encouraging a safety culture can 
impede and delay its effectiveness. Lack of safety promotion can make 
employees unaware about the blame-free approach of the organization, 
creating an atmosphere of fear which will impact on the reporting system, 
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decrease reporting and workers will try to hide their errors. Hazards will not 
be reported and only be captured by chance; corrective actions will be 
delayed and the organization will obtain misleading safety data. 
5.10.6 Just culture 
The participants perceived that just culture is one of the most important 
factors in the effectiveness of an SMS. Just culture was considered as the 
most important component in a safety culture, since a reporting culture and 
learning culture strongly depend upon the existence of a positive just culture 
(Dekker, 2007c, 2009; Reason, 1998; Gerede, 2015a, b). One participant 
commented that the just culture of the organization is reflected by the top 
management’s safety commitment (see Figure 3). Management 
demonstrating a lack of safety commitment will fail to distinguish between 
what is considered acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, will blame 
employees and punish them either directly or indirectly. When the balance 
between accountability, blame and punishment is disturbed, either 
accountability is suspended or people who make errors are crushed by the 
blame culture and punishment, which results in a culture of fear (Dekker, 
2007c, 2009; Reason, 1998). When there is a fear culture in an organization, 
just culture will be compromised, violations will increase, and workers will try 
to hide their errors (Gerede, 2015b). One participant suggested that the lack 
of just culture affects the safety culture of their organization and a positive 
safety culture is needed for the SMS to work. It results in employees being 
afraid to report or choosing not to report and hide their errors. Workers who 
have previously experienced blame when reporting, the next time they are 
involved in an occurrence they will recall their previous experience and will 
conceal their errors. Peer pressure from workers who have already 
experienced blame can also influence other workers who intend to report 
their errors but actually convince them to conceal their errors and not to 
report. Fear culture and blame culture is nurtured by a poor just culture and 
impacts on the reporting culture of the organization (Dekker, 2007c; Gerede, 
2015b). Workers might be afraid of top management, losing their job, losing 
their license or about people gossiping behind their back. Poor just culture or 
lack of a just culture, can weaken the reporting, learning and flexible culture 
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and workers might perceive this as a lack of safety commitment from the 
organization.  
5.10.7 Resistance to change 
Changes in an organization may bring new hazards and risks. The 
organization will be required to address these for both regulatory 
requirements and to enhance safety performance. If the organization, top 
management and, workers fail to manage the changes it will be difficult to 
manage safety (Gerede, 2015b). Because the SMS is something relatively 
new to employees, top management, the regulatory authorities and the 
aviation industry are required to participate not only in the changes required 
for the SMS but also in a cultural transformation to achieve a positive safety 
culture (Gerede, 2015b). For SMS implementation and to ensure its 
effectiveness the most important component is this cultural transformation 
since shared beliefs and attitudes shape people’s and the organization’s 
policies and attitudes, and as a consequence their decisions and behaviour 
(Gerede, 2015b). A cultural transformation will change the beliefs and 
attitudes of the organization, hence will influence decisions and behaviour of 
the organization. Cultural transformation can contribute to a change in the 
behaviour towards safety, in the way the organization makes decisions 
regarding safety and will reduce the reluctance to change.  
Cultural transformation is a requirement in organizations where workers 
resist participation in safety management activities and in the efforts an 
organization makes to develop a positive safety culture. As one of the 
external factors, elements of national culture of the participants coming from 
the small Mediterranean countries influence the performance of the SMS. 
Studies involving pilots from different national cultures have shown that 
because of their national culture there were differences in the ways these 
pilots conducted their work and there were differing implications for safety 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Johnston, 1993; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996a; 
Merritt & Helmreich, 1996b; Sherman, Helmreich, & Merritt, 1997). This is an 
important challenge to resistance to change within organizations. Employees 
coming from the small Mediterranean countries in this study perceived that 
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their national culture had an impact on the culture of their organization and 
affected their SMS. This finding may suggest that certain characteristics of 
national cultures may become an obstacle to improving their SMS. As 
previously seen, cultural transformation within an organization is required to 
eliminate elements from the national culture having a negative impact on the 
culture of the organization. Governmental organizations allocating financial 
resources to aviation organizations may have limited available funds.  
Organizations that depend financially on the government, might perceive that 
the government is demonstrating a resistance to change when it comes to 
allocating the financial resources required for their cultural transformation 
(see Table 2).  
5.10.8 Reporting systems/ Data collection 
Incident data is an important element of an SMS as from incident data, 
safety metrics can be derived and quantitative risk assessments can be 
conducted (Wilke et al., 2014). Yet, the quality of the incident data resident in 
an organizational database, influences the results. The quantity and quality 
of the reports are influenced by a number of factors. The effectiveness of the 
SMS may be hindered by a poor reporting culture (Gerede, 2015b). People 
perceive reporting as risky. The fear of the unknown about their report and 
the fear of the consequences of reporting is a prevailing factor for most 
potential reporters (see Table 3). Challenges related to reporting can also 
hinder organizational learning: safety related data are needed to learn 
lessons from the past and to assure safety in the future.  
5.10.9 Deficient reporting systems 
The preliminary study and the current study suggest that problematic 
reporting systems or process may have an impact on the SMS (see Figure 
2). 
Unsuccessful reporting can hinder hazard and risk analysis, risk mitigation, 
measurement of safety performance, monitoring of safety over time, finding 
root causes of factors that compromise safety, predicting future 
performance, and as a consequence, taking measures for and managing 
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change (Gerede, 2015b). Reporting and the production of safety data ensure 
the flow of information and knowledge related to the above activities (see 
Table 3). Values and beliefs related to reporting and obtaining information 
from the reports, are all required for the reporting system to work, and hence 
for the SMS to survive. In a discussion with the employees, they mentioned 
that when the management acknowledges their contribution, explains to 
them the benefits of their reports and shows how their reports contribute to 
safety, they feel encouraged to report. In a discussion with the middle 
management, they mentioned that the reward system they implemented 
encouraged employees to report. 
The majority of participants believed that the importance of reporting and the 
relationship with top management’s commitment to safety and just culture 
were important for the effectiveness of the SMS. Participants explained that 
the reporting process was impaired when they felt that the top management 
was not committed to safety and this resulted in a number of challenges 
related to reporting. They believed that lack of top management’s safety 
commitment contributed to a lack of allocation of resources to promote 
reporting and in developing a more user-friendly reporting system for the 
employees to use. Top management’s safety commitment influences the 
decisions related to the allocation of resources for the operation of the 
reporting system (see Figure 3). Poor top management safety commitment 
has a negative impact on the beliefs and values regarding reporting and thus 
workers felt a lack of encouragement to report. Lack of encouragement to 
report, lack of support in reporting, resistance to change their attitudes, 
beliefs and facilitating the safety management activities, all demonstrate a 
resistance to change. Resistance to change derives from the fact that the 
organization is not taking the actions required for a cultural and safety 
management transformation to motivate workers to report (see Table 3). 
An effective safety culture is essential to improve safety and for the 
effectiveness of a SMS. Poor safety culture can create an atmosphere of 
blame, fear and punishment. Such a culture of fear and blame in the 
organization will foster a culture where employees hide their errors at the 
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price of a threat to safety and create peer pressure, negatively influencing 
other workers who were intending to report. When employees are blamed 
this atmosphere will reduce their confidence in reporting and increase the 
belief in the lack of just culture in the organization.  
Inadequacies in the reporting system mean that the reporting systems does 
not give a complete picture of the hazards and risks in the organization. The 
effectiveness of the SMS and organizational performance is hindered as 
organizations lack the complete picture of hazards. An inadequate reporting 
system can hinder hazard and risk analysis, development of mitigation 
measures, measurement of safety performance and monitoring of safety 
over time. 
 5.10.10 Selective reporting 
A number of participants thought the concept, that they named as “selective 
reporting” was a challenge to the effectiveness of the SMS and in measuring 
their safety performance (see Table 2). The fear employees held about 
losing their license, job, salary or reputation drove them into selecting the 
events to report while hiding other events. Participants explained that their 
national culture, (coming from a small Mediterranean country) influenced the 
safety culture of the organization. However, they would report their error 
when they perceived that the other party involved would report it.  
In an atmosphere of fear, blame and punishment employees will choose not 
to report and hide their error rather than be blamed. If employees perceive 
that there is a lack of just culture, they will report, but they choose what to 
report. Just culture is an important component of safety culture and the 
promotion of a reporting and learning culture depends on the existence of a 
just culture. If an organization has a disciplinary system which does not 
balance accountability, blame and punishment, then the organization will 
foster a culture of fear; just culture will be compromised, errors or violations 
will increase, and workers will try to hide their errors (Dekker 2007c, 2009; 
Reason, 1998; Gerede, 2015b). Selective reporting can be a challenge for 
organizations because the organizations receive reports (and falsely believe 
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that the reporting system is working well) while employees report only minor 
events.  They hide major hazardous events that actually endanger safety 
and require action. 
The number of reports might give the false impression that the organization 
has a strong reporting culture, while in fact, there are other hazards, usually 
major ones, remaining unknown because they were not reported (see Table 
3). Selective reporting can result in employees hiding their errors, errors not 
being reported and only captured by chance hence the learning culture is 
impaired and corrective actions delayed. Most importantly, selective 
reporting gives a false impression of safety performance. 
5.10.11 External factors 
The findings from the study suggest that external factors influence the 
performance of an organization’s SMS. The external factors identified in the 
current study include the government, outsourcing, the media, the legal 
authorities and national culture. Aviation organizations that are managed by 
the government may face restrictions concerning the allocation of resources 
forcing them to prioritize the safety activities of the organization and causing 
a delay for organizations attempting a cultural change. Organizations that 
are subcontracting some services to other organizations have experienced a 
number of hazards due to the unsafe habits of the personnel from the 
subcontracted organization. Employees explained that the way the media 
treated employees involved in accidents has influenced their day to day 
work, causing a fear of punishment, blame and humiliation causing them to 
conceal their mistakes. Miyazawa’s study (2008) suggests that there is a link 
between cultural and political populism with the punitiveness of a country’s 
criminal justice system and the media coverage creating social reactions. 
Additionally, interviewees expressed the opinion that fear of the legal 
authorities has an impact on the safety culture of their organization. Aviation 
has been reporting an increase in the criminalization of human error 
(Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou, 2010; Michaels, 2008; Pandit, 2009; Ter 
Kulle, 2004; Thomas, 2007). Automatic criminal prosecution after an 
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accident has become a common practice in most countries (FSF, 2006; 
ICAO, 2007) and in the aftermath of several accidents and incidents 
(Wilkinson, 1994; Ballantyne, 2002; Ruitenberg, 2002) the aviation 
professionals involved were charged with criminal offences such as 
professional negligence or manslaughter (Dekker, 2003).  Interviewees 
commented that their National culture, being from a small Mediterranean 
country, also had an effect on the culture of the organization and impeded 
the effective implementation and effectiveness of their SMS. Applying 
Hofstede’s work (1980, 1991) with national culture in the commercial aviation 
environment, it is emphasized that national culture underlies and interacts 
with many other influences to shape performance (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998).  
Figure 4 presents the detailed model including the broad categories, the 
properties and the dimensions of each property (see Table 2). This model 
shows the relationships between factors and how each factor influences 
other factors resulting in misleading data and hidden hazards. Figure 4 
suggests that external factors such as the “government” and “national 
culture,” influence the “safety commitment” of the “top management”; top 
management appears not to participate in safety activities, does not 
understand risk and is not interested in knowing anything about safety. The 
government (external factor) also influences the allocation of resources in 
the aviation organizations when these are part of the government. The 
government may also influence safety promotion, as some organizations 
might require resources from the government to provide training and 
promote safety.  
External factors such as the media, the legal system and the national culture 
can influence the just culture of the organization, creating a culture of fear 
and blame for the employees and impeding their reporting. External factors 
such as the government may not allocate enough resources to enable 
organizations to implement cultural change, thus resulting into resistance to 
change.  
 160 
The media, legal system and national culture may influence employees as 
they might feel that they will be blamed for their errors, thus they resist 
change and choose to hide their errors. Family effect, a characteristic of the 
national culture of small countries in the Mediterranean, results in employees 
selecting what to report and who to report.  
Top management’s safety commitment will reflect on safety promotion, their 
encouragement of employees to report and the provision training. Failure to 
do so, demonstrates a lack of top management safety commitment. Top 
management’s safety commitment influences the allocation of resources. A 
management which is committed to safety will allocate the financial and 
human resources for the performance of safety activities. Top management’s 
commitment to safety will also influence just culture. A committed top 
management will not foster a culture of fear and blame and will ensure a just 
culture in which employees are encouraged to report. 
 The allocation of resources, such as financial or human resources may 
influence safety promotion of the organization and training. Lack of 
resources will have an impact on promoting safety culture and providing 
safety training to employees.  As a result, this will impact the just culture of 
the organization; not informing employees about the just culture of the 
organization may create a culture of fear (see Figure 4). The allocation of 
resources also influences the resistance to change. Cultural change and 
changing employee habits requires resources.  A failure to allocate the 
necessary resources will mean that the organization will be unable to 
improve their safety culture and their safety performance.  
The model suggests that the lack of safety promotion and the lack of training 
influences the reporting process. Employees should be encouraged to report 
and trained in the benefits of reporting for the improvement of safety. Lack of 
safety promotion fosters a culture of fear as employees are afraid to report if 
they are not informed about the just culture of the organization. Just culture 
influences the reporting culture. Lack of a just culture will impact the 
reporting system as employees will be afraid to report. Just culture also 
influences resistance to change. Blame culture and fear culture will influence 
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the employees’ attitudes as they will prefer to avoid reporting if that might get 
them into trouble. The impracticality of the reporting system suggests that 
because of the nature of some reporting systems, this may allow other 
employees to identify the reporter also creating a fear culture. Selective 
reporting influences the resistance to change. Because of the characteristic 
of this national culture, employees refuse to abandon their habits and they 
select what, and who to report. Due to this national cultural characteristic, 
they resist changing their work habits. 
 
Figure 4 Final detailed model showing the influence of each factor on 
other factors  
5.11 Conclusions 
This qualitative interview-based study set out to explore the factors that 
hindered the effectiveness of an SMS in aviation service providers and 
whether there were factors influencing the quality and quantity of the safety 
data required for the development of their SPIs.  It built upon the structure 
initially proposed in the earlier exploratory study. The results suggested the 
individual factors and combinations of factors which may have an impact on 
the hazard and incident reporting system. Poor reporting or insufficient 
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reporting, results in the production of low-quality data. Since organizations 
depend on the data to develop their SPIs, the organization might be 
developing their SPIs using inappropriate data. The results indicate that 
there are challenges affecting the effectiveness of the SMS and hence the 
performance of the SMS as measured by the SPIs. The analysis explored 
the most significant challenges hindering the performance of the SMS from 
top management’s attitude towards safety, safety culture and challenges 
related to the reporting systems and reporting processes, and proposed a 
model of ‘cause and effect’. The most significant challenge derived from a 
poor positive safety culture as there was a link between this and the other 

















6. Survey study 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous studies (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) provided a theoretical 
framework for the factors that can directly influence the performance of an 
SMS in aviation service providers, as well as describing the effects of the 
relationship between these factors on an SMS. The preliminary study used a 
grounded theory approach to discover the factors impeding the performance 
of an SMS.  Building on the preliminary study, the larger qualitative study 
(see Chapter 4) used a thematic analysis derived from interview data, in 
which safety managers and safety officers from aviation organizations 
participated. Quantitative data obtained from a survey is used for this study, 
which describes the perceptions of aviation organization employees and 
aims to confirm the findings from the previous studies. 
6.2 Procedure 
6.2.1 Questionnaire 
The first phase of the qualitative interview data collection was between June 
2015 and January 2016. During that period, all operational personnel and 
their line managers were invited to participate in this questionnaire study 
during the visit to their organizations. Additionally, they were also invited to 
participate by an email written to them by their line manager. It was agreed 
with top management, staff union representatives and employees that their 
participation was entirely voluntary, and confidentiality and anonymity would 
be ensured. The questionnaire was distributed to the participants through an 
email invitation containing a link that directed the participants to online 
software (BOS-Bristol online surveys). 
The questionnaire was also distributed to further participants during a 
second phase between October 2016 and May 2017, this time as a paper 
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and pencil version.  Data from competed surveys were then manually 
transferred into the online data collection software for storage and analysis. 
The main focus of the set of items in the questionnaire was to capture 
respondent’s perceptions regarding the role that top management played in 
safety management activities, their demonstration of commitment to ensure 
safety, and their perceptions about the safety culture and the reporting 
systems in their organization. 
The full survey questionnaire included 55 items derived from the preliminary 
study results.  These were divided into four themes of which three were 
further subdivided into two parts. 
The first section concerned the respondent’s perceptions of the 
organization’s top management’s safety commitment.  This included nine 
items.  The second section concerned respondent’s views of top 
management and just culture, and included 14 items. The third section 
looked at the respondent’s perceptions of their safety culture and included 
24 items. The fourth section comprised respondent’s perceptions of their 
reporting system included eight items.  A Likert scale rating was used, using 
a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” at one end to “Strongly 
Agree” at the other with “Neither Agree nor Disagree” in the middle. Each 
level on the scale was assigned a numeric value or coding, usually starting 
at 1 for “Strongly Disagree” and incremented by one for each level, reaching 
to 5 for “Strongly Agree”. 
The questions included in the questionnaire were derived from the main 
themes of the model (see Figure 2) which was initially developed in the 
preliminary study and further refined in the larger follow-on interview study. A 
full copy of the questionnaire items is contained in Appendix D.  
Participants were informed that the questionnaire would require 15-20 
minutes to be completed. 
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Figure 5 Hypothesized model showing the factors impeding the 
production of quantity and quality safety data required for the 
development of SPIs, showing the gaps between SMS and actual 
performance.   
6.3 Results 
A total of 90 employees including (pilots, air traffic controllers, aircraft 
engineers and cabin crew) completed the questionnaire regarding the safety 
data collection practices in their organization. Out of the 90 surveys, 34 were 
completed online and 56 were filled in using pen and paper. Through the 
screening process it was found that three of the participants returned the 
questionnaires with some items unanswered. These questionnaires were 
dropped and not considered in the analysis. Among the participants, 83 were 
male and 7 female. 
6.4 Overview of analysis 
Data were analyzed with IBM SPSS software (version 22) and IBM AMOS 
(version 24). A reliability analysis was conducted to examine the internal 
consistency between the scales.  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques were used to construct a 
path analysis and test the hypothesis and goodness of fit of the various 
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models. 
An initial confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then conducted, derived 
directly from the hypothesized structure.  The initial CFA model showed a 
poor fit with the hypothesized underlying structure and a process of model 
modification was followed by removing the weak indicators and combining 
indicators together. After this process, the scales were modified and 
combined, subsequently resulting in eight scales. A final factor model was 
produced after removing weak indicators and further combing some 
variables together which resulted into six latent variables. Based on the six 
latent variables derived from the final factor analysis a path analysis was 
conducted.   
The means and standard deviations for the questionnaire items are 
presented in appendix E. The path model tested was based upon the model 
described in Figure 2 and is presented in Figure 6.  
6.5 Initial Cronbach’s analysis of scale internal consistency 
Reliability is defined as the proportion of observed score variance that is 
attributable to true score variance. Reliability, like validity, is one way of 
assessing the quality of the measurement procedure used to collect data.  
For results to be considered valid, the measurement procedure must 
be reliable. There are several ways of establishing the reliability of a 
measuring instrument, and internal consistency is one of the most commonly 
used methods. Internal consistency is estimated using Cronbach’s alpha (α) 
(Cronbach, 1951). An α value of 0.70 and above is considered to be the 
criterion from demonstrating strong internal consistency of established 
values (Nunnally, 1978). The hypothesized model in Figure 6, shows six 
factors that influence the safety data collection of organizations which are 
required for the development of SPIs. The scales which were based on the 
factors derived from that model. Table 4 presents a description of these 
factors. The factor top management has one scale namely “top 
management” (TM), the culture factor has one scale namely, “culture” 
(CULT) and one namely “safety culture” (SC). The factor “data collection” 
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comprised two scales namely “data collection” (DC) and “data collection/data 
collection” (DCDC). The factor just culture has three scales namely, “just 
culture” (JC), “just culture/management” (JCM), and “just culture/employees” 
(JCE). The factor resistance to change, has one factor namely “resistance to 
change” (RTC). The factor reporting system, has one scale namely “data 
collection/reporting system” (DCRC).  
 
Figure 6 The preliminary model showing the factors and the scales 









Table 4 Summary of the factors hindering the production of safety data 
required for the development of SPIs. 
Factors Factor description 
TOP MANAGEMENT 
TM Top management: Indicates the actions the top management 
follows to demonstrate their commitment to safety. 
JUST CULTURE 
JC Just culture: identifies employee’s perception about 
management’s contribution to the safety culture of the 
organization.  
JCM Just culture (management): Indicates if the top management 
promote, supports and takes actions for a just culture in their 
organization. Indicates if employees undstand what is 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, or if they hide errors. 
Indicates if there is a fear of punishment in their organization 
and unsafe acts go unnoticed. 
JCE Just culture (employees): Demonstrates the employees’ 
perceptions about the just culture of their organization. 
CULTURE 
CULT Culture: Indicates the actions taken for a positive safety culture 
in the organization. 
SC Safety Culture: Indicates if the organization has he components 
(1997) of a safety culture according to Reason (1997). 
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RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
RTC Resistance to change: Identifies the factors that may cause 
Resistance to Change such as failure to change their behaviour 
which reduces the flexibility of the culture. 
DATA COLLECTION 
DC Data collection: Indicates the existence of data collection 
systems in the organizations, if there is an open-door policy to 
report errors and hazards. Indicated whether the organization is 
using a non-punitive approach and whether there is mutual trust 
among employees. 
DCDC Data collection: Identifies the data collection systems and the 
practicality of the reporting processes of the organization. 
Identifies whether the reporting system may fail, hazards remain 
hidden. 
DCRC Data collection, reporting culture: Indicates if there is a punitive, 
fearful reporting culture where there is a lack of mutual trust and 
people believe that can be identified if they report. 
 
6.6 Reliability 
Results from the reliability analysis of the 10 sub-scales making up the 
questionnaire are reported in Table 5.  All scales showed strong internal 
consistency, except just culture, just culture (employees), data collection and 
data collection (reporting culture).  The Cronbach alpha values were not 
satisfactory for these scales: .646 for JC, .535 for JCE, .667 for DCDC and 
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 . -059 for DCRC. All the values that were below 0.70 were removed or 
combined, initially reducing the variables to eight. A further improvement was 



































9 .905 .905 
2.  Just culture 14 .646 .687 
3.  Just culture 
(management) 
9 .858 .855 
4.  Just culture 
(employees) 
5 .536 .532 
5.  Culture 14 .801 .802 
6.  Safety culture 5 .862 .861 
7.  Resistance to 
change 
5 .904 .907 
8. Data collection. 8 .667 .722 
9. Data collection 
(data collection) 
4 .797 .802 
10.  Data collection 
(reporting 
culture) 
4 -.059 .139 
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6.7 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The evidence for “convergent validity” is obtained when a measure 
correlates well with other measures that are believed to measure the same 
construct (Kaplan and Scauzzo, 1993).  In other words, convergent validity is 
the degree to which the various approaches to construct measurements are 
similar to other approaches that they theoretically should be similar to 
(Sureshchander et al.,2001). Using a confirmatory factor analysis technique, 
the convergent validity of the questionnaire scales was established. A 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was initially performed using the pre-
determined factor structure derived from the qualitative study (see Figure 5) 
to test to see if the underlying dimensions in the data set reflected those in 
the hypothesized model. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted 
using AMOS-22 software. The present study used a set of different types of 
fit measures such as Chi-Square values (χ2). Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
the Bentler-Bonnett fit Index (NFI) and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) to determine the goodness of fit of the model. The 
recommended values for CFI, NFI are higher than 0.9 and RMSEA value 
less than or equal to 0.006 for good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
The initial CFA derived from the questionnaire items suggested a poor fit to 
the hypothesized underlying structure and the model was modified by 
removing the weak indicator variables and by combining two of the latent 
variables which resulted into reducing the initial 10 scales in the 
questionnaire (see Figure 7) to eight scales in the CFA. 
Two CFA models were subsequently tested. In the first model all the items of 
the questionnaire were now loaded on eight latent variables. This eight-latent 
variable model also did not show adequate fit to data. Figure 7 shows the 
hypothesized model showing the relationship between the eight latent 




Table 6 Initial descriptive statistics, inter-factor correlation among 
latent constructs (n=90) 
 TM JCM CULT SC RTC DCDC JCE DCRC 
JCM .947**        
CULT .751** .913**       
SC .756** .839** .846**      
RTC .764** .888** .868** .868**     
DCDC .511** .129** .750** .612** .698**    
JCE -.555** -.662** -.549** -.575** -.640** -.513**   
DCRC .622** .790** .665** .632** .711** .693** -.916**  
 
Table 6 shows the initial inter-factor correlations amongst the latent 
constructs. Correlation measures the association between two latent 
variables. Figure 7 suggested a poor fit to the hypothesized underlying 
structure and the model was modified by removing the weak indicator 
variables and by combining two of the latent variables which resulted into 
reducing the eight scales in the questionnaire to six scales The weak 
indicators were removed and the items were loaded on two other latent 
variables resulting into 6 latent variables (see Figure 8). Table 7 shows the 
descriptive statistics showing the inter-factor correlation among the six latent 
variables after removing the weak variables.  The statistics is Table 7 were 
used to develop Figure 8. Figure 8 shows the final improved model after the 
removal of the weak indicators, resulting into six latent variables. 
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics showing the inter-factor correlation 
among latent constructs after removing the weak indicator variables 
(n=90) 
 TM JC CULT RTC DC 
JC .879**     
CULT .715** .893**    
SC .734** .803** .849**   
RTC .758** .897** .882** .867**  
DC .626** .841** .831** .642** .794** 
TP, Top Management; JC, Just Culture; CULT, Culture; RTC, Resistance to 
Change; DC, Data Collection. 




Figure 7 Hypothesized initial model showing the relationship between 
the latent variables. 
CFA model development 
CFA was performed to test that the structure of the underlying dimensions in 
the data set as suggested in Figure 2 (see Chapter 4) could be confirmed. 
The first ten latent variable model suggested poor fit and the weak indicators 
were combined reducing the ten scales to eight. Figure 7 shows the eight 
latent variable model developed in the second CFA which was developed 
using the initial descriptive statistics, inter-factor correlation among latent 
constructs (n=90) from Table 6 and modification indices from the CFA 
output. This second CFA model also suggested poor fit and the model was 
improved further by removing the weak indicators and combining two latent 
variables resulting into reducing the model to six latent variables. Figure 8 
shows the final CFA model with six latent variables and the relationship 
between those latent variables. 
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6.8 Final CFA model 
Table 8 shows the internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) of the scales of the 
final model. Figure 8 shows the final CFA model and shows the correlation 
between the six latent variables. 
Table 8 Reliability analysis of the latent variables in the final CFA 
Safety management 
practices 
 Cronbach’s α Cronbach’s α based on 
standardized items 
Top management .896 .896 
Just culture .834 .836 
Culture .892 .893 
Safety culture .819 .816 
Resistance to change .904 .907 






Figure 8 Final CFA solution showing the correlation between the new 
latent variables. 
6.9 Path analysis 
The results from the final CFA solution were used to develop a path model.  
The path model tested was based upon the model described in Figure 2 and 
is depicted in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 Path analysis model describing the impact of the safety 
management practices on the data collection, based on the meta-
variables derived from the CFA. Path weights are standardized 
regression weights. TM=Top Management, CULT= Culture, JC=Just 
Culture, RTC= Resistance To Change, SC=Safety Culture, DC=Data 
Collection 
 
The fit indices of the path analysis are summarized as follows: chi-square 
=980.818, chi-square value/degrees of freedom, df=1.657, p<0.01; the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.86; goodness of fit index, 
GFI=.653; adjust goodness of fit, AGFI=.587; the parsimony goodness of fit, 
PGFI=.550; normed fit index,; the normed fit index, NFI=.677; comparative fit 
index, CFI=.836.  
The path analysis model describes the perceptions of aviation organization 
employees. The model suggests that the top management’s commitment to 
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safety, influences the culture of the organization. The culture of the 
organization, influences the just culture, the resistance to change and the 
safety culture of the organization. Then the presence of a just culture, of 
resistance to change and the presence of a safety culture influence the data 
collection upon which organizations rely for the development of SPIs. Poor 
quality and quantity of data will yield misleading results, influencing the 
decisions related to the development of SPIs. 
6.10 Discussion 
The purpose of the study was to verify the structure of the underlying factors 
and the relationship between them which may impede the safety 
management practices and the success of the SMS and to validate the 
model derived in the qualitative interviews. In the first step, a CFA was 
conducted using the main factors to validate the underlying structures in the 
data, however the data did not fit the hypothesized underlying model very 
well. The initial CFA derived from the initial questionnaire items and the 
model was modified by removing the weak indicator variables and by 
combining two of the latent variables.  As a result, a large decrease in the 
Chi-square/df value was obtained and much increased values of the various 
goodness of fit indices.  The latent variables from the CFA were used in the 
path analysis to develop a model of the factors influencing the collection of 
data to be used for the development of SPIs.  
The model (Figure 6) containing the factors influencing the safety data 
required for the development of SPIs consists of Top Management (TM), 
Culture (CULT), Just Culture (JC), Resistance to Change, (RTC), Safety 
Culture (SC) and Data Collection (DC). The ultimate objective of the study 
was to predict the success of safety data collection, which is required for the 
development of the SPIs.  All SMSs are dependent upon the amount and 
quality of the safety data collected. The model was developed based on the 
underlying assumption that top management’s safety commitment will 
influence the culture of the organization. The analysis suggests that the top 
management’s safety commitment does influence the culture of the 
organization. The culture of the organization determines the existence of a 
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just culture and just culture influences data collection. The findings suggest 
that in an organizational culture, data collection would not be successful 
without the presence of a just culture. Culture predicts resistance to change 
and resistance to change subsequently predicts data collection which 
suggests that resistance to change in organization influences the data 
collection process. Overall, the findings of the model suggest that top 
management influences the culture of the organization and in an 
organizational culture, the presence of just culture, resistance to change and 
safety culture influence the data collection of an organization. These factors 
may work in isolation or in a combination with each other to influence the 
culture of an organization.  
Top management had an impact on the culture of the organization. Zohar 
(1980), McDonald et al., (2000), Hsu et al., (2010), Liou et al., (2008), Chen 
and Chen, (2012), Flin et al., (2000), also found that management’s 
commitment to safety was a major factor that affected the success of the 
safety management system.  This study also suggests that top management 
has an impact on the culture of the organization, which itself then influences 
just culture. Just culture is seen as the most important component of a 
positive safety culture since the promotion of a reporting and learning culture 
depends upon a positive just culture.  
In a culture where people are blamed and punished for errors, the 
organization will foster a fear culture, just culture will be compromised and 
errors will be concealed (Dekker, 2007c). Employees might be afraid to 
make changes as these create uncertainty concerning what may happen if 
they change: errors that may occur during change may lead to the 
employees getting blamed and punished. It was suggested in this study that 
just culture helps to predict data collection. Lack of just culture may create a 
fear culture compromising safety data collection. When employees perceived 
that they are going to be blamed and punished after a report, they will try to 
conceal their error. Lack of just culture in the organization can also mislead 
the organization into believing that it is receiving adequate safety reports and 
thus perceiving that the reporting system is successful. In such a case, 
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people report minor events that may not practically contribute to enhancing 
safety, while the severe events are concealed because of the fear of 
punishment. 
Reason (1997) defined failing to keep pace with changes and resisting 
changes as a poor flexible culture.  This study also suggests that culture is 
related to resistance to change. Resistance to change is the result of a poor 
flexible culture (Reason, 1997). Organizational cultures that demonstrate a 
resistance to change will have difficulties developing a safety culture, as the 
organization will need to make some changes to improve safety. If the 
organization fails to manage the changes it will be difficult to manage safety.  
To enhance safety in an organization, there is a need for a flexible culture 
and employees should be encouraged to adapt to organizational changes 
and not to resist them. An SMS requires systematic management of change 
and it will not be possible to have a successful SMS in cultures that act only 
through habit and resist changes (Gerede, 2015a). Resistance to change 
can also impact the data collection process of the organization.  Resistance 
to change suggests that employees demonstrate an unwillingness to change 
their current habits and are being reluctant to report even if there was an 
improvement in the reporting process (Figure 5). Organizations might 
mention in their policies or in initial or recurrent training that they have a just 
culture, but uncertainty about what is going to happen to reporters after they 
report may still impede people from reporting. Since shared beliefs and 
values shape people’s and organization’s policies, attitudes and hence 
decisions and behavior, cultural change will be needed for an effective and 
successful SMS.  
When analyzing the relationship between culture and safety culture, it can be 
seen that the culture of the organization influences the safety culture.  
Reason (1997) introduced the concept of “organizational accident” and he 
argues that without a positive safety culture, it will be difficult to prevent 
organizational accidents if this culture is not present. Obadia (2011, p. 16) 
argues that ‘‘safety culture shall not be seen as a part of the organizational 
culture, but rather that an organizational culture has safety as a perceived, 
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effectively shared and prevailing value.” This suggests that the 
organization’s safety culture is formed by peoples’ perceptions of the value 
of safety in the work environment (Heese, 2012). Hence, safety culture is 
influenced by the overall organizational culture reflecting national, vocational, 
and other subcultures, and vice versa. In line with these results, studies 
(Heese, 2012; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2011; Gerede, 2015a,b; Ioannou et 
al., 2017) have found that the effectiveness of the organization’s SMS 
depends upon the strength and maturity of the organization’s safety culture. 
This study suggests that the safety culture of the organization influences the 
data collection of the organization (see Figure 5). Poor and unsuccessful 
reporting will result into a lower quality of data which influences the results of 
the organization’s performance measurement. The output of any data 
analysis is limited to the quality of its data sets (Wilke et al., 2014). 
Unsuccessful reporting is likely to hamper hazard and risk analysis, risk 
mitigation controls, safety performance measurement, monitoring over time, 
finding the root causes of factors compromising safety, predicting the future 
and thus managing change.  
Overall, the study findings suggest that top management’s behavior and 
attitudes influence culture. Organizational culture, predicts just culture, 
resistance to change, and safety culture. The presence of a just culture, 
resistance to change and safety culture within an organizational culture, 
ultimately influences the data collection process of the organization. 
Reporting means providing the data that is required for the SMS to function. 
Lack of reporting may result directly or indirectly from a poor just culture and 
may also hinder the development of a mature safety culture as it influences 
the organizational learning and flexible culture. Unsuccessful reporting is 
likely to impede hazard and risk analysis, risk mitigation measures, 
understanding the effects of risk mitigation, measurement of safety 
performance, monitoring safety over time, finding the root causes of factors 
compromising safety, predicting the future and taking measures for the 
management of change (Gerede, 2015b).  
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6.11 Conclusions 
This study attempts to identify the factors that impede the collection of data 
to be used for the development of SPIs by the aviation service providers. 
The results suggest that data collection, which is required for the 
development of the SPIs are dependent upon the amount and the quality of 
the safety data collected and can be influenced by a number of factors. The 
findings highlight different areas that organizations should change to achieve 
more successful and accurate safety performance measurement and hence 
enhance the effectiveness of their SMS.  
There are obvious benefits having an SMS is place but the problems 
impeding the performance of the SMS need to be diagnosed accurately so 
the best can be brought out of the SMS. The results of this study provide 
support for the theoretical model that was developed in the previous work. 
The influence of the top management, just culture, culture, safety culture, 
resistance to change and data collection were demonstrated. The framework 
developed in this research is recommended to be used for the assessment 
of organizations’ SMSs as these components may be the underlying factors 
hindering performance. The results of this study highlight the mechanisms by 
which changes in an organization wishing to improve the performance of 










Chapter 7  
7. General discussion and conclusions 
7.1 General discussion 
Accidents such as that at Dryden (see Chapter 2) indicate that the human 
causes of major accidents are distributed widely within an organization as a 
whole and may be present for several years prior to the event. The Swiss 
Cheese model (Reason, 1990) traces the development of an accident 
sequence from organizational and managerial decisions, to various 
conditions in the workplace and on to personal and situational factors 
leading to errors and violations.  
Researchers and practitioners for some years have been concerned with 
specifying the organizational preconditions that will enhance safe 
performance and risk handling in complex and hazardous situations 
(Pidgeon, 1997). In order to reduce the accident rate, new approaches on 
the part of all participants in the aviation industry, including ICAO, nation 
states, aircraft manufacturers and operators will be required.  In particular, 
emphasis on pro-active, risk analysis-based approaches recognizing that the 
human element in the aviation system is of paramount importance to 
accident prevention initiatives and aviation safety are required (ICAO, 
2003:67). Safety management systems (SMS) are expected to significantly 
improve aviation safety (Gerede, 2015b).  The objective of this PhD was to 
identify the factors that impede organizations from obtaining the data to be 
used for the development of their SPIs which are required for measuring and 
monitoring the safety performance of their SMSs in aviation service 
providers. The findings from this research are based upon Mediterranean 
aviation service providers. Nevertheless, the factors impeding the 
effectiveness of the SMS, either individually or in combination, may be 
present in aviation organizations in other parts of the world. What may be 
different in the other parts of the world might be the magnitude of these 
factors either taken individually or in combination. 
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7.2 Dryden accident and Safety Management today 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2, suggested that in accidents 
such as that at Dryden, had the required effective and adequate resources, 
regulations, procedures, training and policies been in place on March 10, 
1989 it is possible, and indeed likely, that the event sequence of events 
resulting in the accident would have been interrupted. Moshansky states in 
the findings of the accident report that the Air Ontario accident was 
preventable and should not have occurred. 
Had the required effective and adequate resources, regulations, procedures, 
training and policies identified throughout this Inquiry, been in place on 
March 10,1989, it is possible and indeed likely that the event sequence that 
resulted in the accident would have been interrupted.  
Moshansky, p1138 
Some of the findings in the report relevant to safety management included: 
 A lack of understanding existed within the aviation industry in general, 
and within Air Ontario in particular, with respect to both safety and 
accident prevention management with a resultant lack of Air Ontario 
management’s attention and commitment to these important areas 
prior to the Dryden accident. 
 Air Ontario’s efforts in the area of safety management in the critical 
months of the company’s restructuring prior to the accident received 
little or no priority and can be best described as cosmetic. 
Moshansky in the final report of Air Ontario (p1135) explains that he was 
convinced that whatever flight safety organization might have existed, it had 
little if any management support and was largely ineffective. The chief pilot 
also resigned a month later, citing lack of support by Air Ontario 
Management. The findings from this research suggested that management 
support is extremely important for the effectiveness of an SMS. The Air 
Ontario’s informal culture, similar to the “family effect” identified in this 
research, combined with the operational management of Air Ontario, 
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demonstrated a tendency to follow non-standard operational practices. 
Organizational background and experiences working together, combined 
with the lack of standard operating procedures reduced the effectiveness of 
the employees working together. 
7.3 Recommendations for safety management based on the findings: 
Some of the recommendations after the accident changed the way safety 
management was viewed and contributed to today’s improved safety 
management. 
Although IATA issued a policy since 1989, requiring member airlines to 
appoint a safety manager and perform the safety management functions 
Moshansky went further and observed that these safety related activities 
were not only relevant to air carrier management, but also to the 
management of the regulatory bodies responsible for aviation safety. In line 
with the IATA requirement, regulatory authorities need to implement an SSP, 
for the regulation, guidance and oversight of service providers and 
responsible for the overall state safety. 
Aviation service providers as well as regulators should know which factors 
influence the effectiveness of their SMS. As Moshansky suggested, 
regulatory bodies responsible for aviation safety need to recognize that 
certain regulations that are developed from a North American and Western 
European country might be challenging for implementation by small 
countries and smaller aviation service providers. This study to address the 
challenges small Mediterranean countries are facing with the effectiveness 
of their SMS. The following discussion summarizes the findings of the 
research. 
In the preliminary study (see Chapter 4), safety managers from aviation 
organizations participated in an interview. Using grounded theory, their 
interview comments were analyzed to identify the factors hindering the 
performance of their SMS. The hindering factors were categorized and 
integrated into a model.  Several features of the model were consistent with 
the findings of Gerede (2015a), who also showed how the success of the 
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safety management systems could be impeded. Gerede (2015a) identified 
the failure of the reporting system, acceptable and unacceptable behavior 
not being distinguished, fear of punishment, and hazards that remain hidden 
as the main factors contributing to the success or failure of an SMS. The 
model developed in this initial study suggested that top management, 
culture, and data collection processes were significant factors that could 
either individually or in combination influence the success of the SMS by 
impeding the development of appropriate practices. 
Based on the findings of the preliminary study and using these factors as 
themes for interview questions, safety managers and safety officers from 
aviation service providers were asked to participate in a further interview 
study to uncover what they perceived as hindering factors in their SMSs. 
Using a thematic analysis, the second study further described the factors 
that hindered the production of the safety data required for the development 
of SPIs in aviation service providers. This study identified the main factors 
that hindered the safety data production to be used for the development of 
the SPIs and also described the underlying factors or subcategories deriving 
from these main factors (see Chapter 5). The results indicated that there 
were several challenges affecting the effectiveness of the SMS and hence 
the performance of the SMS as measured by the SPIs. The qualitative 
analysis explored the most significant performance challenges, comprising 
top management’s attitude towards safety, safety culture and challenges 
relating to the reporting systems and reporting processes.  The most 
significant challenge derived was from a poor positive safety culture as there 
was a link between this and all the other important factors. 
The third study used the theoretical framework (see Chapters 4 and 5) 
developed in the previous studies to develop a questionnaire that employees 
from aviation service providers were asked to complete. The quantitative 
data obtained from a survey described the perceptions of aviation 
organization employees and supported the earlier findings of the previous 
studies. This study used a CFA and a path analysis model (see Chapter 6) 
that described how top management, culture, just culture, resistance to 
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change, and safety culture impacted on the safety data collection upon 
which organizations relied to develop their SPIs. Overall, the findings of the 
model suggested that top management influenced the culture of the 
organization and the presence of just culture, resistance to change and 
safety culture influenced the data collection of an organization.  
The ultimate objective of the study was to identify the factors providing for 
safety data collection, which are required for the development of SPIs. The 
study suggested that poor and unsuccessful reporting will result into a lower 
quality of data which influences the results.  All the SMSs depend upon the 
amount and the quality of the safety data collected. The findings of this study 
support the findings of Wilke et al. (2014) who suggested that the output of 
any data analysis is limited to the quality of its data sets. Important prior 
research (Gerede 2015b) suggested that unsuccessful reporting is likely to 
hamper hazard and risk analysis, risk mitigation controls, safety performance 
measurement, monitoring over time, finding the root causes of factors 














 The research identifies that safety data required for the development of the 
SPIs and the performance of SMSs in aviation service providers is hindered 
by a number of factors. The research also further supports other work in 
aviation organizations (Gerede, 2015a, b) who also showed how the 
effectives of the SMS could be impeded. Gerede’s study (2015a) was 
performed during a two-day workshop using nominal groups and 
brainstorming to identify the problems with the implementation of the SMS. 
This current study extends the work of Gerede and also attempts to acquire 
deeper knowledge by performing, a three-hour interview with each 
participant for a better understanding of the factors impeding the 
effectiveness of their SMS. 
While the results of this research suggest that there are challenges with the 
effectiveness of the SMS and these challenges might influence the quality 
and quantity of data used for the SPIs, there are a number of limitations in its 
method acknowledged by the researchers. Primarily, this research applies 
principally to small Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, this does not 
suggest that the findings of this research might not be applicable in other 
parts of the world. Furthermore, as a result of the nature of the research 
question, which addressed attempting to identify the challenges and 
problems people were facing with the implementation of their SMS, in some 
cases, the interview questions may have induced some potential bias in the 
way that they were phrased.   
It is suggested that future studies can explore the factors that also contribute 
to the effectiveness of the SMS. The survey study could also have included 
a larger number of participants to enhance the generalizability of the results. 
It is also suggested that in the future the models of the study can be 
presented to the participants for validation. 
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8.2 Research contribution 
Although different manuals are published by aviation organizations to comply 
with Annex 19 and assist regulatory authorities in the monitoring of aviation 
safety in their country, these manuals are considered to be guidance 
material. Nevertheless, the ICAO SMS approach assumes a Western (North 
American/ Western European) perspective and assumes that the 
organizations implementing the SMS requirements are also relatively large 
with the necessary resources. As a result, the subsequent strategies for 
preventing the underlying causes of accidents, such as an SMS, might seem 
reasonable and easily implemented to deliver the intended results.  
However, these strategies might in fact present problems for smaller 
countries in the rest of the world. This study suggested that the 
Mediterranean countries with a different national culture, have difficulties 
implementing the SMS requirements as developed using a more Western 
approach. As observed by Moshansky and included in his findings, it is 
increasingly important that regulators understand the effects of national 
culture on attitudes and behaviour when designing programs in one country 
which are required to be implemented in other countries. This research fills 
the gap between regulatory requirements and reality, identifying the 
problems such organizations are facing while attempting to meet 
international regulatory requirements. What is more, Westerners developing 
SMS requirements may not be aware of such a problem that certain nations 
are facing with the implementation of their SMS. 
This study suggests that safety culture is a very important component for the 
effectiveness of the SMS and that the lack of a safety culture may influence 
other contributory factors, thus affecting the performance of the SMS. The 
benefits of a positive safety culture in aviation organizations are 
considerable, drawing emphasis on observations that the lack or poor safety 
culture increases the difficulty of aviation organizations in establishing an 
effective SMS. 
The study also fills in the gap between the assumed and the actual 
performance of the SMS. It suggests that data collection, which is required 
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for the development of the SPIs and determines their quality, can be 
influenced by a number of factors. When a number of factors or a 
combination of these factors are present in aviation organizations, these 
influence the quality and quantity of the data used to develop their SPIs. 
Poor quality data may result into the organization relying on safety data that 
are misleading. 
The thesis has identified factors that can impede the successful performance 
of an SMS. Furthermore, it has identified the relationship between reality and 
the performance of the SMS. Although the SMS is a regulatory requirement 
and aviation organizations are required to undertake safety activities based 
upon the data derived from their SMS, this study has found that because of a 
number of factors the underlying SMSs can be less-than-optimal. There are 
obvious benefits of having an SMS is place but the problems impeding 
performance of the SMS need to be diagnosed accurately to bring out the 
best from it. 
8.3 Suggested further research 
Given the observation that there are different areas organizations should 
change to achieve more successful and accurate safety performance 
measurement and enhance their SMS, it might therefore be prudent to 
expand the work by attempting to identify other possible factors impeding the 
performance of the SMS. The current study’s contribution suggested that 
certain national cultural characteristics affect the implementation of SMS in 
aviation service providers. For future research, it is recommended to build on 
the current research and investigate the effects of National culture on the 
implementation of SMSs. 
It is also equally recommended researching the factors that can enhance the 
effectiveness of SMS in aviation service providers. 
The framework developed in this research is recommended to be used for 
the assessment of an organization’s SMS as these components may be the 
underlying factors hindering performance. The results of this study highlight 
the mechanisms by which changes in an organization wishing to improve the 
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performance of their SMS will take effect. A further development may be to 
investigate whether organizations that have implemented changes in the 
factors and underlying factors actually improve their safety performance. The 
factors and underlying factors suggested in this study may be used by 
organizations to implement changes and improve around these areas of 
potential concern. It would be beneficial to research how these factors can 
be used to suggest new safety management practices to be adopted by 
aviation organizations and assess whether these changes improve their 
performance. Since the use of SMSs and safety performance measurement 
is used in other industries, research can be undertaken to investigate and 
compare the safety management practices used in other industrial socio-
technical systems such as nuclear, oil and gas. The research may 
investigate the ways these industries are measuring their performance and 
how can these practices be applied in aviation organizations, so the aviation 
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions of the preliminary study 
Biographical 
1. How many people are in the safety department? 
2. Can you tell me what is your job description? 
3. Is the person responsible for the SMS, responsible for other things? If 
yes, how much time do you spend for other responsibilities and how 
much time do you spend for the safety responsibilities? 
Safety 
1. In what ways does the Safety Policy influence your daily work? 
2. Is the Safety Policy understood by all employees? How do you know? 
3. Do you understand the contents of the SMS? Can you provide any 
examples? 
4. How do you think management’s commitment to safety can affect the 
safety of an organization? 
5. How does management promote the Safety Policy and the SMS? 
SMS 
1. Who is the responsible person for the SMS? 
2. What processes and procedures do you have in place for data 
collection? 
3. How do you communicate safety issues? 
4. How does the SMS affect you daily work? 
5. How does the SMS affect your operations? 
6. Has there been a change in safety? Eg the rate of incidents and 
events or any other measure, since the implementation of the SMS? 
7. Who performs risks assessments? 
8. How effectively are these risks assessments performed? 
9. What sort of training in safety and SMS do you provide to new 
employees? 
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10. How often do you provide recurrent training for the existing 
employees? 
11. How are the employees trained in identifying hazards? 
12. How are employees communicating safety issues to supervisors? 
How often is this performed? 
SPIs 
1. How are hazards identified and prioritized? 
2. what do you do with the collected data? How is it analysed, shared 
and used to take action? 
3. Does the reporting system give a clear picture of the most important 
risks in your work and does it help you manage them effectively? 
4. Do you know to whom to report? 
5. Do you take remedial actions for all hazards? 
6. How do you prioritize remedial actions? 
7. Do you have a “lessons learnt” process?  
Outcomes 
1. How do you monitor remedial and follow up on actions taken? 
2. Can you provide an example of an action taken and the outcome of 
the remedial action taken? 
3. What is your data collection approach? 
4. How often do you collect data? 
5. Do you consider the SPIs in isolation or in combination with other 
indicators? 
6. Do you think SPIs give you an opportunity for learning? Can you give 
me an example? 
7. Do you think SPIs give you an opportunity to adjust your SMS? Can 





Interview questionnaire/qualitative study 
Safety management systems 
1. What do you think about SMS?  
2. Is it working? 
3. Do you see any problems with SMS? What problems are you facing 
as an organization working with the SMS? 
4. Could it have been implemented in a better way? 
 
Top management safety commitment and involvement and safety 
knowledge 
1. How does management adopt a positive safety culture? How do they 
do this? Can you give an example? 
2. How is management involved in the safety process? 
3. Do you think management understands the risks? 
 
Top management and just culture 
1. Do you think the management encourages reporting? How do they 
encourage reporting, can you give an example? 




1. How would you describe the culture of the organization? Safety 
culture? (Components of safety culture-Reason) 
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Culture/resistance to change 
1. Is the organization willing to change towards the adoption of a positive 
safety culture? 
2. Do you try different ways to change current habits? 
3. How do you change different habits? Can you give an example? 
 
Data collection 
1. How do you use the collected data? 
2. Do you think the reporting system gives you a clear picture of all the 
hazards? 
3. Were there cases where hazards were not captured through the 
reporting system but you discovered them by chance? 
 
Culture/ data collection 
1. Do you encourage your employees to report? How? 
2. Do you think employees report their errors, hazards or any safety 
concerns or they are a bit reluctant? 
3. Do you think because of the organizations culture, there are hazards 









Interview questions Number of positive 
quotes for each 
question 
Number of neutral 
quotes, neither 
positive or negative 
Number of 
negative quotes 
for each question 
Safety management systems    
What do you think about SMS? 5 18   
Is it working? 6  17  
Do you see any problems with SMS? What problems are 
you facing as an organization working with the SMS? 
 12 (seeing problems) 
11 
Could it have been implemented in a better way? 10 13  
Top management safety commitment and involvement 
and safety knowledge 
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How does management adopt a positive safety culture? 
How do they do this? Can you give an example? 
12 4 7 
How is management involved in the safety process? 11 6 6 
Do you think management understands the risks? 9 9 5 
Top management and just culture    
Do you think the management encourages reporting? How 
do they encourage reporting, can you give an example? 
12 3 8 
What are the actions the management takes to change the 
culture of the organization? 
10 6 7 
Culture    
How would you describe the culture of the organization? 
Safety culture? (Components of safety culture-Reason) 
5 11 7 
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Culture/resistance to change    
Is the organization willing to change towards the adoption 
of a positive safety culture? 
6 11 6 
Do you try different ways to change current habits? 11 5 7 
How do you change different habits? Can you give an 
example? 
14 4 5 
Data collection    
How do you use the collected data? 12 10  1 
Do you think the reporting system gives you a clear picture 
of all the hazards? 
2 11 10 
Were there cases where hazards were not captured 
through the reporting system but you discovered them by 
 10 Not reported 




Culture/ data collection    
Do you encourage your employees to report? How? 15 8  
Do you think employees report their errors, hazards or any 
safety concerns or they are a bit reluctant? 
3 9 11 
Do you think because of the organizations culture, there 
are hazards that remain hidden? 
 
No hazards remaining 
hidden 
2 







Management contributes a lot in preventing accidents. 
Management is committed to safety. 
Management always encourages employees to inform them about any 
worries regarding safety issues. 
Management encourages safety improvement proposals. 
Management is concerned about safety. 
Management goes around the facility to see if any safety issues arise. 
Safety is given high priority by the management. 
Management always takes corrective actions when they find out about 
unsafe practices. 
Management attends safety meetings. 
Management encourages reporting. 
Management takes actions to change the culture of the organization. 
Management creates a just culture. (A just culture is a an atmosphere of 
trust, in which people are encouraged (even rewarded) for providing 
essential safety related information, but in which is also clear about where 
the line must be drawn between acceptable behaviour 
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Management pays attention to what employees say. 
When near misses/accidents are reported, management acts quickly to 
solve the problems. 
Supervisors and managers try to enforce working according to the 
procedures. 
Management encourages employees to attend safety training programs. 
Safety training given to me is adequate to enable me to assess hazards. 
Safety issues are given priority in training. 
I don’t understand what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
There is the fear that we will get punished. 
Employees are rewarded for reporting safety hazards (thanked, recognition 
in letters). 
People are blamed when they make an error. 
I don’t trust other people in the organization. 
Management encourages reporting. 
Management takes actions to change the culture of the organization. 
Management creates a just culture. (A just culture is a an atmosphere of 
trust, in which people are encouraged (even rewarded) for providing 
essential safety related information, but in which is also clear about where 
the line must be drawn between acceptable behaviour. 
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Management pays attention to what employees say. 
When near misses/accidents are reported, management acts quickly to 
solve the problems. 
Supervisors and managers try to enforce working according to the 
procedures. 
Management encourages employees to attend safety training programs. 
Safety training given to me is adequate to enable me to assess hazards. 
Safety issues are given priority in training. 
I don’t understand what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
There is the fear that we will get punished. 
Employees are rewarded for reporting safety hazards (thanked, recognition 
in letters). 
People are blamed when they make an error. 
I don’t trust other people in the organization. 
In the organization we follow rules and procedures to avoid accidents. 
There is an open door policy for safety issues. 
There are sufficient opportunities to discuss and deal with safety issues in 
safety meetings. 
We have safety meetings where employees participate. 
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Employees are encouraged to share safety concerns. 
Safety inspections are carried out regularly. 
The safety procedures in the organization are useful and effective. 
Employees do not sincerely participate in identifying hazards. 
Lessons learnt are shared with the whole organization so they will be 
avoided next time. 
The organization uses information derived from the reporting system for 
organizational learning. 
We have an open communication and distribution of safety information. 
We wait for accidents to happen before we take action. 
I know how to identify hazards. 
Safety culture makes a significant contribution to the high levels of safety 
performance. 
Those who manage and operate the system have a knowledge about the 
human, technical, organizational factors that determine the safety of the 
system as a whole.(Informed culture, Reason,1997) 
There is a culture in which people are prepared to report their errors and 
near-misses (Reporting culture, Reason,1997) 
The organization has a culture in which is able to reconfigure in case of 
high tempo operations or certain kinds of danger-often shifting from the 
conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter mode (Flexible culture, Reason) 
The organization demonstrates the willingness to draw the right 
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conclusions from the safety information system and is willing to implement 
major reforms (Learning Culture, Reason 1997) 
The organization has an atmosphere of trust, in which people are 
encouraged (even rewarded) for providing essential safety related 
information, but in which is also clear about where the line must be drawn 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Jus 
The organization has a flexible adaptation to change. 
Efforts to persuade staff regarding changes are sufficient. 
The organization is willing to change towards the adoption of a positive 
safety culture. 
The organization changes easily bad habits . 
The organization motivates people for improvement. 
My organization has a hazard reporting system where employees can report 
hazards before these become into accidents 
We have an open reporting of all observed hazards and mistakes. 
The organization provides me with feedback concerning the report I 
submitted in the reporting system. 
The reporting system of the organization is practicable/easy to use. 
I am afraid that someone can identify me through the reporting system. 
The management encourages us to report hazards/safety concerns in the 
reporting system. 
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There is a non punitive culture in the organization. 
There is a no blame culture in the organization. 
My organization has a hazard reporting system where employees can report 
hazards before these become into accidents 
We have an open reporting of all observed hazards and mistakes. 
The organization provides me with feedback concerning the report I 
submitted in the reporting system. 
The reporting system of the organization is practicable/easy to use. 
I am afraid that someone can identify me through the reporting system. 
The management encourages us to report hazards/safety concerns in the 
reporting system. 
There is a non punitive culture in the organization. 
There is a no blame culture in the organization. 
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Appendix E 
Table showing the Means and Standard deviations of the questionnaire 
items 
 Mean  Std. Deviation N 
Management 
contributes a lot 
in preventing 
accidents. 




















2.20 .914 90 
Management is 
concerned about 




goes around the 
facility to see if 
any safety issues 
arise. 
2.66 1.029 90 
Safety is given 
high priority by 
the management. 





they find out 
about unsafe 
practices. 








1.63 .800 90 
Management 
takes actions to 
change the 
culture of the 
organization. 
2.77 1.017 90 
 234 
Management 
creates a just 
culture. (A just 
culture is a an 
atmosphere of 








in which is also 
clear about 
where the line 




2.69 1.158 90 
Management 
pays attention to 
what employees 
say. 





acts quickly to 
solve the 
problems. 
1.99 .954 90 
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Supervisors and 
managers try to 
enforce working 
according to the 
procedures. 







2.47 1.124 90 
Safety training 
given to me is 
adequate to 
enable me to 
assess hazards. 
2.16 .935 90 
Safety issues are 
given priority in 
training. 







3.93 1.159 90 
There is the fear 
that we will get 
punished. 









3.56 1.191 90 
People are 
blamed when 
they make an 
error. 
2.78 1.234 90 
I don’t trust other 
people in the 
organization. 




1.63 .800 90 
Management 
takes actions to 
change the 
culture of the 
organization. 
2.77 1.017 90 
Management 
creates a just 
culture. (A just 
culture is a an 
atmosphere of 
trust, in which 









in which is also 
clear about 
where the line 






pays attention to 
what employees 
say. 





acts quickly to 
solve the 
problems. 
1.99 .954 90 
Supervisors and 
managers try to 
enforce working 
according to the 









2.47 1.124 90 
Safety training 
given to me is 
adequate to 
enable me to 
assess hazards. 
2.16 .935 90 
Safety issues are 
given priority in 
training. 







3.93 1.159 90 
There is the fear 
that we will get 
punished. 












they make an 
error. 
2.78 1.234 90 
I don’t trust other 
people in the 
organization. 
3.21 1.086 90 
In the 
organization we 
follow rules and 
procedures to 
avoid accidents. 
1.53 .565 90 
There is an open 
door policy for 
safety issues. 




discuss and deal 
with safety 
issues in safety 
meetings. 
2.87 1.153 90 
We have safety 
meetings where 
employees 
















are useful and 
effective. 






3.13 .939 90 
Lessons learnt 
are shared with 
the whole 
organization so 
they will be 
avoided next 
time. 
2.79 1.166 90 
The organization 
uses information 
2.44 1.103 90 
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2.62 1.128 90 
We wait for 
accidents to 
happen before 
we take action. 
3.39 1.260 90 
I know how to 
identify hazards. 





the high levels of 
safety 
performance. 




system have a 
knowledge about 
the human, 






safety of the 




There is a culture 
in which people 







2.41 1.048 90 
The organization 
has a culture in 
which is able to 
reconfigure in 
case of high 
tempo 
operations or 
certain kinds of 
danger-often 
shifting from the 
conventional 
hierarchical 
mode to a flatter 







to draw the right 
conclusions 
from the safety 
information 



















in which is also 
clear about 
where the line 
must be drawn 







has a flexible 
adaptation to 
change. 






2.86 1.045 90 
The organization 
is willing to 
change towards 
the adoption of a 
positive safety 
culture. 
2.53 1.083 90 
The organization 
changes easily 
bad habits . 




2.91 1.278 90 
My organization 
has a hazard 
reporting system 








We have an open 




2.14 1.087 90 
The organization 




submitted in the 
reporting 
system. 
2.62 1.205 90 
The reporting 




2.21 1.000 90 









encourages us to 
report 
hazards/safety 
concerns in the 
reporting 
system. 
2.11 .905 90 




2.86 1.167 90 
There is a no 
blame culture in 
the organization. 
3.10 1.237 90 
My organization 








1.86 .943 90 
We have an open 
reporting of all 
observed 
hazards and 








submitted in the 
reporting 
system. 
2.62 1.205 90 
The reporting 




2.21 1.000 90 






2.86 1.354 90 
The management 
encourages us to 
report 
hazards/safety 
concerns in the 
reporting 
system. 
2.11 .905 90 
There is a non 
punitive culture 




There is a no 
blame culture in 
the organization. 
3.10 1.237 90 
 
 
Table showing the scale statistics means and standard deviations 
 




18.69 37.610 6.133 9 
Just culture 36.83 39.242 6.264 14 
Just culture 
(management) 
20.51 35.713 5.976 9 
Just culture 
(employees) 
16.32 12.625 3.553 5 
Culture  34.88 59.771 7.731 14 
Safety culture 12.92 17.691 4.206 5 
Resistance to 
change 
14.29 22.477 4.741 5 
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10.92 5.308 2.304 4 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
